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Summary
This thesis provides a critical examination of John Rawls’s political philosophy 
as it relates to international justice and human rights, Rawls’s theory of justice 
as fairness has made an enormous impact on contemporary political and ethical 
theory, yet it has been criticized by some for failing to address the extra-domestic 
aspects of social justice, including universal human rights. In Chapter One I 
describe the theoryof.rights, developed in the social contract tradition and how 
this theory has influenced the modern discourse of human rights. In Chapter Two 
I discuss Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness, the basic rights and liberties, and 
the idea of political liberalism. In Chapter Three 1 analyze Rawls’s account of 
international justice and argue that it fails to uphold the same rigorous principles 
of justice as found in his account of domestic justice. Finally, in Chapter Four 
l discuss Rawls’s more recent attempts to theorize international justice and 
human rights, I conclude that Rawls is not justified in limiting the set of human 
rights available to persons in different societies, and that this limitation is an 
unnecessary feature of his theory of justice. In contrast 1 argue for a more 
cosmopolitan system of social justice that is strongly normative and grounded in 
Rawlsian ideal theory,
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Preface
The media assaults us with horror stories daily , . , How 
should we think about these events? What should we do 
about them? What is the relationship between these two 
questions? In particular, what is the relationship between 
the theory of human rights and the practice of international 
human rights law? We are troubled not solely by injustice, 
but also by theoretical scruples ab> ut the universality of any 
given view of justice and human rights as a basis for 
intervention. The relationship between the theory and 
practice ofhuman rights is problematic.1
This thesis is intended to contribute to Lhe ongoing philosophical debate on 
international justice and human rights by exploring to w hat extent John Rawls’s 
theory of justice can account For both. I base this project on the view that human 
rights discourse is best situated w'ithin the broader context of theories of social 
justice. This is because human rights theory depends in important ways on the 
terms or principles of social justice, which delineate the conditions of a well- 
ordered society necessary for the recognition and implementation of claims to 
human rights. Since conceptions of justice are not all created equally, it is my 
belief that a theory of justice which pays no regard to human rights is not an 
acceptable theory of justice. With this in mind, then, I examine Rawls’s most 
important writings in order to assess how adequately his theory of justice does 
or is able to accommodate universal human rights.
Rawls’s major statement on justice came in his influential A Theory of 
Justice. There Rawls identifies one’s right to the most equal extensive liberty 
compatible with a similar liberty for others as the first of his principles ofjustice 
as fairness. Rawls establishes his principles by suggesting a scenario in which 
individuals representing several generations are to be abstracted from time and 
space and required to choose principles for an actual society, into which they 
would eventually be returned, which they could all agree to support as the most 
just possible. However, Rawls restricts his inquiry to single societies ordy, 
effectively neglecting the problem ofjustice internationally or globally.
In light of this omission in his work, it is not surprising that Rawls’s 
theory has received criticism from those concerned with the international aspects 
of social justice, and in particular with universal human rights. In several of his 
publications following A Theory of Justice. Rawls has attempted to respond to 
these criticisms and explain how he understands justice as fairness to extend into 
the global domain and, most recently, its relationship to human rights theory and 
practice. It is this particularpointof debate surrounding Rawls’s work thatforms 
the focus of this study.
i shall proceed as follows. In the first chapter I survey the primary ethical 
and political concerns of the social contract tradition and discuss the influence 
of this tradition on the development of modern human rights discourse. I also 
discuss some of the current issues confronting human rights theory, in particular 
those of social pluralism and globalization. With this as background, I then offer 
a comprehensive examination of Rawls’s theory ofjustice as fairness in the 
second chapter. Here I address the role of rights in Rawls’s theory and the 
transformation of this theory in his later writings,
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In Chapter Three I specify more precisely Rawls’s account of international 
justice. I show that Rawls’s account fails to sustain the critical and creative 
energy of his domestic conception of justice, mainly because he gives priority to 
the domestic conception and restricts the principles ofjustice at the international 
level. In response, I argue that Rawls’s theory should be reformulated such that 
the global original position is no longer subordinated to the domestic.
In the fourth chapter 1 offer an analysis of Rawls’s most recent effort to 
globally extend justice as fairness in his essay “The Law of Peoples.” I conclude 
that, although Rawls now attempts to justify the inclusion of universal human 
rights in his theory, he fails to overcome the same deficiencies that marked his 
earlier account of international justice. In the end, Rawls sacrifices the normative 
strength of his theory ofjustice as fairness in favor of a status quo description of 
international affairs, thereby weakening his attempt to account for human rights,
I argue that an effective system of universal human rights would require a more 
cosmopolitan system of social justice than is offered in Rawls’s own theory of 
international justice.
Perhaps the most enjoyable part of writing a doctoral thesis is having the 
opportunity to thank those who played a constructive role in its completion. First 
and foremost, I wish to thank my supervisor Paul Voice. He was a source not 
only of intellectual stimulation, but also of much needed guidance and 
encouragement. I would also like to thank Ron Slye for his useful and much 
appreciated comments on the issues considered in this thesis. Finally, I wish to 
thank my wife Katherine for her constant love and support; I could never have 
finished this thesis without her,
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Chapter One
Contractarianism, Rights, and the Modern Discourse of Human Rights
In this fust part of this chapter, 1 begin by surveying the basic ethical and 
political concerns of classical social contract theory. I then turn to a 
consideration of the relation between contract theory and the theory of rights, in 
particular of natural rights, which has informed the development of modern 
human rights discourse. It is not my intention to provide a detailed description 
and analysis of the various contractarian-rights approaches. Rather, I want to 
indicate how these approaches generally account for social order and political 
legitimacy, and how they conceive of the fundamental rights of individuals in 
society. In the second part of this chapter, I discuss the emergence of the 
modern theory of human rights and some of the conceptual and practical 
problems currently facing this theory, keeping in view the role of the 
contractarian-rights tradition.
A survey of the contractarian-rights tradition provides a useful 
introduction to this thesis for three reasons: First, because this thesis seeks to 
examine Rawls’s theory of justice as regards the cogency of both the 
contractarian argument and the theory of universal human rights, the reader will 
benefit from an understanding of the philosophical principles and reasoning
1
offered in support of the contractarian-rights tradition. Second, many of the basic 
components of the contractarian-rights tradition are presupposed in the arguments 
examined more fully in later parts of this thesis and thus a certain amount of 
background information is necessary. Third, Rawls’s contractarian theory differs 
in a number of ways from earlier, as well as contemporary, social contract 
theories, as does his employment of (human) rights.2 The background material 
on the contractarian-rights tiadition will, I hope, provide the preliminary 
spadework which helps to define the set of principles Rawls advances for his 
theory ofjustice and its concomitant theory of rights, as well as the arguments 
he gives in favor of those principles.
LI Normative Theorizing and the Social Contract Tradition
A brief discussion of the main divisions of ethical theory is necessary if the 
contractarian-rights tradition in general, and the Rawlsian version in particular, 
are to be adequately related to the issues of social justice and human rights. It is 
typically understood that ethical theories differ fundamentally over the relations 
they specify between the two most central ethical notions, the right and the good, 
as well as the way they characterize those notions. Two generalizations may be 
made about the many theories making up the social contract tradition. First, the 
contractarian theory of right is deontological in nature, Second, the theory of 
good one finds in the tradition is generally a choice theory of some kind. I will 
briefly explain both of these features in the discussion that follows.
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Ethical theory is divided into two branches. The first, normative ethics, 
may be characterized as the study of the aims and principles of conduct and 
choice. The two central questions of normative ethics are: (1) What is 
intrinsically good? and (2) What is the right thing to do? Theories which answer 
the first question are called theories of value while theories dealing with the 
second question may be called theories of right.
The second branch of ethics, metaethics, involves theorizing about the 
theories belonging to the first branch of ethics. The two central questions of 
metaethics are: (1) What is the meaning, use, and logical status of the ethical 
terms which appear in normative theories? (2) Upon what grounds and by what 
methods, if any. are normative theories to be justified?
Theories belonging to the first branch of ethics are often called first-order 
theories and the melaethical theories about those first-order theories are termed 
second-order theories,3 This distinction between first-order and second-order 
theories is evident in Rawls’s complete theory ofjustice, for instance, in terms 
of the first-order principles of social justice which Rawls advances and the 
second-order arguments he gives in support of those first-order principles.
A bit more must be said about the subject of normative ethics. Value 
theory, as noted above, attempts to answer the question: What is intrinsically 
good? Value theories may be divided into four categories:
(1) Hedonistic theories identify pleasure as the only intrinsic good.
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(2) Eudaemonistic theories characterize the intrinsic good as a state of 
well-being or flourishing which is considered to be more than merely a 
sum of pleasures,
(3) Ideal theories characterize the intrinsic good in terms of values other 
than either pleasure or well-being. Examples of such other values include 
love, beauty, knowledge, and community.
(4) Choice theories characterize the good as either the satisfaction of 
desire or as the satisfaction of rational desire.
The second division of normative ethics, the theory of right, as noted 
previously, provides an answer to the question: What is the right thing to do? 
Three very different kinds of theories have been proposed in response:
(1) Teleological theories characterize the good independently of the right 
and then characterize the right as a function of the good. For a 
teleological theory, the right act to perform (or, in some theories, the right 
rule to follow) is that which maximizes the amount of intrinsic good in the 
consequences. Of eourse, a theory specifying what counts as intrinsically 
good is required if a teleological theory is to be useful. Teleological 
theories are sometimes called “consequentialist” because they require that 
actions or rules be judged solely by the amount of good contained in the 
consequences.
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(2) Axiological theories specify a definition of intrinsic value and then 
define the right in terms of a non-consequentialist relationship to intrinsic 
value.
(3) Deontological theories characterize the right independently of the 
good and so base the rightness of acts or rules on criteria other than solely 
the intrinsic good contained in the consequences. Deontological theories 
are thus non-consequentialist because they hold that actions or rules are 
to be judged on the basis of non-consequentialist criteria. Examples of 
such criteria include rights, duties, consent, principles that apply 
independently of consequences, certain features possessed by certain kinds 
of actions, and God’s will,
Deontological theories are often called right-based theories, for the deontic 
concepts of right and ought are fundamental and other ethical concepts are 
defined in terms of them. For instance, the right, in such a theory, is prior to the 
good. Principles of right are derived independently of principles of good (or 
value) and serve as “side constraints” on the pursuit of the good,4 (Side 
constraints specify kinds of actions one may never perform no matter what goal 
one alms at.) Thus, something does not count as good unless it is consistent with 
the right.
Teleological and axiological theories may both be called value-based 
theories, for in both types of theory, the category of the good becomes the 
category of overriding moral importance. Value is theoretically fundamental and
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the deontic concepts are defined in terms of, or by reference to it. Teleological 
theories are sometimes called goal-based theories, for the right is subordinated 
to the good and defined in terms of the maximization of the amount of good in 
consequences.5
A complete theory of right must cover two different but related ethical 
categories, namely, obligation and duties. These may be partly distinguished as 
follows/ An obligation is a moral requirement that is (a) generated by the 
performance of a voluntary act or omission and is (b) owed by a specific person 
to a specific person or persons. There are two kinds of duty, (1) A natural duty 
is a moral requirement that (a) is not generated by the performance of an act but, 
rather, is binding upon all moral agents independently of any action; and (b) is 
not owed to any specific person but, rather, is owed to all moral agents. (2) An 
institutional duty is a duty which is (a) defined in terms of a particular office or 
other institutional position, and which is (b) binding only upon the individual 
occupying the particular office or position.
Now, most of the historically significant contract theories give a central 
place to the problem of political authority, a problem basic to any theory of right. 
That problem may be expressed as the question: What reasons, if  any, justify the 
authority of the state? In other words, why ought one to obey the commands of 
the state? Some social contract theories provide, in addition to a theory of 
political obligation, a theory of social justice and some go on to provide an 
account of the rights, duties, and obligations of individuals, as well.
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Although it encompasses a rich variety of theories, the social contract 
tradition is built upon the idea of conceiving the state as the result of an 
agreement or contract among the members of society. Through such a contract, 
the members of society give their consent to the authority of the state. This 
expression of consent is held to generate bonds of political obligation. A theory 
of socialjustice and a theory of the rights and duties of individuals may similarly 
be based upon a form of agreement or contract in which consent has been given 
by the members of society. Contract theories derive a structure of obligations 
and duties—a theory' of right—and this structure is erected upon some form of 
personal consent.
As a criterion of right, consent is non-consequentialist in nature. The fact 
that an individual consented, or perhaps would consent under certain conditions, 
is a criterion which obtains independently of (future) consequences. Thus, since 
contract theories typically base the right on some kind of consent, contract 
theories typically provide deontological theories of right.
Social contract theories differ over the nature of the contract or act which 
establishes the structure of right. On some accounts, the contract is a historical 
reality that was made and ought to be adhered to. On other accounts, the contract 
is an ideal construct that either ought to have been made, ought to be made, or 
perhaps ought to serve as a guide or ideal to aim at. On still other accounts, the 
contract is one which is only tacitly made, or the contract is a hypothetical entity 
only and is used to specify what persons would consent to under certain 
conditions, Each type of contract theory, historical, ideal, and hypothetical, has
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made its own method of arguing from the contract or expression of consent to a 
structure of right.
It is also possible to distinguish between versions of the contract which 
involve a permanent, non-revocable pact and versions which involve a renewable, 
revocable trust. Another set of distinctions concerns the actors involved. For 
some theories, the contract is between individuals only while for others it is 
between agents of individuals. For other theories, the contract is between 
individuals and the state while for others it is only between the state and 
individuals meeting certain qualifications. Thus, some contract theories are 
democratic while others are non-democratic.
There is a sense in which social contract theories are both reductionist and 
individualistic. Contract theories generally fit into the following schema. A 
question of justification at a national or institutional level (e.g., is the state’s 
doing such and such justified?) is reduced to a question of justification at a 
“lower” level, one which involves only considerations about individuals (e.g., has 
each individual consented to the state’s having such and such powers?). This 
reduction is generally accomplished using two elements. The first element is a 
normative theory and the second is an appeal to certain facts. The normative 
theory typically establishes some sort of natural moral status, a status which is 
possessed by each moral agent independently of political or institutional 
considerations. This natural status is usually specified in terms of rights (natural 
rights), duties, and obligations which are in turn based upon some characteristic 
or set of characteristics possessed by all moral agents independently of political
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or social status, The facts appealed to will be either historical or hypothetical 
considerations concerning the origin, development, and operation of the state as 
well as (perhaps) the institutions of rights, duties, and obligations.
The natural moral status specified in the normative theory is typically 
established by employing a description of the state of nature, a state in which 
individuals exist without the institution of government. An account of the state 
of nature can be employed in a number of ways.7 By theorizing about the state 
of nature, questions can be asked about the moral status of the person considered 
independently of institutional and political facts. This might lead to the 
development of a natural basis for various rights, duties, and obligations. That 
is, one might discover a way to derive rights, duties, and obligations from some 
characteristic or set of characteristics possessed by all moral agents and 
possessed independently of institutional and political facts.9
By specifying what life was like or perhaps would be like without the 
institution of government, an account of the state of nature allows us to compare 
the state of nature with civil society. This comparison may be used to justify the 
existence of the state. There are three types of justification here. First, one 
might argue that civil society is superior to the best non-state situation we could 
reasonably hope for. Second, one could argue that the state would necessarily 
arise from any non-state situation by a series of steps involving no morally 
impermissible acts. Third, one might show that the state would be an 
improvement if  it arose.9
9
Theorizing about the state of nature might also be used to provide a 
fundamental explanation of the political realm, one which explains the political 
in terms of non-political elements. This might involve explaining why civil 
society developed out of the state of nature, or it might involve constructing a 
model of the process by which civil society comes into being. As Robert Nozick 
observes (1974: 6), therearetwo alternatives to such reductive explanations. One 
might argue that the political realm arises from the non-political but is not 
reducible to it. Or, one might hold that the political realm is completely 
autonomous, neither arising from nor explainable in terms of, the non-political. 
However, social contract theories tend to reduce questions of justification 
and explanation from a soeictai level to an individual level, and they typically 
employ a normative theory in conjunction with an appeal to certain facts. This 
reduction can be accomplished in a variety of distinctive ways each making use 
oTsome form of contract, and we may categorize the various theories in terms of 
the contractual clement employed. The first three categories delineated below are 
historical, while the fourth and fifth categories may be called ideal (in that the 
theory is not historical in some sense):
(1) “ Express consent” theories appeal to an actual contract in which 
individuals have expressed their consent to certain institutions or 
arrangements.
(2) “Tacit consent” theories appeal to the terms of a tacitly-made contract 
in which individuals tacitly give their consent to certain institutions.
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(Tacit consent is consent implied by action rather than consciously 
intended.)
(3) Mixed theories appeal to both tacit and express consent.
(4) “Perfect consent” theories describe an act of consent that constitutes 
a model to be aimed at, an act that ought to be made or a contract that 
ought to be adhered to. Perfect consent is not hypothetical in nature.
(5) “Hypothetical consent” theories appeal to an act of consent that would 
be given if certain specified conditions obtained. For example, consent 
that would be expressed given full rationality and a knowledge of all the 
available facts qualifies as hypothetical consent.
Brief examples of some representative contract theories illustrate that 
these distinctions have real applications, One of the very first versions of the 
social contract theory appears in Plato’s Crito,10 There Socrates states a 
historical, pure tacit consent theory which may be summarized as follows. If any 
person chooses to live in a particular city or colony when he could live elsewhere, 
then that person has—in virtue of the act of residency—agreed to obey the laws of 
the state; that person has tacitly given his consent to the authority of the state. 
Socrates’ theory is incomplete, but it surely belongs to the social contract 
tradition.
A historical, express consent theory is given in Plato’s Republic when 
Glaucon suggests that; “Men decide they would be better off if they made a
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compact neither to do wrong nor to suffer it. Hence they begin to make laws and 
covenants with each other.”15
One of the first contract theories to appear in the modern period, and the 
first popularization of the theory, is that of Richard Hooker (1925). Hooker's 
theory is an example of a historical, pure express consent theory in which 
political obligation is grounded in a permanent, non-revocable contract. The 
contract, supposedly made at an early stage of society, is binding on all 
subsequent generations, Hooker’s theory encountered vigorous opposition. 
Among the criticisms of his theory, several stand out as especially challenging. 
How can an agreement that is made by one group of persons obligate another 
group ofpersons?12 How can weknow the terms of the original agreement? And 
what evidence do we have that such an original agreement was ever formed?
It is with the work of Hobbes that classical contractarianism, and the 
theory of natural rights, is bom. Hobbes (1962) postulates a state of nature 
characterized by the “war of everyone against everyone.” Only by setting up an 
artificial condition of shared power, that is, the state, can human beings secure 
peace. Hobbes constructs a historical, mixed consent contract theory in which 
individuals transfer all authority to a supreme power, the state, on terms that 
make the state’s power nearly unrestricted. The state’s power is not totally 
unrestricted, however, for on Hobbes’s account some elements of natural right 
constrain the power of the state after the contract is established.
Hobbes defines the “right of nature” as “the liberty each man hath, to use 
his own power, as he will himself, for the preservation of his own nature” (1962:
12
103), This is the fundamental liberty that each individual possesses in the 
absence of political authority. The problem, however, is that in the state of 
nature one’s natural right amounts to doing whatever one wants. Thus, “unless 
the natural right of every man to every thing" is defined and regulated by 
enforceable law, nobody is obligated to respect the natural rights of others: 
“RIGHT, consisteth in liberty to do, or to forbear; whereas LAW, determineth, 
and bindith to one of them" (1962: 103), It is the transfer of natural rights to a 
sovereign authority that is the basis of political obligation. Each individual must 
act or refrain from acting as If he were a party to an agreement to obey that 
authority. On Hobbes’s view, the contract originates in an original act of express 
consent and it is then tacitly renewed by each subsequent generation.
However, the authority established by the contract is restricted when it 
comes to certain natural rights that Hobbes regards as inalienable:
[T]here be some rights, which no man can be understood by any 
words, or other signs, to have abandoned, or transferred. As first 
a man cannot lay down the right of resisting them, that assault him 
by force, to take away his life. . . . The same may be said of 
wounds, and chains, and imprisonment.. .. And lastly the motive, 
and end for which this renouncing, and transferring of right is 
introduced, is nothing else but the security of a man’s person, in 
his life, and in the means of so preserving life, as not to be weary 
of it, (1962: 105)
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For Hobbes, the foundation that limits the power of the state is provided 
by the natural rights of individuals which precede the state. Specifically, the 
existence of the rights to life and to all things which are indispensable to the 
preservation of life, ground the limits of sovereign authority. The primary 
weakness of Hobbes’s theory of natural rights, however, is his focus on the self­
preserving character of those rights, In other words, while Hobbes is concerned 
to show in his account of the state of nature that humans have natural rights 
which, at least in part, cannot be fully surrendered to political authority, these 
rights consist in one’s liberty to do or forbear to do whatever is necessary for the 
preservation of one’s own life. Hobbes does not adequately account for the 
possibility of an obligation to equally preserve the rights of others.
The classical social contract and natural rights theory born with Hobbes 
is brought into a more mature age with the work of Locke. Locke’s philosophy 
often differs sharply from Hobbes’s, and plays an important role in the 
development not only of contractarianism but also of ideas about human rights 
and the state’s duty to respect them.
Locke’s description of the state of nature is significant in that he asserts 
that the fundamental law of nature is not simply that of self-preservation, but 
rather preservation of the life of others as well as oneself (1986: 9-10). It is for 
the purpose of securing life and ensuring the equality betw een and freedom of 
persons that a contract engendering civil society is agreed upon. According to 
Locke, “The chief and great end, therefore, of men uniting into a commonwealth,
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and putting themselves under government, is the preservation of their property” 
(1986: 70), In this context, however, Locke uses the term “property” not only in 
the narrow sense of external possessions; rather, he says it must be understood 
to mean “that property which men have in their persons as well as goods,” 
namely, “life, liberty, and estate” (1986; 49). With this statement Locke 
establishes the well-known idea that the individual possesses the natural rights 
to life, liberty, and property.
The primary function of the state—the protection of the natural rights of 
individuals—is thus conferred by the consent of those who enter into the social 
contract. Yet this function is not conferred absolutely or irrevocably; it is 
established instead as a trust for the public good. The only way that humans can 
divest themselves of their natural rights is by mutual consent to a social contract 
that would ensure not only the comfort and safety of all members, but most 
importantly the equality and liberty of all:
[Political power is that power which every man having in the state 
of Nature has given up into the hands of the society, and therein to 
the governors whom the society hath set over itself, with this 
express or tacit trust, that it shall be employed for their good and 
the preservation of their property, (1986: 94-95)
The contract that Locke derives from the state of nature gives the state far 
less power than does the contract derived by Hobbes. In Locke’s theory, only one
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contract is made* namely the social contract proper. This contract empowers the 
majority to erect a government with the state as a trustee, the people as trustor. 
Such a relationship places all of the rights on the side of the people and all of the 
duties on the side of the government. In Locke’s view, natural rights are 
inviolable in the state of nature but are enforceable only in a civil society that 
recognizes and acts to protect such rights through the mechanism of the social 
contract.
Locke’s contract theory is, then, an example of a historical, mixed theory. 
After sketching a theory of natural rights which serves to establish a natural 
moral status possessed by each individual, Locke bases the legitimacy of the state 
upon two premises. First, all societies originate in contracts expressly made by 
the original members. Second, this original contract is tacitly renewed by each 
member of succeeding generations. Each person~~by either his residency in 
society, ownership of property, or acceptance of the benefits of society--implies 
by his actions a tacit acceptance of the contract, However, if a government 
exceeds the legitimate limits of the authority conferred to it, it can be dismissed 
for a breach of its trust, and replaced by another. A government exceeds its 
authority when it unjustly encroaches upon or fails to preserve the natural rights 
and liberties of the people,
Another important member of the social contract tradition is Rousseau, 
Rousseau (1994) develops a tacit consent theory according to which, when a 
number of individuals voluntarily unite behind a political power, each, by his 
actions tacitly gives his entire self, and rights, up to the group. A corporate being
16
is thus formed which possesses a general will and which is called the state. The 
general will aims at the good of all.
For Rousseau, the social contract functions as the fundamental principle 
underlying the political association whereby the social becomes an embodiment 
of the personal. The contract is a mechanism for harmonizing the liberty of 
individuals with the legitimate freedom of others, insofar as natural liberty is 
exchanged for civil liberty. By the terms of the contract, each person relates to 
all others as constituent yet equal parts of an “indivisible whole,” under the 
direction of the general will:
“Find a form of association that defends and protects the person 
and goods of each associate with all the common force, and by 
means of which each one, uniting with all, nevertheless obeys only 
himself and remains as free as before.” This is the fundamental 
problem which is solved by the social contract. . . . The clauses of 
this contract . . . come down to a single one, namely, the total 
alienation of each associate, with all his rights, to the whole 
community. (1994: 138)
The social contract gives the political association its characteristic 
“existence and life,” namely, the intertwining of the individual good with the 
common good. Clearly, Rousseau differs from Locke in relegating the rights of 
the individual to a collective general will. In other words, the equal natural rights
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of persons are ultimately grounded in the general will of society, such that these 
rights are conceived by Rousseau as being properly legitimated in the acts of 
political association by which society is formed. Rousseau’s version of the social 
contract contrasts with the individualism of Locke’s version, inasmuch as it 
favors a social conception of rights based on a contract intended to protect not 
only individual liberty but also social equality and political justice.
Rawls has developed his own theory of justice under the explicit 
inspiration of the contractarian tradition. In A Theory ofjustice. he describes the 
idea ofjustice as fairness formulated therein as a theory “that generalizes and 
carries to a higher level of abstraction the traditional conception of the social 
contract" (1971: 3). In his major work, Rawls identifies one’s right to the most 
equal extensive liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others as the first of 
his principles of justice. The first principle, the liberty principle, is to be 
secured, whenever possible, prior to the implementation of the second principle, 
the difference principle.
Rawls establishes his principles by suggesting a social..coatract scenario 
in which individuals representing several generations are to be abstracted from 
time and space and required to choose principles for an actual society, into which 
they would eventually be returned, which they could all agree to support as the 
most just possible. This “original position” would allow these individuals 
knowledge of general facts about the world, but not of the specific place they 
would be occupying, a restriction Rawls calls the “veil of ignorance.” Particular 
conceptions of the good are thus disallowed in the original position and the
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parties to the contract “do not know what final aims persons have” (1971: 563). 
Rawls stipulates that this is so because, first, the only relevant aspect of the self 
in considerations ofjustice (in the original position) is “moral personality” and, 
second, allowing knowledge of substantive standards of the good would 
compromise the priority of liberty (1971: 327-28), From this presumably 
impartial situation Rawls sets out a contemporary version of contract theory, 
since the occupants of the original position would use the principles they have 
agreed upon as guides for constructing actual socio-political institutions. In this 
manner Rawls offers a unique attempt to conceptualize the problem of social 
justice and support the priority of the right over the good.
Thus far, we have examined contractarian theories of right. As for the 
other branch of normative ethics, value theory, contract theorists have generally 
devoted relatively less space to the elaboration of a theory of the good. This 
point can be ascribed to the recognition that, in increasingly diversified societies, 
what is most important ethically and politically for contractarians such as Rawls 
is to reach agreement on general principles of right which will publicly regulate 
each person’s pursuit of his or her own conception of the good.
As I mentioned above, contract theories have generally held choice 
theories of the good. What this means is that each person is to choose his or her 
own conception of the good and devise his or her own pursuit of that good. For 
contract theory, however, this pursuit must take a path which does not violate the 
public principles of right. In other words, people should be free to pursue their
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own ends within a general framework of rules that is neutral toward these ends 
yet that nevertheless enforces the right.
According to some contract views, then, the good is the object of rational^ 
choice. This is a ehoice that meets certain rationality norms. An example of such 
a rational choice theory of the good is that of Rawds. Briefly stated, Rawls views 
people as sharing a minimal rational capacity for making moral choices and for 
taking responsibility for their lives, defined in terms of two aspects of moral 
personality: the capacity for a conception of the good, and the capacity for a 
sense ofjustice (1971: 560-67). Consequently, he holds that people are moral 
agents capable of adopting, pursuing, and changing their own beliefs about what 
constitutes a morally good life for them (which is not to say that all such 
conceptions of the good are equally valuable), while the legal and political 
institutions of the state enforce right actions as between individuals. These 
issues will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter.
In sum, then, wre have seen that the contractarian tradition developed a 
deontological conception of right which harmonized with differing conceptions 
of the good. The right was to take precedence over the good insofar as the 
principles of right were seen as side constraints on the pursuit of the good,11 This 
in turn has led to a strong emphasis on the fundamental rights of individuals 
within the sphere of social justice.
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1.2 Contractarianism and the Theory and Practice of Human Rights
The philosophical and political dialogue on human rights has been greatly 
influenced by the natural rights tradition associated with classical and modern 
contractarianism. Although the natural rights perspective has often been 
criticized by various competing theories, it is nevertheless generally regarded as 
the primary precursor of contemporary human rights doctrine and remains an 
important concept in philosophy, politics, and law.14 In the aftermath of World 
War II, natural rights theory became central to the renewed attempt to protect 
humanity from the atrocities promulgated by unrestrained political machinations 
and iniquitous laws divorced from critical ethical and moral foundations.
As u c have seen, to some degree the classical social contract theorists all 
share a desire to protect the subjective interests and rights, of..mtUvidiial persons- 
Th cir view is that the various rights naturally possessed by persons are
irrevocable elements essential to a scheme of social justice. In other words, if all 
individuals equally possess certain fundamental rights, then the consensual moral 
and political framework of the social contract is concerned to protect those rights, 
as justice demands. Thus, the contractarian scheme of social cooperation in the 
pursuit of justice rests, to a great extent, on the view that there are certain 
fundamental rights which are basic features of a just social order. Such rights are 
properly called “human” rights because they prescribe a minimum definition of 
what it means to be human in society.’5
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The influence of the idea of natural rights is evident in the contemporary 
human rights doctrine. For instance, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR) begins by stating; “Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of 
the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the 
foundation of freedom, justice, and peace in the world.. . Article l ofthe same 
document asserts; “All humans are born free and equal in dignity and rights. 
They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another 
in a spirit of b r o t h e r h o o d , A s  employed in contract theory, natural rights 
embody aspects of both negative freedoms, i.e., freedom from government 
intervention in the quest for human dignity, and positive freedoms, i.e., rights to 
just governmental intervention in the quest for human dignity. Negative 
freedoms roughly correspond to the civil and political rights that are often 
referred to as "first generation" human rights, while positive freedoms belong to 
the “second generation" of economic, social, and cultural rights.17 From the 
survey given thus far, it is possible to identify four basic concepts from the 
contractarian-rights tradition which have informed the modern idea of human 
rights, as expressed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;
(1) The equality, dignity, and worth of each individual (Article 1),
(2) The right of liberty to pursue the quest for human dignity against the 
abuse of political authority (Articles 2-21).
(3) The right to basic necessities in order to ensure an existence worthy 
of human equality and dignity (Articles 22-27).
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(4) The obligations and responsibilities of individuals, states, and the
international order to ensure these rights for all (Articles 28-30),
These basic conceptual and normative points have been formalized in a 
number of conventions and declarations in the International Bill of Human 
Rights, The International Bill of Human Rights consists of the human rights 
provisions of the United Nations Charter of 1945, The Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights of 1948, and the two Covenants of 1966 on Civil and Political 
Rights, and on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. In the Covenants, which 
are treaties that legislate what the Universal Declaration has declared, states 
undertake to respect and ensure the following rights: to life and personal integrity 
and security; to freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading 
treatment or punishment; to freedom from coercion, slavery, and forced labor; to 
due process of law' and to a humane and working penal system; to freedom to 
travel within and outside one’s country; to freedom of thought, conscience, 
religion, expression, assembly, and association; and to take part in the conduct 
of government and public affairs (including the right to vote and be elected). The 
dominant themes are equality (equal treatment, equal protection of the law% 
equality of opportunity) and non-discrimination on the bases of race, color, sex, 
language, religion, opinion, origin, birth and status. In connection with non­
discrimination, members of minorities within states are granted the rights, in 
community with other members of their group, to enjoy their culture, practice
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their religion, and use their language (in addition, to be sure, to the rest of the 
rights in the Covenants).
In the Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights states are to 
take steps “individually and through international assistance and cooperation . .
. to the maximum of their available resources , . . with a view to achieving 
progressively full realization . . .  by all means, including legislative measures” 
toward the fulfillment of the following rights: to work; to just anu favorable 
conditions of work, including leisure; to join trade unions and to strike; to social 
security; to social protection of the family, mothers, and children; to an adequate 
standard of living, including adequate food, clothing, housing, medical care, 
social services, especially in the events of unemployment, sickness, disability, 
old age, or any other lack of livelihood beyond one's control; to standards of 
physical and mental health; to education and training; and to take part in the 
cultural life of the community and benefit from any scientific progress therein. 
Again, the themes of equality and non-discrimination are dominant in this 
Covenant. Together with non-discrimination, the right of all peoples to self­
determination is the most important common provision appearing in both 
Covenants.
Human rights standards are said to be international and universal. Human 
rights are also said to be “inherent” or “inviolable” entitlements; in other words, 
they are supposed to work as normative trumps, having priority when in conflict 
with other norms, values, or goals. They are viewed as interdependent, and 
protective of a range of interrelated and equally important categories or
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generations of goods. And finally, they are said to imply advantages for 
individuals and groups, as well as obligations on an individual’s society and any 
other pertinent actor anywhere in the world (Lindholm, 1992: 394). I will briefly 
discuss the first two features of human rights standards below.
To say that human rights are international is to say that human rights are 
a matter of international concern (and of international standards), as is any other 
matter under international law, and are no longer only a matter of individual 
states’ domestic jurisdiction. By adhering to the Charter, which is a treaty, states 
recognize the internationalization of rights. Virtually all states are parties to the 
UN Charter; either because the Universal Declaration is considered an 
authoritative interpretation of the rights provisions of the Charter (because 
whenever individual governments, the UN, or any other organization invoked 
human rights or condemned their violation, they appealed to the standards of the 
Declaration as the authoritative definition of human rights necessary to fulfill the 
Charter’s obligations to respect human rights, and they did so with a sense of 
obligation), or it is considered customary law since it is claimed in principle that 
all governments must now ensure the enjoyment of all the rights of the 
Declaration, irrespective of whether they are parties to any other formal 
agreements. To put it another way, the universality of obligation and recognition 
on Lhe part of every state and the universality of the applicability of standards in 
their integrity to every human being is presumed both in the law and in the theory 
of human rights.
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As for the character and purpose of the International Bill, legal theorists 
tell us that they aspire not only to help establish the legal, political, and economic 
climates in which individual freedom and equal dignity can flourish, but also to 
help protect the individual against governmental excesses everywhere. After 
World War II, it was argued that national protections for rights were deficient and 
that additional, international protection was necessary. It was believed that some 
of the monstrous violations of rights carried out during the war period might have 
been prevented had an international system of protection been in place. Still, 
most theorists add, the current human rights discourse sees human rights as rights 
to be enjoyed under the constitutional-legal system of domestic society. To 
induce states to rearrange their constitutional-legal systems in order to achieve 
that result an international law of human rights was promulgated. The aim ofthis 
law is the universal acceptance of the whole range of rights and the substantive, 
universal enjoyment of normative standards in their integrity.18 When there are 
differences between national and international standards, the latter are supposed 
to supplement national rights.
Of course, the internationalization of rights standards, the universality of 
(state) obligation and recognition, and the universality of the applicability of the 
full range of rights are all theoretically and practically contested. Much has been 
written about the need to develop the International Bill so that it is capable of 
attracting popular support and vindication. Some authors point out that there is 
a certain theoretical conception of human rights in the International Bill capable 
of guiding social practices for their realization, although it is maintained that that
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conception is still underelaborated. According to Louis Henkin, in 1948 the 
following points were proclaimed and accepted, and since then have been 
repeated as articles of faith:
(1) That there are fundamental human rights, rights of individuals, of all 
and equally, though no single, specific theory of the (aimed at) relation of 
the individual to her community (or for that matter, of the individual to 
the world community at large) is advanced, other than what is implied in 
the concept of rights itself.
(2) That human rights derive from the inherent and equal dignity of the 
human person. Even though, says Henkin, this does not necessarily 
assume that rights antecede society, it seems to forbid the claim that 
human rights or other instruments merely legislate rights. Still, there is 
no single, specific theory on how the needs and rights of such human 
dignity are exactly determined.
(3) That human rights have become necessary given World War II and 
prospective world circumstances. Yet beyond references to the Hitler and 
Hiroshima disasters, no clarification of those world “circumstances” is 
adduced.19
(4) That human rights are the foundation or the cornerstone of freedom, 
justice, and peace in the world, although there is no theory specifying 
what conception of freedom or justice is supposed to be reflected in the
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list of human rights, or how human rights delimit such conceptions and 
guarantee peace.
(5) That human rights help create conditions (or, rather, are among the 
conditions) of well-being and stability, necessary for peaceful and friendly 
relations among peoples, even though there is no theory on how rights are 
to do so.
What one can read, both in the Charter and the Declaration, is that there 
cannot be peace without recognition of human rights and the conditions of 
justice, and that there cannot be a full realization of human rights without new 
types ofsociut-domcsiic and international orders. However, these practical ideals 
have been largely dissociated from significant treatment in moral and political 
philosophy.
Moreover, it is recognized today that one of the most important problems 
in the human rights field (encompassing both theory and practice) is how to 
implement and make enforceable the human rights of the International Bill in a 
world of differing cultures. Theorists disagree in their solutions to, and even in 
the statement of, this problem. They disagree as to the nature of the obstacles 
and hindrances to the implementation and enforcement of rights, such as whether 
those obstacles are mostly domestic or extra-domestic; whether they hinge on 
normative differences or are structural or procedural; and whether they are due 
to the behaviors of populations and majorities or to the behaviors of governments 
and governmental actors, Some theorists might not deny the relevance of the
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diversity among cultures of considered convictions about what political justice 
or human rights require; they might object, though, to the practical or moral 
priority this diversity is granted. At issue here as well are different 
understandings of the primacy and autonomy of the state within the inter-state 
system and perhaps, more specifically, of the current relevance of the domestic 
political community within the globalized framework. Also at issue are different 
understandings of the relation of the state to the community and of the notion of 
political community itself. Ultimately, the converging dynamics of globalization 
and pluralization bring culture and tradition to the foreground of current debate 
concerning international human rights. But what culture and what tradition? In 
what way does cultural pluralism matter to the theory of human rights?
When we reflect upon human rights abuses carried out in various countries 
around the world, we are characteristically torn between two potentially 
contradictory ethical concerns. On the one hand, we have strong, deep-seated 
intuitions that certain behavior, carried out by nations other than our own is, 
nevertheless, morally reprehensible. In juxtaposition is our simultaneous 
recognition of the value of cultural diversity, coupled with an acknowledgment 
of a dismal history of colonialism and unfounded moral condescension. The 
tension between these two sentiments has resulted in the contemporary dispute 
regarding the moral foundation and nature of international human rights. 
Largely, the discussion is carried out between cultural relativists, who contend 
that an individual’s human rights are exclusively determined by his or her 
culture’s traditions and contingent norms, and universalists, who insists that
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despite a wide diversity of cultures, every human being qua person possesses 
certain inalienable rights universally held against a state or culture.
Cultural relativism, generally, is the thesis that “culture is the sole source 
of the validity of a moral right or rule” (Donnelly, 1984: 400), It is a political, 
often philosophical, conviction which results from a great variety of sources, 
some anthropological, others skeptical. Relativism is, in no small part, a 
backlash against 18th and 19th century notions of rationality and enlightenment. 
While there has always been a current of moral relativism throughout the history 
of Western philosophy, it had not attained its contemporary stature of acceptance 
until well into the twentieth century and the two world wars. The apparent 
senselessness of the world wars, coupled with their unprecedented levels of 
human loss and social destruction, irreparably broke much of the West's historical 
confidence in its moral and social superiority. Philosophers in both the analytic 
and continental schools became increasingly skeptical of traditional moral and 
religious thought, and enlightenment notions of universal reason. At the same 
time, an increase in Western interaction with Foreign nations and cultures resulted 
in a greater skepticism toward the applicability and international relevance of 
supposedly European ethical norms.
Against this background, cultural relativism has entered into the debates 
concerning international human rights in a diversity of forms. There are, in the 
first place, anthropological observations that, as a matter of fact, the different 
cultures of the world have radically different ethical norms. What reason, some 
claim, might we appeal to for the belief that our moral systems are better than
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those of other nations or cultures? Other relativists concede the possibility of 
universal morality, but believe it is epistemically impossible to determine what 
rights or duties such a moral system would entail. Lacking any potential 
knowledge, we should, and in fact must, content ourselves with whatever rights 
are provided in the context of our particular culture. Finally, there are several 
radical relativists who, perhaps paradoxically, argue that the very notion of 
human rights is inescapably immoral, in that the imposition of human rights is 
destructive of non-Western cultures.20
Thus cultural relativists believe, in varying extents, that culture forms the 
only legitimate basis for assessing the validity of any code of conduct (Donnelly, 
1984: 400-401), Hence, whether an individual can exercise any particular right 
will ultimately depend upon whether, and to what extent, the protection of that 
right will conflict with that individual’s native culture. In response, human rights 
proponents typically assert that irrespective of culture, international norms are 
either universal imperatives derived from the status of being human or rules of 
conduct explicitly consented to (Donnelly, 1984: 404-405), A universalist might 
argue, for example, that while it is clearly true that culture and upbringing 
determine, in varying degrees, our self-conception and societal roles there 
remains, regardless of cultural input, certain inalienable features common to all 
human beings, ranging from the ability to experience pain to the capacity to 
rationally form conceptions of the good (although the conceptions themselves 
vary). So when a universalist claims of an individual that she has a human right, 
he might mean that “She ought to be treated in such-and-such a manner” because
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all human beings have certain common interests or moral powers that can be 
violated regardless of the culture in question, A universalist also might argue 
that the attitude of the cultural relativist, though perhaps motivated by a well- 
intentioned tolerance of cultural differences, is naively romantic, stereotypical, 
and ultimately discriminatory. It degrades the intelligence of “non-Western” 
people and refuses them a place in the international community (Howard 1993: 
329 ff.). Finally, a universalist can counter that although one can in principle 
agree that respect and tolerance towards different manners of organizing social 
life are sound goals, in practice, the catchword of “difference” is often 
appropriated by state elites against their own populations, Thomas Nagel makes 
this last argument when he calls for the need to resist the “cynical appeals to 
cultural relativism with which authoritarian regimes defend the cruelties they use 
to stay in power" (1995: 84),
I agree with NagcFs position and, without entering into an extended 
discussion of this debate, I believe that cultural relativism is ethically and 
politically more problematic than useful/'  Social and cultural pluralism is, of 
course, an issue to be addressed by any suitable contemporary account of human 
rights, but it is not clear that relativism of the type mentioned above is the only 
possible consequence of trying to frame human rights in wfays congenial to 
diverse cultures and traditions, Rawls speaks, for instance, of the “social bases 
of self-respect” as a primary good of social justice, that is, as a way of showing 
equal respect and consideration toward diverse individuals and their interests. 
Other authors, like Will Kymlicka (1989), have argued that protecting those
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“social bases" might entail the granting of special rights to minority cultures, for 
disadvantage with respect to the primary good of cultural membership affects the 
individual distribution of other benefits and burdens, which is the concern of 
liberal democratic justice,22 In his essay on human rights (1993: 42-43), Rawls 
goes further and speaks of the need to tolerate “other reasonable ways of ordering 
society,” i,e,, other communities “organized by comprehensive doctrines, 
provided their political and social institutions meet certain conditions,” such as 
protecting basic human rights. This approach, he suggests, is very much in 
keeping with liberal democratic ideals.
Furthermore, the moral concern with community and cultural pluralism is 
expressed in the international human rights instruments themselves. The 
International Bill of Rights recognizes a number of human rights that must be 
exercised by individuals as members of different racial, ethnic, and religious 
groups, in the understanding that membership and participation in those groups 
arc essential to a life of dignity. Thus, the right of individuals in community with 
others to practice and observe their religion is an integral part of freedom of 
religion and might forbid, as expressed in the Declaration on the Elimination of 
Intolerance and Discrimination based on Religion or Belief, the establishment of 
measures on the part of the state whose effects are the impairment of that right, 
Of special importance are the cultural rights of minority cultures within 
multinational slates; thus, Article 27 of the Covenant on Civil and Political rights 
ensures the right to members of those cultures in community with others to 
preserve their distinctive language, religion and, ultimately, their “way of life,"
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Because of the range of human rights protected in the major international 
human rights instruments* we might draw the conclusion that the framers of these 
agreements believed that cultural and individual rights are not necessarily at 
odds, The difficulty facing both the relativist and universalist views is that if 
either is taken abstractly the result is the denial of important elements of our 
humanity. The relativist ends up overlooking the value of individuality while the 
universalist ends up ov erlooking the necessarily social nature of every human 
being, [ think it is for these reasons, however, that human rights have best come 
to be defined as those moral rights that every individual possesses as a human 
being, that is, merely by virtue of being human, even though individuals live in 
different cultures (Nickel, 1987: 38). In a clear indication of the influence of the 
contractarian-rights tradition, human rights are further defined as the moral rights 
held by human beings vis-a-vis the state, those “ethical liberties, claims, powers 
and immunities" of the individual which cannot be justly expropriated by any 
political power and which ought to be guaranteed by domestic and international 
law (Wellman, 1978: 53-56).
Human rights, then, are generally understood to mean those fundamental 
rights that human beings mutually recognize and grant one another in order to 
guarantee a life that meets the necessary conditions of dignity, liberty, and 
respect across all cultures. This does not preclude recognizing and respecting the 
diverse interests and values of individuals and groups, yet at the same time it 
means protecting those interests—such as obtaining the means of subsistence 
necessary for a life of dignity, and not being arbitrarily arrested, imprisoned, and
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tortured—that can be reasonably regarded as common to all persons wherever and 
whenever they happen to exist. Human rights have thus been recognized as of 
paramount importance to matters of social justice.
As Rex Martin (1985) has noted, Rawls’s work can be seen as making a 
substantive contribution to the inquiry into an adequate basis for a philosophy of 
rights and, I think, human rights. Seeking to pose an alternative to the utilitarian 
tradition, Rawls offers a contractarian conception of justice as fairness which 
provides that all “social primary goods,” such as rights, liberties, opportunities 
and self-respect, are those things that all rational persons are presumed to want. 
For Rawls, injustice is a result of inequalities of these primary goods, such that 
the respect and human dignity of persons is unjustifiably violated. As I hope to 
demonstrate in the remaining chapters of this thesis, Rawls’s theory of justice 
places on the philosophical and political agenda the realization that philosophy 
can help articulate notions of a just society and, moreover, a just international 
social order in which human rights are regarded as an essential end ofjustice. 
Whether Rawls himself articulates such a clear vision of global justice and human 
rights is the central problem this thesis examines.
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Chapter Two
Rawls on Justice, Basic Rights, and Pluralism
The goal of the preceding chapter was to provide a brief yet coherent survey of 
contractarianism and its normative concerns, with special reference to the central 
place it accords to fundamental individual rights. This survey was then related 
to modern human rights theory and practice in order to highlight the relationship 
that contractarian normative theory has with the concept of human rights.
In this chapter I want to develop the primary features of Rawls’s 
contractarian theory ofjustice in such a way as to bring out the conceptual and 
substantive claims made about rights in that theory. First, I offer a fairly 
straightforward exposition of Rawls’s initial approach to justice and social and 
political organization as presented in his influential A Theory of Justice. I then 
try to elaborate on the emphasis Rawls places on the social primary goods of 
basic rights and liberties, and discuss how Rawls’s views on the basic rights and 
liberties are taken up and modified in his later political conception ofjustice as 
fairness. Finally, I explore the influence of social pluralism on Rawls’s theory 
ofjustice, again with respect to the issue of basic human rights and liberties, and 
respond to some criticisms of Rawls’s theory raised by Michael Sandel.
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2.1 Rawls’s Contractarian Approach to Justice
In the first chapter I noted that the social contract tradition to which Rawls’s 
theory belongs rose to prominence during the Enlightenment and has long served 
as an important inspiration to many liberal theorists concerned with social justice 
and human rights. I also discussed the different categories of contract theories 
in terms of the contractual element employed by each theory, such as the express 
consent and tacit consent theories. Rawls explains in A Theory ofjustice that his 
“aim is to present a conception ofjustice which generalizes and carries to a 
higher level of abstraction the familiar theory of the social contract as found, say, 
in Locke, Rousseau, and Kant" (1971: 11). In this section I present an account 
of Rawls’s hypothetical consent theory ofjustice. I do so for two reasons. First, 
aji least a basic description of the elements Rawls’s theory is needed if we are to 
understand his approach to basic rights. Second, because our discussion of 
international justice and human rights in the following chapters seeks to extend 
Rawls’s initial domestic or national account of justice, it will be useful to first 
work through the initial account itself. Thus, the general analysis offered here 
will be an essential guide our later inquiry.
In place of the original compact postulated by the various contract 
theories, Rawls describes what he calls an initial situation. This is a hypothetical 
choice situation from which the principles of social justice and the principles 
assigning basic rights and duties are to be chosen. Of course, a large number of 
descriptions of such an initial situation might be constructed, each determining
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a choice of principles of social justice, Rawls calls his favored interpretation of 
the initial situation the “original position,” and he provides substantial arguments 
in support of the claim that the original position is the most appropriate 
interpretation of the initial situation.
A general definition of the original position is introduced early on in A 
Theory ofjustice. The original position is a purely hypothetical state of affairs 
in which all the members of a particular society are free, rational, equal, and 
concerned to further their own interests. They are to choose once and for all what 
is to count in their society as just and unjust. Thus, a set of principles must be 
chosen w hich will define the fundamental terms of their association, namely, the 
principles covering the major institutions of society.
The parties in the original position are behind what Rawls calls a “veil of 
ignorance.” Behind the veil of ignorance no person knows his or her social 
position or status. No one knows the particular circumstances of his or her own 
society, such as its economic or political situation, or its level of civilization and 
culture. Furthermore, no one knows to which generation he or she belongs. No 
one knows how he or she fares in the distribution of natural assets. That is, no 
one knows his or her talents, intelligence level, abilities, health, gender, 
appearance, race, or ethnic origin. In addition, nobody knows his or her level of 
income or wealth, career, religion, conception of the good, psychological 
orientation toward risk, the personal characteristics of his or her parents. 
However, the parties know' the general truths of economics, political science, 
anthropology, sociology, and human psychology--presumably in the form in
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which these truths are known in society upon “entry” into the original position 
(1971: 548).
The veil of ignorance provides part of the sense in which all of the parties 
in the original position are equal, for the veil of ignorance removes from 
consideration all personal characteristics which serve to differentiate one person 
from another and it eliminates knowledge of natural and social factors that set 
persons at odds. The result is arguably a “symmetry of everyone's relations to 
each other,” for all are “similarly s£tuated” (l971: 12), The veilofignorance also 
serves to ensure that the choice of principles is impartial or unbiased. Thus, 
nobody is able to tailor principles to favor the particular circumstances of her 
own case.
In Rawis's view, the correct principles of social justice are those that 
would be chosen in such a situation of equality. Rawls calls this way of 
regarding the principles of social justice “justice as fairness,” for the reason that 
the original position exemplifies what is arguably a fair choice situation (1971: 
1 1-12). Thus, “justice as fairness” is the name of the view which conceives the 
correct principles of social justice to be those that would be chosen in a 
hypothetical choice situation having the features of the original position. In this 
way, Rawls defines a procedure for the selection of principles of social justice, 
one which involves discovering the principles that jvould.be chosen by persons 
in the original position.
Rawls takes it as an axiom that justice is the highest standard against 
which the laws and institutions of society may be assessed (1971: 3). That is, a
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law or institution must be altered or abolished if it is unjust, even though it may 
be good or proper according to some other criteria. According to Rawls, a 
society is a relatively self-sufficient association of individuals who generally 
acknowledge certain rules of conduct and generally act in accord with those rules. 
These rules specify a system of cooperation organized to advance the good of 
those involved. Any society involves both a conflict and an identity of interests 
in the following sense: as Hobbes, Locke, and Hume recognized, an identity of 
interests exists because social cooperation makes possible a better life for each 
person in society than they would have outside of society. The conflict of 
interests consists in the fact that people disagree over how the benefits and 
burdens of social cooperation are to be divided. Thus, social life presents us with 
a typical decision theoretic problem; that is, all gain from cooperation, but people 
disagree over the form the cooperation should take.23
The basic structure of society is the complex consisting of major political, 
social, and economic institutions as well as the manner in which these institutions 
assign fundamental rights and duties, shape the division of advantages that arise 
through social cooperation, influence life prospects, and affect the hopes, 
ambitions, and realized abilities of the members of society (1971; 7), RawTs 
holds that the basic structure of society for simply “the basic structure”! is the 
primary subject ofjustice. This means that the most fundamental principles of 
justice are designed to regulate the basic structure. Therefore, these principles 
must cover the assignment of fundamental rights and duties, they must regulate 
the way the advantages of social cooperation are distributed, and they must
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concern themselves with the way the basic structure influences life prospects, 
ambitions, hopes, realized abilities and so forth.
This is a controversial thesis, for many theories ofjustice do not take the 
regulation of the basic structure of society to be of fundamental concern, For 
example, theories of distributive justice often specify, as their most fundamental 
principle, a principle of allocative justice. Such a principle specifies a standard 
for determining a correct distribution of goods and this standard is determined 
independently of the operation of the social process, An allocational principle 
ofjustice typically specifies a property or set of properties of individuals on the 
basis of which the burdens and advantages arising through social cooperation are 
to be distributed. Marx’s dictum, “From each according to his ability, to each 
according to his need" is such a principle. Utilitarianism is also an allocative 
conception of justice for it directs that goods are to be distributed so as to 
maximize the total or average level of satisfaction. Such principles do not apply 
directly to the basic structure and so do not take the basic structure to be of 
primary concern, for (a) they are designed to be grafted onto a functioning basic 
structure from above and the results of the operation of the basic structure are 
treated as raw input into the allocational principle, and (b) this leaves many 
aspects of the basic structure unaffected,
Rawls gives a number of  reasons for his claim that the primary subject of 
justice is the basic structure of society, First, suppose that a society is free and 
social conditions are fair at time T1,24 It is possible that a series of exchanges 
and agreements might be made, each member of which—when viewed alone—
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seems free and fair, and yel the unintended, accumulated result of this series 
might eventually alter institutions and opportunities so that conditions for free 
and fair agreements no longer obtain. For example, a series of agreements—each 
of which seem free and fair when viewed alone—might, together with historical 
and social contingencies, lead to a state in which “fair” equality of opportunity 
no longer exists. This requires some explanation.
In order to understand what Rawls means by “fair” equality of opportunity, 
it is necessary to distinguish “fair” equality of opportunity from “formal” 
equality of opportunity (1971: 83-89). Formal equality exists when no laws 
unequally restrict the opportunities of anyone to acquire wealth, income, or 
powers of office. However, formal equality of opportunity does not concern 
itself with inequalities of life prospects that stem from unequal starting places in 
society. Thus, under a scheme of formal equality of opportunity, if two equally 
motivated and equally talented individuals start from unequal social positions, 
they may well achieve unequal levels of wealth, income or powers of office. 
Consequently, persons wbth equal talents and motivations will not have equal life 
prospects or expectations.
In contrast, fair equality of opportunity exists when persons with equal 
talents, abilities, and motivations have the same life prospects or expectations of 
attaining positions involving certain levels of income, wealth, and powers of 
office—regardless of the social position each is born into (1971: 73), This 
requires certain institutions designed to mitigate the influence of social position 
on individual attainment and thus to equalize life prospects regarding the
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attainment of income, wealth, or the powers of office for individuals with similar 
abilities and motivation. As an example of a situation in which fair equality of 
opportunity fails to obtain, compare the life prospects of two equally talented, 
motivated, and able young persons, one having been born into a poor, illiterate 
black family living in a rural part of the country, and the other having been born 
into a wealthy white family headed by a mother who practices law with a 
prestigious law firm and a father who teaches at a major university. Surely two 
such individuals, similarly talented and motivated, do not have similar life 
prospects.
Consider that such a state of affairs in which fair equality" of opportunity 
no longer exists could develop as the result of a series of agreements and 
exchanges—each of which seems free and fair when viewed alone—together with 
various natural and social contingencies. For instance: some people enter a line 
of w ork and then, due to market forces beyond their control, suffer prolonged 
periods of unemployment during which they lose nearly everything they own. 
Others take up farming and, due to a series of crop failures and early freezes, go 
completely bankrupt. Or, a man is killed in an automobile accident, leaving 
behind a hungry family. Cases such as these can result in large numbers of 
children being raised in poverty and without the encouragement, education, and 
training necessary for getting out of such a situation. It follows, the argument 
continues, that the basic structure generates, in conjunction with natural and 
social contingencies, conditions w'hich can be the source of what seem to be 
significant injustices. Consequently, the basic structure must itself be regulated.
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Rawls’s judgment, that an absence of fair equality of opportunity is an 
injustice, is controversial. Whether such a condition is unjust or not depends 
upon which principles ofjustice are correct. On Nozick’s theory, for example, 
an absence of fair equality of opportunity might be unfortunate or bad but it 
would not necessarily be unjust; the basic principles of justice would not 
necessarily be violated.
It might be thought that rules could be devised to regulate each member 
of Lhe series of agreements and transactions made in society so as to insure that 
free and fair backgroundconditions are maintained but without requiring constant 
attention to background institutions. Rawls replies to this that the consequences 
of acts leading to unfair background conditions are usually unforeseeable either 
because the consequences are so far in the future or because the causal connection 
is so indirect, thus, such rules cannot be formulated since the necessary 
information is not available. According to Rawls, therefore, any theory which 
does not concern itself in a fundamental way with the operation of the basic 
structure will be inadequate as a theory ofjustice, for it will operate at the wrong 
level of generality by failing to cover the most fundamental injustices, namely, 
those generated by the basic structure in conjunction w'ith natural and social 
contingencies.
Rawls (1977: 160) gives another reason for taking the basic structure as 
the primary subject of  justice. The basic structure influences the desires, 
ambitions, hopes, abilities, and talents of individuals. Even if some of these, 
such as talents, have a genetic component, each is still influenced by the basic
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structure since genetically based attributes can be realized and hindered in a 
variety of ways by existing social conditions. Since the basic structure influences 
important aspects of each of us, it ought to be an object of serious concern. Thus, 
any theory which does not deal in a fundamental way with the basic structure 
neglects an important influence in our lives, an influence we would surely hope 
is in accord with the demands ofjustice.
As a third reason, Rawds observes that the basic structure is the most likely 
source of a number of the most significant social and economic inequalities, some 
of which have very pervasive effects throughout society. For instance, these 
inequalities lead to conditions in which some have lesser life prospects than 
others due solely to their social origins, as described above. Since the effects of 
the basic structure are so significant, and since these effects can include what 
seem to be sonic of the deepest injustices (such as a lack of fair equality of 
opportunity), a theory ofjustice ought to concern itself in a fundamental way 
with the basic structure of society.
It should be noted that Rawls distinguishes the terms “concept of justice” 
and “conception of justice” (1971: 5), Suppose someone asks “What is justice?” 
That person might mean, “Which principles, of the many proposed so far, are the 
correct principles ofjustice?” Or, alternatively, “What do we need principles of 
justice for? What role do principles ofjustice play in society?” A conception of 
justice consists of a particular set of principles of social justice. The concept of 
justice is specified “by the role which these different sets of principles, these 
different conceptions, have in common” (1971: 5), This role consists in the
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assignment of fundamental rights and duties and the determination of a “proper 
distribution of the benefits and burdens of social cooperation” (1971: 5). Thus, 
justice provides the most fundamental standard we have for the resolution of the 
various conflicts of interest that go with organized human social life. Various 
conceptions ofjustice ought to be evaluated in terms of how well they fill this 
role,
Rawls divides his theory ofjustice into two parts. The first part to be 
developed is ideal theory (1971: 245). In an ideal theory, one assumes strict 
compliance and then works out the principles ofjustice that would characterize 
a well-ordered society existing under circumstances favorable to the functioning 
of such a society, Strict compliance obtains when everyone acts justly and does 
his part in upholding just institutions. Ideal theory thus gives us an account ol 
what a perfectly just society would be like, it presents a social ideal.
After constructing ideal theory, one completes the theory ofjustice by 
constructing non-ideal theory (1 971: 245-46), tn non-ideal theory, one assumes 
partial compliance and less favorable circumstances. There are two parts to non­
ideal theory. The first part covers the principles for governing adjustments to 
ideal theory that are required because of natural limitations and historical 
contingencies, The second part, called partial compliance theory, consists of 
principles for handling injustices. Here, principles of punishment, civil 
disobedience, revolution, and just war are worked out.
Ideal and non-ideal theory together fit into a complete theory ofjustice in 
the following manner. Ideal theory presents a conception of a perfectly just
46
society against which the existing society is judged. To the extent that the 
existing society diverges from perfect justice, injustice exists. Non-ideal theory 
then comes into play as a guide to the rectifying of injustice. Rawls writes that 
his main concern is with ideal theory. Thus, in the original position, strict 
compliance and favorable conditions are assumed; the principles chosen in the 
original position belong to ideal theory and provide a definition of a perfectly just 
scheme of social cooperation. The point of developing such a theory is to 
provide a guide for social reform, an ideal we can aim at (1971; 245).
As mentioned above, Rawls’s principles require a thorough regulation of 
the entire basic structure of society. However, they do not provide for principles 
of allocative justice. While it is important that Rawls’s principles be 
distinguished from allocational principles ofjustice, I will not explore this issue 
here. I will note, however, that Rawls assumes that the distributive and allocative 
functions of the market system can be separated, as long as market mechanisms 
operate against just background conditions. The market is used to achieve 
allocative efficiency but it is not used as the sole determinant of the distribution 
of income. Rather, distribution is partly determined according to the principles 
of justice. In other words, once the basic structure satisfies the two principles 
and a suitable minimum is provided, the rest of the total income is settled by the 
operation of the price system (1971: 277). Rawls characterizes this situation in 
terms of “pure procedural justice.” He argues that three types of theories of 
justice should be distinguished:
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1 • In perfect procedural justice, there exists an independent criterion for 
what counts as a fair or right outcome, defined prior to and separately 
from the procedure to be followed. Furthermore, it is possible to devise 
a procedure which will guarantee the desired outcome (1971: 85).
2. In imperfect procedural justice, there exists an independent criterion 
for what is to count as a fair or right outcome, defined prior to and 
separately from the procedure to be followed. However, it is not possible 
to devise a procedure which will guarantee the desired outcome (1971: 
85),
3, In pure procedural justice, there is no independent criterion for the 
right result. Instead, there is a correct or fair procedure which is such that 
whatever the outcome that results, it will be right or fair (1971: 86),
As an example ofperfect procedural justice, Rawls mentions a case where 
a number of people must divide a cake between themselves (1971: 85), The 
independent criterion of a fair division is, simply, equal pieces. The procedure 
guaranteed to lead to this, technicalities aside, is to let one person divide the cake 
and get the last piece, the others choosing their pieces first. As an example of 
imperfect procedural justice, Rawls mentions a criminal trial. Although an 
independent standard specifying the correct result obviously exists, no procedure 
is available to guarantee this result (1971: 85). As an example of pure procedural 
justice, Rawls mentions a game consisting of a series of fair gambles. In such a 
case, we have no criterion for the distribution of winnings after the betting has
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taken place. But if all individual bets have been technically fair, then the 
outcome is fair as well (1971: 86).
We can now contrast Rawls’s theory ofjustice with other theories in terms 
of the way the basic structure of society is dealt with. Justice as fairness involves 
pure procedural justice in a fundamental way. Rawls develops principles which 
aim lo insure that the process by which the basic structure operates is a fair 
process. However, no independent criterion for the proper social outcome is 
specified. Rawls even develops an argument that the basic principles ofjustice 
must treat the issue of distributive shares as one of pure procedural justice (1971: 
84). In contrast, an allocational theory such as average utilitarianism allows the 
fundamental operation of the basic structure to proceed unchanged and then 
requires redistribution of the burdens and benefits of the social process in such 
a way that an independent standard is satisfied, namely, average utility is 
maximized. Of course, no process is known which insures that average utility is 
at all times maximized, so average utilitarianism is a theory of imperfect 
procedural justice.
The definition of the original position, it will be recalled, characterizes the 
terms of a problem of rational decision. The terms of a rational decision problem 
must include a conception of value as an assumption about motivation and so the 
definition of the original position must include an account of what counts as 
good. However, this raises a problem for Rawls. In justice as fairness, the 
concept of right is supposed to be prior to the concept of good, which means in 
part that a necessary condition for something’s being good is that it fits into
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activities consistent with the principles of right already established (1971: 396). 
Thus, Rawls must work out a theory of right before he ’works out a theory of good 
and then the theory of right will be used in the formulation of the theory of good. 
Yet the definition of the original position is used to determine the theory of right 
and, as noted, that definition requires a conception of good. So, the problem is 
that Rawls needs a conception of right in order to fully characterize a conception 
of good, but he needs a conception of good in order to determine a conception of 
right.
Rawls’s solution is to construct what he calls a “ thin” theory and a “full” 
theory of the good (1971: 395ff.). The thin theory of the good is used to establish 
a motivational assumption for the purposes of the original position, and the 
account of the original position is then used to derive a theory of right. Once the 
theory of right is derived, the full theory of the good is constructed within the 
constraints of the principles of right. The full theory of the good that Rawls 
develops includes an account of the moral virtues, an account of the moral worth 
of persons, an account of supererogation, and a number of other issues covered 
by any complete theory of good.
The thin theory consists of the bare essentials of a theory of good and is 
relatively non-controversial for it is a familiar theory going back to Aristotle and 
is accepted by many contractarian and utilitarian philosophers, Rawls defines his 
thin theory with three stages. The first stage provides an explanation of what we 
mean when we say that some object is good in relation to a shared set of interests 
and circumstances (e.g., Honda is a good car). The second stage provides an
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explanation of what we mean when we say that something is good for a certain 
person when our judgment makes no evaluation of the w ay the person is living 
his life (e.g., It would be good for a bank robber to have a fast car). The third 
stage provides an explanation of what wre mean when we say that something is 
good for a person in a more objective sense (e.g., It would be good for someone 
who wants to be an airline pilot to receive the proper training). According to the 
three stage definition, then, a human good is anything that satisfies what “is 
rational for someone with a rational life plan to want" (1971: 399).
Among the things that qualify as human goods, Rawls includes what he 
calls the “primary” goods. These are goods that are necessary for the 
implementation of any rational life plan, wdth a greater number of primary goods 
a person can generally be assured of a greater likelihood of success in carrying 
out his or her plan no matter what that plan is. Thus, primary goods are goods it 
is rational to w ant no matter w hat one’s rational plan of life, Primary goods are 
divided into two categories. Social primary goods, so named because they are at 
the disposal of society, include rights and liberties, powers and opportunities, 
income and wealth. Natural primary goods arise from nature although they are 
influenced by the basic structure. Included in this category are health, vigor, 
intelligence, and imagination (1971: 62),
Rawls offers several arguments in support o fhis accountof primary goods, 
although here I mention only his conclusion that what to count as necessary for 
the execution of any rational life plan relies upon the general facts of social 
interdependency. The social facts of interdependency concern those values that
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are not only good for those enjoying them but which also tend to enhance the 
good of others as well (1971: 425). Rawls mentions here friendship, education, 
and the creation of art and beauty. Such socially interdependent values will 
naturally be encouraged in any well-ordered society, and the fact of 
interdependency provides reason to include these values in any long-term plan 
of life.
The thin theory of the good is used by Rawls in his derivation of the 
theory of right. In contrast, the full theory of the good makes essential use of the 
theory of right, the theory of right being prior to and built into the full theory of 
the good.
Rawls observes that we naturally distinguish, in principle, between claims 
of liberty and right on the one hand and the value of an increase in total social 
welfare on the other hand (1971: 27-2S), Furthermore, he says, we give a certain 
priority to claims of liberty and right over considerations of social welfare. That 
is. each person is naturally presumed to have "an inviolability founded on justice 
or, as some say, on natural right, which even the welfare of everyone else cannot 
override” (1971: 28).
Rawls aims, in constructing justice as fairness, to develop a theory which 
takes account of this “common sense conviction,” that is, that claims of right take 
a certain priority over considerations of social welfare. Thus:
In justice as fairness , , . persons accept in advance a principle of equal
liberty and they do this without a knowledge of their more particular
S2
ends. They implicitly agree, therefore, to conform their conception of 
their good to what the principles ofjustice require, (1971: 31)
The principles of right which justice as fairness contains place limits upon which 
satisfactions have value and upon w7hat is to count as a reasonable conception of 
the good; they therefore serve as constraints upon the principles of good. In this 
sense, the principles of right are prior to the principles of good. On this view, 
social policy does not simply take individuals’ wants and aims for granted and 
then seek the most efficient way to fulfill those wants and aims. Rather, a just 
social system defines the scope within which persons must develop their wants, 
aims, and life plans.
The theory of right is used in the definition of the moral virtues, A good 
person, a person of moral worth, is defined as one who possesses to a higher 
degree than the average “the broadly based features of moral character that it is 
rational for the persons in the original position to want in one another” (1971: 
437). Thus, moral worth is judged in terms of “broadly based” properties, that 
is, properties it is rational to want in a person no matter what social role she fills.
The theory of righths also used by .Rawls as a kind of restriction on the 
parties in the original position, along with the veil of ignorance, Rawls does not 
claim that the formal constraints are implied by the concept of right, nor does he 
claim that they are self-evident or that they follow from the meaning of morality. 
Rather, Rawls holds that given the role the principles of right must play, viz,,
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adjudicating the claims persons make on social institutions and on each other 
through the assignment of basic rights and duties determining the division of 
social advantages, it is reasonable to impose the conditions of the formal 
constraints on the choice of conceptions ofjustice. Five constraints are given;
(1) Moral principles, and thus principles of social justice, must be general 
principles since principles of justice must be capable of serving as a public 
charter of a well-ordered society in perpetuity.
(2) The principles ofjustice should be public which means that they must 
be suitable for use as a public conception ofjustice,
(3) Principles should provide an ordering of conflicting claims that can 
or that are likely to arise.
(4) The principles should serve adequately as a final court of appeal in 
practical reasoning; there w ill be no higher standards for the adjudication 
of  disputes concerning claims.
(5) The principles must be universal in application. That is, they must be 
understood and followed by every moral agent and they must hold for a 
given moral agent simply in virtue of the fact that she is a moral agent.
This last constraint is significant. Rawls’s definition of moral personality 
involves two features: (i) a moral agent is capable of having a conception of 
good, and she normally realizes this capacity in the normal course of 
development, and (ii) a moral agent has a sense ofjustice, that is, the “desire to
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apply and act upon the principles of justice15 (1971: 505). Moral personali ty 
singles out the kind of beings that the principles ofjustice bind. Rawls notes that 
this idea may be used to provide an interpretation of the traditional idea of natural 
rights, discussed In the previous chapter. Claims of right that follow from the 
principles ofjustice are based upon the possession of moral personality. Justice 
as fairness bolds that certain fundamental rights are “assigned in the first instance 
to persons’5 and “are given a special weight” such that “the system of equal 
liberties is absolute practically speaking under favorable conditions” (1971: 505­
06, n. 30). I will return to the issue of rights in the following section of this 
chapter.
Although the original position is a hypothetical state of affairs, its 
definition does provide a heuristic device, one which provides for a way of 
thinking about the question of social justice. As Rawls observes, one may 
“simulate the deliberations of this hypothetical situation, simply by reasoning in 
accordance with the appropriate restrictions" (1971: 138). Thus, to say that a 
particular conception ofjustice would be chosen in the original position is similar 
to saying that rational deliberation under certain restrictions and conditions 
would result in a certain conclusion. This task of determining which principles 
would be chosen in the original position is easier than it first sounds. As Rawls 
observes, since all “differentiating characteristics” among the parties are removed 
and since everyone is equally rational and “similarly situated,” each will reason 
in the same way (1971: 12).
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After setting out the definition of the original position, Rawls argues that 
a two-tiered set of principles would be chosen by the parties in the original 
position, The fust tier of the two-tiered structure is summarized by Rawls in the 
form ofthe following principle, referred to as the “general conception” ofjustice:
All social values—liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and the 
bases of self-respect—are to be distributed equally unless an unequal 
distribution of any, or all, of  these values is to everyone’s advantage.
(1971: 62)
The general conception ofjustice applies only at early stages of economic 
development which allow' for neither the effective establishment nor the effective 
exercise ofbasic liberties (1971:54-2). The genera! conception allows a trade-off 
oF social values such as liberties and equality of opportunity for, perhaps, 
improvements in economic wcll-beingprovided that (a) the quality of civilization 
is enhanced in such a way that all benefit, and (b) the improvement moves society 
closer to a state of development w'here equal liberty and opportunity can be 
enjoyed by all as specified in the special conception ofjustice (discussed below).
The idea here is that at very low levels of economic development, the 
marginal value of further economic and social advantages is so relative to the 
interests of liberty—since the liberties cannot be effectively exercised anyw'ay— 
that it is rational to allow the stated trade-offs. Rawls argues that as the 
economic development of civilization continues, the marginal value of further
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economic and social benefits diminishes relative to the interests of liberty so that 
apoint is reached beyond which it becomes irrational—from the perspective of the 
original position—to allow liberty to be traded off for the sake of greater material 
benefits. Consequently, a new conception ofjustice would be chosen to govern 
a society which had advanced to a level of economic development capable of 
supporting rights and liberties that can be effectively exercised (1971: 542). 
Thus, the general conception ofjustice is superseded in favor of the “special 
conception” with wliich Rawls develops his theory of justice as fairness. The 
special conception of justice constitutes the second of the two tiers, and is 
expressed in two principles ofjustice that Rawls argues would be chosen in the 
original position:
(1) First Principle:
Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of 
equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all.
(2) Second Principle:
Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both: 
(a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, and consistent with the 
just savings principle, and (b) attached to offices and positions open to ail 
under conditions of fair equality of opportunity. (1971: 302)
In the first principle, Rawls speaks of a “system” of liberties, which 
suggests that the various liberties are components affecting one another. The
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reason the principle is framed In terms of systems of equal liberties is because 
Rawls holds that basic liberties cannot be evaluated singly. Rather, they must be 
evaluated as awhole since the character ofone liberty normally depends upon the 
specification of other liberties (1971: 203). For example, if freedom of speech 
is defined too broadly, then property rights might be endangered. I have in mind 
the case where freedom of speech is defined in such a way that the incitement of 
riot is permissible. Although it is true that a greater liberty is by and large 
preferable to a lesser liberty, this only holds for the system of liberty as a whole 
and does not hold for each individual liberty. Another reason Rawls gives for the 
claim that the character of a liberty depends upon the specification of other 
liberties is the observation that when individual liberties are left unrestricted, 
they “collide” with one another. For instance, without rules of order in a 
convention, freedom of speech loses its value. Thus, liberties must be balanced 
in a give and take process until a systematic maximum of total liberty is reached— 
subject to the constraint that all individuals have the same liberties.
The first principle of justice thus guarantees an equal liberty to each 
person. Rawls illustrates how the argument for equal liberty from the original 
position would proceed by taking the example of the liberty of conscience, The 
reasoning in this case is then generalized to the other freedoms. The parties do 
not know what their religious or moral convictions are, or whether they even have 
any such convictions. Furthermore, they do not know whether their religious or 
moral beliefs are in the majority or the minority. Thus, they will not want to take 
chances concerning their liberty of conscience by (say) permitting the majority
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religion to suppress other views (1971; 207). Neither would the parties consent 
to a utilitarian principle, for their freedom of conscience would then be subject 
to the “calculus of social interests” and might be restricted if such an action 
maximizes utility. Consequently, equal liberty of conscience is the only principle 
the parties will acknowledge.
Rawls goes on to derive a limitation to this principle: The maintenance 
of public order is understood as a necessary condition for any person’s achieving 
his or her ends, no matter what those ends might be. Thus, from the standpoint 
of the representative citizen, all have an interest in public order and security, and 
this common interest limits the principle of liberty of conscience, that is, when 
it is reasonably expected that the public order will be damaged, liberty of 
conscience can be restricted. And this gives us a principle of toleration: 
Different moral and religious views are to be tolerated until the point is reached 
at which the public order is threatened.
It may be observed that liberty and the notion of the “rule of law" are 
closely associated in Rawls’s theory. Liberty is “a complex of rights and duties 
defined by institutions” (197!: 219). The rule oflaw is essentially format justice 
or justice as regularity, i,e.s the ideal of “regular and impartial administration of 
public rules” applied to the legal system (1971: 235), The relation between the 
two is expressed by the observation that without the rule oflaw, one’s liberties 
cannot be secure.
From this ideal of a legal system, a number of precepts follow, First, 
ought implies can. Given this precept, (a) actions required ot forbidden by rules
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oflaw should be ones that persons can reasonably be expected to do or avoid, (b) 
those who enact laws and give orders must do so in good faith, (c) impossibility 
of performance should be recognized as either a defense or at least a mitigating 
circumstance. Without this precept, a legal system might be an “intolerable 
burden on liberty.”
The second precept is: similar cases must be treated similarly. That like 
decisions be rendered in like cases limits the discretion of judges and figures in 
authority, and forces them to justify the distinctions they make between people. 
The third precept is; there is no offense without a law. This requires (a) “that 
laws be known and expressly promulgated,” (b) “that their meaning be clearly 
defined.” (c) that laws be general and not be used to harm particular individuals, 
(d) and that the more severe offenses be strictly construed {1971: 238). The 
fourth precept is that of natural justice, A conscientious effort must be made to 
determine guilt and innocence and impose correct penalties. Thus, orderly trials 
and hearings, the correct application of rules of evidence, and so on are required. 
Rawls argues that without the rule oflaw, our liberties are uncertain and insecure. 
In order to attain confidence in the exercise of their liberties, then, the members 
of a well-ordered society will require the rule oflaw.
The second principle ofjustice that Rawls argues would be chosen in the 
original position speaks of "social and economic inequalities.” RawTs is here 
referring to inequalities in the following social primary goods: income, wealth, 
opportunities, and powers of office. Liberty is not included in this list since it 
is treated by the first principle ofjustice.
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The term “least advantaged members of society” in clause (a) of the 
second principle requires explanation. When principles refer to persons, Rawls 
notes, the reference is to ‘"representative persons” holding various representative 
social positions. It is not necessary to consider things from the point of view of 
each representative person from each social position. An assessment of the 
competing claims of thousands of different social positions is obviously 
impossible. A complete theory ofjustice must therefore single out certain social 
positions as more basic than others and as providing an “appropriate standpoint 
forjudging the social system” (1971: 96).
Rawls supposes that each person holds two social positions, that of equal 
citizenship, and that specified by a place in the distribution of income and wealth. 
The position of equal citizenship is defined in terms of rights and liberties 
required by the first principle and also in terms of the fair equality of opportunity 
provided by the principle of fair equality of opportunity. Equal citizenship 
provides a “general point of view” from which to judge a social system (1971: 
98).
The number of representative positions in the distribution of income and 
wealth is problematic, but clause (a) of the second principle focuses upon the 
position of the least advantaged and this requires only the representative least 
well-off person. Rawls suggests two possible ways of characterizing this 
position. One might take the average income of an unskilled worker and count 
as least advantaged all those with the average income of this group, or less. The 
expectation of the least advantaged would then be equal to the average income
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and wealth of this group. Or, one might count as leas! advantaged all those with 
less than half the median income and wealth.
Clause (a) of the second principle ofjustice is known as the ^difference 
principle” and allows inequalities in wealth, income, and powers of office i f  these 
work to the advantage of the least well-off members of society, as measured by 
reference to an index of social primary goods and a measure of long-run 
expectations. The extent of the inequalities allowed would be decided, 
presumably, at the legislative stage, since a great deal of information about 
society, economic incentives, and so on is required for this task, w'hich the veil 
of ignorance excludes from consideration (1971: 285).
One may view the difference principle as a requirement that social and 
economic inequalities are to be evaluated in terms of their impact on the least 
well-off. Rawls notes, however, that there are several senses in which the 
expectations of each representative person are raised by the operation of the 
difference principle {1971: SO).
First, it is obvious that each representative person’s expectations are raised 
by the operation of Che difference principle in comparison to an initial 
arrangement of absolutely strict equality (i.e., one involving equal shares of the 
benefits of social cooperation). In addition, expectations might be chain- 
connected, w'hich means that if an advantage has the effect of raising the 
expectations of the representative worst-off, then it also raises the expectations 
of all representative positions in between (1971: 81). This does not entail that all
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effects upon all levels always move together, for nothing is said of cases where 
the least advantaged do not gain while others do.
Furthermore, expectations might be close-knit. This means that it is 
impossible to raise or lower the expectations ofanv representative person without 
raising or lowering the expectation of every other representative person, 
especially the least well-off (1971; 80). Obviously, in such a case, all benefit by 
the operation of the difference principle in the sense that each person’s 
expectations are raised.
Suppose that expectations are not close-knit. The representative least 
advantaged is not affected by some changes in the expectations of the 
representative best off, although others are. Thus, providing incentives to certain 
well-off individuals raises the expectations, say, of the middle class but leaves 
the exp eclat ions of the worst-o ff unchanged, In order to cover such possibilities, 
Rawls proposes what he calls the lexica! difference principle. This is the general 
principle of which the di ffercnce principle constitutes merely a simplified form:
[l]n a basic structure with n relevant representatives, first maximize the 
welfare of the worst off representative man; second, for equal welfare of 
the worst-o ff representative, maximize the welfare of the second worst-off 
representative man, and son on until the last case which is, for equal 
welfare of all the preceding n-1 representatives, maximize the welfare of 
the best-off representative man. (1971: 83)
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Clause (a) of the difference principle makes mention of the just savings 
principle. This principle represents a solution to the complex problem ofjustice 
between generations. The life of a people is a scheme of cooperation spread out 
across time and intergenerational relations ought to be governed by the same 
conception of justice that regulates relations between contemporaries (1971: 
289). Thus, a principle of just savings must be chosen from the original position, 
specifying how the burden of capital accumulation and of raising standards of 
development is to be shared between generations. In the original position, no 
generation has stronger claims than any other. The parties to the original position 
ask what is reasonable for members of adjacent generations to expect of each 
other, and seek to balance how much at each stage they would be willing to save 
for their immediate descendants against what they fee! entitled to claim of their 
immediate predecessors. Clause (a) thus requires that the operation of the 
difference principle be consistent with the just savings principle. By this, Rawls 
means that the just savings principle acts as a constraint on the application of the 
difference principle. The expectations of the least well off in a given generation 
are to be maximized subject to the constraint that the just amount of savings has 
been set aside (1 971: 292),
Clause (b) of the difference principle requires that fair equality of 
opportunity be established. This requires the establishment of various 
institutions whose purpose is to insure that similarly endowed and motivated 
individuals have similar life prospects regardless of the social circumstances of 
birth.
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Next, Rawls devises two priority rules which apply to the two principles 
of justice. The purpose of the priority rules is to solve the priority problem 
which plagues intuitionist theories of ethics. Intuitionism is the doctrine that 
there exists an irreducible family of first principles from which all other ethical 
principles and judgments derive. In cases where the various principles conflict 
and give contrary directives, the intuitionist requires that we balance the 
principles against each other by intuition. Thus, the family of first principles is 
not “prioritized.” Utilitarianism avoids the priority problem by reducing all 
moral principles to a single, fundamental first principle, namely, the principle of 
utility. Rawls avoids the priority problem by specifying the two priority rules. 
Without such rules, we w-ould have no precise way to balance the satisfaction of 
both of Rawls's principles ofjustice. The first priority rule states:
The principles of justice are to be ranked in lexical order and therefore 
liberty can be restricted only for the sake of liberty. There are two cases:
(a) a less extensive liberty must strengthen the total system of 
liberty shared by all;
(b) a less than equal liberty must be acceptable to those with the 
lesser liberty. (1971:302)
This priority rule (The Priority of Liberty) places the two principles of 
justice in a serial or lexical order with the first principle lexically prior to the 
second. This means that a society must satisfy the first principle before the
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second principle comes into play. Therefore, a departure from the institutions of 
equal liberty—required by the first principle—cannot be justified by a resulting 
increase in social and economic advantages or by increased fair equality of 
opportunity. A lexical order prohibits the balancing of principles. Tt functions 
like a sequence of constrained maximizing principles: any principle is
maximized given the constraint that the preceding principle is fully satisfied 
(1971: 43).
An example of what Rawls has in mind with clause (a) of the first priority 
rule is the following: It might be determined that our total system of liberties is 
stronger if no private individual has the liberty to possess machine guns or plastic 
explosives. Or, perhaps our system of liberties might be strengthened if private 
individuals arc not allowed to construct their own atomic weapons, even if they 
do so purely for their own scientific enlightenment. In these cases, while our 
total system of liberties is restricted, the remaining liberties are much more 
secure so that our total system of liberty is strengthened. Without the restriction, 
none of our other liberties would be as secure.
Clause (b) of the first priority rule requires that, in order to justify an 
unequal liberty, one must take up the perspective of a representative person 
having the lesser liberty and one must prove that the inequality in liberty would 
be accepted by the less favored individuals i4in return for the greater protection 
of their other liberties that results from this restriction” (1971: 231). This 
qualification, that the unequal liberty must be acceptable only in return for the 
strengthening of the remaining liberties, is important. For without the
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qualification, it sounds as if an unequal liberty is justifiable if it is acceptable as 
a means to any other end, whereas the first priority rule insures that liberty may 
be restricted only for the sake of liberty. The second priority rule states;
The second principle of justice is lexically prior to the principle of 
efficiency and to that of maximizing the sum of advantages; and fair 
opportunity is prior to the difference principle. There are two cases;
(a) an inequality of opportunity must enhance the opportunity of 
those with the lesser opportunity;
(b) an excessive rate of saving must on balance mitigate the 
burden of those bearing this hardship. (1971; 302-03)
The principle of efficiency is the Pareto optimality criterion of welfare 
economics. According to this criterion, a social arrangement is optimal or 
efficient when it is impossible to change it without making at least one person 
worse off. The principle Rawls mentions requiring the maximization of the sum 
of advantages is simply the principle of utility.
By specifying that the principle of fair opportunity is lexically prior to the 
difference principle, Rawls is requiring here that the principle of fair equality of 
opportunity be fully satisfied before the difference principle comes into play. 
Thus, the expectations of the least well-off are maximized subject to the 
constraint that the institutions required for fair equality of opportunity are fully 
funded and operating properly. By specifying that the difference principle is
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prior to the principle of efficiency, Rawls is requiring that the difference 
principle be fully satisfied before officials seek to move the economy towards its 
Pareto frontier. By specifying that the difference principle is prior to the 
principle of utility, Rawls is requiring that society must first fully satisfy the 
difference principle before attempting to promote total or average utility.
Rawls offers a number of detailed arguments as to why the two principles 
ofjustice constitute the correct solution to the decision problem of the original 
position, primarily In terms that show the two principles are preferable to 
(classical and average) utilitarianism. I shall only briefly review some of those 
arguments here.
To begin, one of the argument Rawls advances concerns the question of 
the burden of commitment associated with the principles ofjustice. He contends 
that the parties will not enter into an agreement which tacks the following 
feature: The agreement is one such that persons can rely upon one another to 
adhere to the principles adopted given even the worst possible consequences 
(1971: 176). The two principles possess this feature, argues Rawls, for the 
following reason. The two principles allow the parties to guarantee their basic 
rights and they also allow the parties to insure themselves against the worst 
eventualities, i.e,, severe deprivation of social primary goods. Such eventualities 
would prove either unacceptable or excessively burdensome, as would an unequal 
or inadequate assignment of basic rights (1971: 176).
In addition, the principle of average milily (maximizing average per capita 
utility) does not insure against the worst eventualities nor does it guarantee that
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equal liberties arc secured under all circumstances (1971: 176-77). Were a 
person to gamble with his liberties and major interests hoping that the principle 
of average utility might bring him a greater well-being than he might receive 
under Rawls’s twro principles, he might find himself in circumstances worse than 
the minimum guaranteed by the two principles. For utilitarianism carries with 
it the possibility that the interests of some are sacrificed for the greater overall 
good, i.e., for the sake of a greater average of advantages to everyone. While the 
two principles guarantee the priority of liberty, the principle of average utility 
allows for the restriction of liberty, or even allows an unequal liberty, if such a 
policy serves to increase average utility. In such a case, this person would 
remind himself that the operation of Rawls’s two principles would have secured 
him a better iife.
Another argument Rawls gives for his claim that the two principles are 
superior to utilitarianism from the standpoint of the original position involves the 
question of psychological stability, A desirable feature of a conception of 
justice, Rawls suggest, is that it would be stable if implemented (1971: 177), A 
conception ofjustice is stable if: (a) the basic structure satisfies it principles for 
an extended period of time, (b) this fact is publicly recognized; (c) the public 
recognition of this fact leads persons to develop a desire to honor and uphold the 
principles of justice and also involve to themselves in institutions which 
exemplify those principles.
Rawls supposes that the two principles are superior to average 
utilitarianism as far as stability is concerned. A well-ordered society involves,
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among other things, a stable scheme of social cooperation. A stable scheme is one 
in a state of stable equilibrium (1971: 457). In general terms, an equilibrium is 
stable when it is such that departures from the equilibrium state call into play 
endogenous forces that tend to bring the system back to the original equilibrium 
state. The internal restorative forces in the case of a scheme of social cooperation 
include a sense ofjustice and concern for others, both of which lead individuals 
to support and participate in just institutions and also make reparations when a 
wrong has been committed. Since stable principles of justice generate their own 
support, it follows that Lhe more stable the principles ofjustice, the stronger the 
internal restorative forces will be and, consequently, the more stable the scheme 
of social cooperation will be. Rawls draws on certain theories of moral 
psychology, which I will not venture into here, to conclude that the two 
principles arc superior to average utilitarianism as far as the question of stability 
is concerned, since they help realize moral development and a sense of justice to 
a greater degree. In short, those in a utilitarian society whose prospects have 
been sacrificed for the benefit of others will not feel very inspired to uphold 
principles ofjustice.
2.2 Rawls on the Basic Rights and Liberties
My aim above was to present the distinctive moral and political principles which 
form the core of Rawls’s conception ofjustice. In this section I want to focus on 
what Rawls has to say about the basic liberties and rights, which allows us to
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consider the connection between ethical principles and social institutions in 
Rawls’s theory. As Rawls recognizes* a good ethical theory is a system of 
principles which explains our considered judgments in the sense that the theory 
shows us how our judgments are implied by the operation of a specific set of 
normative statements plus the relevant factual judgments (1971; 46ff.). This set 
of statements thus serves to unify and systematize our considered moral 
judgments. Furthermore, such a set of principles serves to provide guidance in 
areas where we have no considered judgments. In such cases, we apply the 
principles because they yield plausible judgments in other areas of which we are 
more sure.
Individuals normally develop a sense of justice once they reach a 
sufficient maturity. They display a skill in judging things just and unjust and in 
giving reasons for these judgments. Rawls suggests that we view moral 
philosophy as an attempt at describing this moral capacity, A conception of 
justice describes our capacity when the judgments that we make and the reasons 
that we give, are actually in accord with that conception. Of course we should 
only be concerned with explaining those moral judgments in which our moral 
capacity is displayed with the least amount of distortion. Thus, theory 
development involves a process of give and take between theory and considered 
judgment. The theoretical limit to this process of theory construction is a state 
of affairs in which theories and considered judgments have been altered back and 
forth until the best possible fit has been achieved. Rawls calls this state of affairs 
“reflective equilibrium” (1971: 48).
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Rawls argues that the principles ofjustice which he derives from the 
original position best unify our considered judgments in reflective equilibrium, 
in the sense that those principles constitute the best fit between theory and 
considered judgments as mentioned above. The reflective equilibrium argument 
purports to uncover the highest-level principles that underlie our considered 
judgments in reflective equilibrium. These principles provide “a theory of the 
moral sentiments” which explicates the “principles governing our moral powers, 
or, more specifically, our sense ofjustice” (1971: 51), Thus, the principles 
determined in this way, tested by their congruence with our considered judgments 
in reflective equilibrium, constitute the principles underlying ourmoral faculties. 
As we have seen, Rawls is concerned with the normative implications of the 
contractarian method, as manifested by the principles ofjustice as fairness.
Rawls’s contractarian argument is intended ultimately to demonstrate that 
the conception of social justice that would be chosen by the parties in the original 
position (a) is fair, (b) is acceptable from a moral point of view, (c) enables 
individuals to “express their natures as free and equal rational beings” (1971: 
252), (d) is the most stable conception ofjustice, and (e) fosters self-respect. The 
role ofjustice is that of providing an ultimate standard assigning basic rights and 
duties, fixing a proper balance between conflicting claims to the advantages of 
social cooperation, and determining the proper distribution of the burdens of 
social cooperation.
The two principles of justice, together with the priority rules, guarantee 
each person an equal liberty, a sphere of activity in which one’s claims cannot be
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neglected or overridden even for the sake of a greater benefit to society as a 
whole (1971: 499). In thus guaranteeing to each—regardless of social position or 
natural endowment—such an inviolability, the principles of justice as fairness 
publicly express a deep concern for the autonomy of each person and enhance the 
good of each as well (since autonomy is surely good). This kind of unconditional 
concern for autonomy and liberty for each person, expressed by the two 
principles and priority rules, cannot be guaranteed, for example, by utilitarianism. 
Under utilitarian justice, the liberties of some must be traded-off in favor of the 
liberties of others if doing so increases the measure of social welfare
Rawls mentions a further important factor present in a society regulated 
by the two principles, but absent in one regulated by the utilitarian conception. 
The difference principle functions as a principle of fraternity. This is because the 
difference principle expresses a “refusal by others to take advantage of accident 
and happenstance" (1971: 499). In a utilitarian society, the effects of natural and 
social contingencies are taken as given and fed into the social welfare function. 
The social outcome is thus influenced by these contingencies; no attempt is made 
to nullify their effects or to choose institutions that are based upon considerations 
independent of such factors. However, by agreeing to the difference principle, 
people choose to structure society around a concern for a rational nature as such, 
independently of social and natural contingencies. But this affirms each person’s 
good, in a public manner, for a concern for a pure rational nature is a concern for 
our good. Moreover, by affirming the difference principle, those who are more 
favored in the natural lottery choose to gain from their luck only on terms that
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work for the benefit of those less favored in that lottery. Those more favored do 
not wish to gain unless this benefits the least well-off as well. In contrast, the 
principle of utility expresses no concern for the good of the least well-off, nor 
does it express a concern that all benefit from the process of social cooperation.
It can be seen that the two principles, when manifested in the basic 
structure, express the Kantian imperative that each person is to be treated as an 
end and never merely as a means. Under justice as fairness, each individual 
person is treated in accord with the principles she would freely and rationally 
choose in an initial situation of equality. In this sense, each is treated as an equal 
and as an end. Furthermore, each is guaranteed an equal liberty, which is also to 
treat each as an end (1971: 180), Finally, the difference principle provides an 
additional sense in which each is treated as an end. To treat persons as ends is 
to agree, Rawls says, "to forgo those gains which do not contribute to their 
representative expectations" (1971; ISO). To treat people as means, on the 
contrary, "is to be prepared to impose upon them lower prospects oflife for the 
sake of higher expectations of others” (1971: 180).
According to Rawls, from the standpoint of the original position, self­
respect and effective social cooperation are both important values which it is 
rational to seek and secure (1971; 1 78). Public recognition of the fact that the 
basic structure satisfies the two principles gives increased support to individual’s 
self-respect, and leads to a greater effectiveness of social cooperation. Rawls 
argues that the two types of respect—respect for self and respect for others—are 
reciprocally self-supporting (1971: 179). That is, those who respect themselves
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are more likely to respect others and those who respect others are more likely to 
respect themselves. In addition, the absence of the respect of others undermines 
one’s self-respect, Now, the two principles secure mutual respect among persons, 
for when that basic structure satisfies the two principles, everyone’s good is 
included in a public scheme of mutual benefit. The public affirmation ofthis fact 
supports and enhances an individual’s self-esteem for it affirms that each 
person’s ends are worthwhile, Public recognition of the fact that the principles 
treat persons as Kantian "ends in themselves” ought to also affirm both self­
respect and respect for others.
Every ethical theory works with a conception of the person, of course, 
whether implicitly or explicitly- The members of Rawls’s well-ordered society 
are regarded as free and equal moral agents who can contribute to and honor the 
restraints of social cooperation. Each desires to take part in the scheme of social 
cooperation for mutual advantage. Furthermore, each is viewed as motivated by 
lv> o highcsl-order interests {Rawls, 19S2: 165-66).
The First is the interest to realize and exercise the capacity for a sense of 
right and justice. The sense ofjustice is an effective desire to comply with the 
principles ofjustice as defined by the principles of the public conception, and the 
desire to act on this conception is generally effective. The sense ofjustice also 
implies a desire to conform one’s pursuit of the good and the demands one makes 
on others to public principles of justice which all persons can be reasonably 
expected to accept.
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The second is the interest to realize and exercise a capacity to decide upon, 
revise, and rationally pursue a conception of the good, In addition, persons 
regard themselves as having a higher-order interest “in how their other interests, 
including fundamental interests, are regulated and shaped by the basic structure” 
(Rawls, 1974a; 143). They consider themselves beings capable of choosing their 
own ends and wish to preserve their liberty in this regard. Furthermore, each 
feels it legitimate to make claims on others--in the name of the conception of the 
good--regarding the design of institutions. Finally, each has, and views himself 
as having, “a right to equal respect and consideration in determining the 
principles by which the basic structure of society is to be regulated” (Rawls, 
1975; 548). Accordingly, Rawls’s theory suggests that the basic liberties of 
persons arc intimately connected with the primary goods of respect, both self­
respect and respect for others, and human dignity.
In the first principle ofjustice, Rawls argues that all persons have “an 
equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties” (1971; 
302). Rawls initially outlines that the “basic liberties” are as follows:
political liberty (the right to vote and to be eligible for public office) 
together with freedom of speech and assembly; liberty of conscience and 
freedom of thought; freedom of the person along with the right to hold 
(personal) property; and freedom from arbitrary arrest and seizure as 
defined by the concept of the rule of law. (1971; 61).
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Clearly, Rawls’s outline of the basic liberties retains the same emphasis 
on civil and political freedoms found in the liberal-contractarian theories of 
rights. This emphasis is also reflected in the priority principles, which dictate the 
priority of liberty and hold that liberty may not be sacrificed for other social or 
economic goods. Rawls explains that this prioritization is necessary in order to 
distinguish between liberty and the worth of liberty, insofar as socio-economic 
elements affect “the worth of liberty, the value t:> individuals of the rights that 
the first principle defines” (1971; 204). By this Rawls means that the worth of 
liberty will be unequal, depending on whether a person is either wealthy or poor, 
educated or uneducated, and so on, such that persons will place different values 
on the liberties they hold. Despite this difference in the worth of liberty, 
however, the first principle ofjustice guarantees that all persons equally possess 
the same basic liberties.
This last point, that equality in the worth of the basic liberties is not 
required even though the basic liberties must be held equally, has been frequently 
criticized. For instance, Norman Daniels argues that the unequal worth of liberty 
is unacceptable in the original position. He contends that Rawls’s priority 
principles imply that political liberty is compatible with significant social and 
economic inequalities. Given this assumption, the priority of liberty is “a hollow 
abstraction lacking real application” without the ability to effectively exercise the 
basic liberties (1975: 278). In other words, if the wealthy have an undue 
influence on the political process, it is difficult to speak of the presence of equal
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political liberty, And what effect would this influence have on, say, freedom of 
expression or conscience?
Rawls is not unaware of this point of criticism. A response suggested by
his theory is that, because the interests of different people and their own
perceptions of those interests will diverge, so too will the relative value placed
upon the basic liberties amongst different persons. Yet the difference in relative
*  '
value and possible conflicts between liberties does not negate the principled 
criterion identifying and protecting certain fundamental rights. The basic 
liberties may have different values for different persons, but the liberties 
themselves are something that all individuals are entitled to independently of the 
socio-economic conditions affecting the worth of liberty. Thus, varying social 
and economic benefits do not suffice to justify a less than equal liberty or the 
equal possession of basic liberties; one is not entitled to “more” basic liberties 
if one is wealthy, nor docs one possess "less” basic liberties if one is 
economically disadvantaged. All persons have the same status with respect to the 
basic rights and liberties. And, as mentioned previously, liberty is fundamental 
because it provides the most effective social basis for the primary good of mutual 
and self-respect:
[Tjhe basis for sel f-esteem in a just society is not then one’s income share 
but the publicly affirmed distribution of fundamental rights and liberties. 
And this distribution being equal, everyone has a similar and secure status 
when they meet to conduct the wider affairs of society. (1971: 544)
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In a just society then, liberty, not income, must be distributed equally. For 
Rawls, the principle of equal civil and political liberties is at bottom a normative
principle directed towards the moral quality of social existence and the security
%
of individuals’ relations with one another. On this basis he asserts an integral 
connection between fundamental rights and liberties and the moral-political 
norms- of personal autonomy and mutual and self-respect.
In the essays collected in Political Liberalism, Rawls expands upon his 
discussion ofthe place ofbasic rights in his theory ofjustice. Before addressing 
what more Rawls has to say about rights, it will be useful to briefly mention some 
of the recent developments Rawls’s theory ofjustice has exhibited.
Rawls’s revised theory ofjustice is centered on his claim in A Theory of 
Justicc that the two principles ofjustice would ensure social stability since they 
would be the guiding moral principles adopted by the members of any well- 
ordered society. However, Rawls came to view this position as unacceptably 
idealistic, arguing that the pluralism of moral, religious, and philosophical 
principles as a permanent fact of modern society makes it untenable to claim that 
everyone would adopt the two principles as universal moral truths. In response 
to this problem, Rawls no longer claims that his theory ought to be regarded as 
a comprehensive and general moral theory; instead, it ought to be seen as a 
political theory ofjustice. By this he means that a theory ofjustice should carry 
out the practical task of  developing solutions to political and public problems 
w]t.hin ■society, or a group of societies,-The existence of rival doctrines of the
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good requires developing a theory of justice based on those points of agreement 
or publicly shared ideas that obtain among competing views within our society. 
Only in this way can stable social unity be achieved in the conditions of 
pluralism.
Rawls’s account of justice assumes a political character, he argues, 
because he now takes the public political culture of a contemporary democratic 
society to be the background of his theory. In other words, the ideas out of which 
the political conception ofjustice is constructed and justified are held by Rawls 
to be implicit in that public political culture. Many of the important features of 
Rawls’s earlier version are still operative, such as the original position, the idea 
of a well-ordered society and the basic structure, the notion of social cooperation 
for reciprocal benefit, and the need to establish a set of principles ofjustice 
necessary to achieve such social cooperation. However, these principles are now 
those most appropriate given that there exists an irreducible pluralism of 
reasonable comprehensive moral, philosophical, and religious doctrines in 
contemporary society (1996: 36).
Given this condition, the principles ofjustice are not comprehensive moral 
principles governing all aspects of life, rather, they are the appropriate publicly 
shared principles for socially distributing primary goods ajid governmgjhejife 
of persons in the public domain. Thus. Rawls claims that the pluralism which 
characterizes contemporary societies is one of the basic circumstances ofjustice, 
indeed is the natural outcome in a society which respects basic rights and liberties
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(1996; 66). It is important to recognize the diversity of contemporary societies 
since this diversity often has the potential to destabilize a well-ordered society.
More importantly, social diversity cannot be overcome simply by the 
rational selection of a single comprehensive moral doctrine or theory ofjustice 
overburdened with metaphysical assumptions. It is for this reason that Rawls’s 
revised theory ofjustice takes its justification from ideas and institutions found 
in the public political culture of contemporary democratic societies,26 Rawls 
describes the justification involved as one of formulating an “overlapping 
consensus,” that is, a consensus on a “freestanding” political conception of 
justice that exists despite the differences due to the various conflicting religious, 
philosophical, and moral doctrines in contemporary society (1996: 15, 39-40). 
Presumably, such a consensus provides for the stable unity of political society 
through the engagement and toleration of social differences.
According to Rawls, an overlapping consensus on justice is political, in 
that it is based on public principles ofjustice rather than private comprehensive 
doctrines, and thus neutral because of its independence from such comprehensive 
doctrines. The goal of an overlapping consensus is to reach agreement on 
principles ofjustice in a liberal, pluralistic society in order to achieve stability 
and equilibrium in the public sphere, while remaining neutral toward the private 
sphere of each individual’s personal affairs and beliefs. Overlapping consensus 
is necessary to Rawls’s revised conception ofjustice because the function of 
political philosophy is to construct principles consistent with certain “intuitive 
ideas”—primarily that of  citizens as free and equal persons and of a well-ordered 
society as a fair system of cooperation over time—found in the common public 
political culture of democratic society. Justice as fairness is thus conceived in
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reference to apolitical culture which shares a liberal ideal of citizenship, i.e., of 
persons as free, rational, and equal. Rawls’s concern that his earlier conception 
ofjustice as fairness amounted to a comprehensive doctrine is thereby eased by 
putting forward a revised conception appropriate for a modern liberal democracy, 
hut not necessarily appropriate for other forms of political society.
Because the political conception ofjustice relies on the requirement of 
impartiality as to comprehensive doctrines, the veil of  ignorance is still employed 
at the stage of the original position. Consequently, information concerning 
substantive conceptions of the good must be bracketed by the parties to the 
original position, if agreement (overlapping consensus) on the principles of 
justice is to be reached. Thomas Nagel questions, however, whether the necessity 
of agreement driving Rawls’s theory here provides sufficient reason for the 
parties to exclude knowledge of substantive conceptions of the good. He insists 
that “the demand for agreement. . . must be grounded in something more basic” 
(Nagel, 1987: 229). Nagel suggests the need for “a kind of epistemological 
restraint” through which one’s convictions are to be regarded “merely as beliefs” 
in the context of the public domain, while they may be treated as truths in the 
context of the private domain (1987: 229-30). Epistemological restraint would 
then arrive at the requirement of neutrality by holding that, even though one is 
absolutely convinced o f  the truth of one’s personal religious or moral doctrines, 
one would refrain from advancing those doctrines as bases for the principles of 
apolitical conception ofjustice since they could be reasonably rejected by others 
holding different conceptions of the good. Although Nagel and Rawls take 
somewhat different routes, it seems to me that they both arrive at the same place, 
as is evidenced by Rawls’s statement that “it is vital to the idea of political
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liberalism that we may with perfect consistency hold that it would be 
unreasonable to use political power to enforce our own comprehensive view, 
which we must, of course, affirm as either reasonable our true” (1996: 138),27 
To the problem, then, of arriving at legitimate principles to regulate social 
interaction given the diversity of contemporary societies, Rawls responds with 
two somewhat revised principles ofjustice, which read as follows:
a, Each person has an equal right to a fully adequate scheme of equal 
basic liberties which is compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for 
all.
b. Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions. First, 
they must be attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions 
of fair equality of opportunity; and second, they must be to the greatest 
benefit of the least advantaged members of society, (1996: 291)
The first principle of justice, which is most relevant to the present 
discussion, is revised to read “a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties” 
rather than “the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties.”23 Rawls 
makes this change because the criterion of the earlier version is “purely 
quantitative and does not distinguish some cases as more significant than others” 
(1996: 331). He then identifies two “fundamental cases” in which the basic 
liberties are to guarantee certain essential social conditions for human activity. 
The first is connected with developing and exercising a sense ofjustice, while the 
second is connected with forming, revising, and pursuing a conception of the 
good.29 Rawls refers to each of these activities in terms of “moral powers” that
S3
are developed and exercised given the appropriate social and institutional 
conditions or primary goods. Rawls provides the following revised list of 
primary goods (1996: 308):
a. The basic liberties, which are: “freedom of thought and liberty of conscience; 
the political liberties and freedom of association, as well as the freedoms 
specified by the liberty and integrity of the person; and finally the rights and 
liberties covered by the rule oflaw” (1996: 291).
b. Freedom of movement and free choice of occupation against a diverse 
background of opportunities.
c. Powers and prerogatives of offices and positions of responsibilities.
d. Income and wealth, understood broadly as all-purpose means.
e. The social bases of self-respect.
Rawls offers several arguments in support of the fully adequate scheme of 
basic liberties and rights which focus on the political conception of the person 
and the two fundamental moral powers. First, Rawls argues that the political 
liberties (e.g,, the right to vote, freedom to organize politically, freedom of 
speech and press) and freedom of thought are primary goods necessary to the 
development and use of the capacity for a sense ofjustice (1996: 334). Clearly, 
people will not be able to develop their moral sense ofjustice and apply it to the 
basic structure of society if they are denied freedom of political participation and 
freedom of thought and expression. Second, freedom of thought, liberty of the 
person (e.g., freedom of religious practice, freedom of movement, freedom from 
arbitrary interference or arrest) and the political liberties are also needed if
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people are to be able to pursue and realize their particular conception of the good 
over a complete life (1996; 335).
Freedom of conscience is a particularly important example, since a 
person’s ability to exercise her moral powers would be severely violated if she 
were forced into accepting different or new' moral, religious, and philosophical 
convictions, or was not allowed to freely develop new or different moral, 
rc’igious, and philosophical convictions. In addition, from the perspective of the 
original position, the parties do not know whether their beliefs will be those of 
a minority or a majority. Thus, it is reasonable for the parties to choose the most 
secure guarantee of freedom of conscience that is possible in order to protect 
their equality in either case.
Taken as a whole, the basic liberties and rights effectively advance mutual 
and self-respect insofar as they provide normative conditions for how people 
regard and treat one another in political society; “By publicly affirming the basic 
liberties citizens in a well-ordered society express their mutual respect for one 
another as reasonable and trustworthy, as well as their recognition of the worth 
all citizens attach to their wray of life” (1996; 319). From the perspective of 
Rawls’s revised theory, then, the basic rights and liberties are a scheme intended 
to protect each person’s interest in living cooperatively with other persons, as 
free and equal, on terms of mutual respect and reciprocal benefit, under a stable 
framework of basic political and economic institutions organized by a shared set 
of principles of justice.
One might question, however, how Rawls arrives at his account as to the 
basis of the basic rights and liberties, since Rawls fails to clearly address the 
nature of these rights other than to describe them as “fundamental.” Ronald
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Dworkin (1977), for example, has argued that Rawls’s theory of justice 
presupposes the basic right of individuals to equal concern and respect, so that 
his theory is essentially right-based,■Jc According to Dworkin, such “background” 
moral rights are distinguishable from “institutional” or positive-law rights and 
are akin to the traditional notion of natural rights. Dworkin actually embraces 
this perspective and suggests that Rawls’s original position be seen as modeling 
what he regards as the "undamental natural right persons have to equal concern 
and respect. If Dworkin’s argument is correct, however, would this not present 
a problem for Rawls’s contractarian claim that the standards ofjustice as fairness 
are derived from a rational choice procedure?31 While I do think that Rawls 
“presupposes” certain basic rights, I do not think that move is fatal to his contract 
theory.
Recall that, tn A Theory of Justice. Rawls noted that “it is appropriate to 
call . , . the rights that justice protects” natural rights (1971: 505, n. 30). Rawls 
argued that human beings are equally entitled to fundamental liberties and are 
“owed all the guarantees of justice” because of their “capacity for moral 
personality” (1971: 507, 505). While the contractarian mechanism is used to 
derive principles ofjustice from an agreement between parties to the original 
position, the parties to the agreements are not themselves completely devoid of 
certain characteristics. The description of the parties in the original position 
identifies certain attributes referred to by Rawls as the capacities of moral 
personality, that is, capacities of humans as “ free and equal” moral persons. As . 
a deontological theory, Rawls’s contractarian account ofjustice therefore seeks 
to provide right principles “about the way basic social institutions should be 
arranged to conform to the freedom and equality of citizens as moral persons”
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(19S0: 517), Parlies in the original position are not blank slates; they are “model- 
conceptions” of individuals who agree to the chosen principles of justice 
precisely because those principles accord with their representation as free and 
equal moral persons.
This returns us to our previous discussion of the two moral powers or 
capacities and the two highest-order interests identified by Rawls as 
corresponding to the conception of moral pers mhood, While Rawls’s inspiration 
is decidedly Kantian in this respect, there are further aspects of his revised theory 
ofjustice which help us to find answers to the question raised above by Dworkin. 
First, given Rawls’s characterization of his theory as political rather than 
metaphysical he emphasizes that he is not starting from assumed a nriori 
principles; rather, he is drawing on “certain fundamental ideas seen as implicit 
in the public political culture of a democratic society . . . seen as a fund of 
implicitly shared ideas and principles” (1996: 13-14). Rawls emphasizes that his 
theory is constructed from the political conceptions already held by those living 
in a democratic culture, for the purpose of securing political agreement in spite 
of substantive differences that people may have with regard to philosophy, 
religion, and morality. Second, then, Rawls insists that his theory applies only 
to the basic structure of society, that is, to a society’s main political, economic, 
and social institutions. While Rawls’s theory does not rest on a single 
comprehensive doctrine, it seeks to provide a conception ofjustice on which 
adherents of different doctrines can converge or overlap despite their differences 
in matters that do not involve the public political culture. Justice as fairness thus 
presents a reasonable interpretation of the political ideas and traditions of a 
democratic culture.
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Rawls mentions a number of fundamental ideas that are drawn upon in 
constructing his theory, such as that of society as a fair system of cooperation 
over time, but for present purposes we are concerned primarily with the idea “of 
citizens (those engaged in cooperation) as free and equal persons” (1996: 14), 
As Rawls has made clear, the idea of citizens as free and equal persons is to be 
understood as a model-conception draw'n up from the historically developed 
shared understanding of moral personhood found in our public poll ical culture. 
In other words, members of democratic societies are regarded as free and equal 
moral persons in that, as conveyed by Rawls, they possess a capacity for an 
effective sense ofjustice and a capacity to form, revise, and pursue a conception 
of the good, complemented by the highest-order interests in developing and 
exercising these moral powers. The principles of justice are constructed by 
Rawls in such a way as to reflect the values of the conception of the person 
implicit in a democratic public political culture. The principles of justice 
articulated by Rawls would be agreed to because the members of such a culture 
favor the political ideals of freedom, equality, and the autonomy of moral 
persons.
Three responses are now available to the problem posed earlier. First, 
Rawls's contractarian theory is contextualized by the implicitly shared ideas and 
principles of a democratic political culture. This context provides the 
background for the original position, the parties in the original position, and the 
principles of right and justice, Second, that background of implicitly shared 
ideas and principles includes the conception of free and equal moral persons 
which is fundamental to democratic public political culture. Thus, Rawls does 
not presuppose a metaphysical notion of the essential human self per se, although
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communitarian critics such as Michael Sandel (1982) have taken Rawls to task 
on this point. Rather* he pulls together the fundamental characteristics of how 
the members of a democratic society view themselves and each other, that is, he 
constructs a model-conception of our political self-understandings which have 
developed historically around the notion of moral personhood. Third, as a 
corollary to this shared conception of moral personhood, the democratic public 
political tradition has affirmed the idea of certain basic, inalienable rights and 
liberties possessed equally by all members of society that ought to be protected 
by political and legal institutions. Rawls’s principles of justice reflect this 
affirmation and the conviction that such rights and liberties have a special status 
by virtue of their attachment to the political meaning of free and equal moral 
persons.
It seems safe to say in response to the issue raised by Dworkin, then, that 
Rawls does not sacrifice his claim to a contractarian argument merely because he 
contextualizes his theory with existing social values and practices, and that he 
does provide a political (or practical) rather than metaphysical justification for 
his account of the basic rights and liberties in modern pluralisi societies. 
Whether these basic rights ought to be characterized as traditional “natural” 
rights is debatable and, I think, unnecessary given the entirety of Rawls’s 
political conception ofjustice as fairness. It would perhaps be more useful to 
regard them simply as human rights, without the metaphysical baggage associated 
with traditional natural rights, since such rights are treated as the socially 
recognized and protected claims of all moral persons. By this I mean that Rawls 
conceives of basic rights as natural rights insofar as they are universal and 
unconditional, yet in order to satisfy the actualization of social justice these
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rights must also be elaborated in the form of socio-political institutions, 
including the rule oflaw. Thus for Rawls, such rights are like a coin with two 
sides: they are not merely conventional rights that can be arbitrarily “taken 
away” (although they car be violated), but neither do they have a determinate 
existence unless they are realized and protected in the basic structure of political 
society. This last point is also made by Rex Martin, who writes that “For Rawls 
-11 natural or fundamental rights, insofar as they are rights, strictly conceived, are 
necessarily embedded in the basic structure of society” (1985: 41). It is this 
feature which distinguishes Rawls’s conception of basic rights as “natural” from 
the classic natural rights theories, and leads me to suggest that the basic rights are 
better referred to as human rights.
2.3 Further Reflections on Rawls and Political Liberalism
I have suggested that the account of basic individual rights formulated within the 
framework of the political conception ofjustice as fairness can be referred to by 
a vocabulary of human rights rather than classical natural rights. This is because 
Rawls regards such rights in terms of our publicly justified convictions of the 
characteristics of moral personhood and not as mere metaphysical truths. The 
ethical-political theory advanced by Rawls is, then, firmly entrenched in the 
liberal tradition even though it challenges some of the foundationalist 
assumptions of that tradition. As Thomas Nagel says, “Liberalism takes various 
forms, but they all include a system of individual rights against interference of 
certain kinds, together with limited positive requirements of mutual aid, all 
institutionalized and enforced under the rule of law in a democratic regime”
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(1991: 57), In what follows I want to examine further the broader contours of 
Rawls’s political liberalism and especially the issue of social pluralism, which 
was itself a difficulty recognized by classical liberalism. The discussion will 
then be tied back Into that of the basic rights and liberties by way of a few 
remarks on Michael SandeFs communitarian critique of Rawls’s theory.
In the Federalist I. Alexander Hamilton addressed the responsibility of the 
American people ”b / their conduct and example, to decide the important 
question, w'hether societies of men are really capable or not, of establishing good 
government from reflection and choice, or whether they are forever destined to 
depend, for their political constitutions, on accident and force” (1993: 219). 
What is conveyed in Hamilton’s words is that the task of constituting a well- 
ordered political society is a deliberate undertaking requiring the intelligent and 
conscious participation of persons who do not want to leave their lives and their 
government up to the vicissitudes of fortune. While not disregarding the actual 
historical limits on direct participation in the public political life that were in 
place in 1787, it is important to recognize that the political experiment that did 
take place in the newly independent American colonies signaled a significant 
opening for liberal political thought and life. However, of the many challenges 
faced during the formation of the Constitution of the United States, the 
justification of the legitimacy of a constitutional democracy was the first and 
most pressing task,
Notwithstanding all of its imperfections, that experiment firmly 
established one essential fact of liberal politics: the public political domain is a 
fundamental arena of community life, and consequently of individual well-being. 
Alexis de Tocqueville summarized this importance when he wrote that “among
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the laws that rule human societies, there is one that seems more precise and clear 
than all others. If men are to remain civilized or become so, the art of associating 
together must grow and improve in the same ratio in which the equality of 
condition is increased” (1990: 197). Cultivating the art of association was, for 
Tocqueville, linked to individual self-interest rightly understood. I take self­
interest rightly understood to be the recognition that the pursuit of different 
individual ways of living is bound up in a s icial context where participation and 
cooperation secure the protection and promotion of public rights and liberties that 
enable each person to pursue their conception of the good.
To be sure, the relations of association that we encounter in political 
society are not seamlessly harmonious nor always guided by reasonable self­
interest. The very fact that political relations frequently exhibit the character of 
dissensus rather than consensus has been a central preoccupation of liberal 
political thought and practice. Indeed, factional and individual dissensus created 
by narrowly defined interests or imperatives has made and still makes the forging 
and maintaining of social cooperation a difficult task. And it also renders the 
principles legitimating a democratic polity open to manipulation. James Madison 
viewed “the violence of faction” as the greatest threat to civil society and popular 
government. Madison’s anxiety about the disruptive effects of factional 
dissensus was the principal concern of his famous Federalist X article:
The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man; and we see 
them every vvhere brought into different degrees of activity, according to 
the different circumstances of civil society. A zeal for different opinions 
concerning religion, concerning Government, and many other points, as
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well of speculation as of practice; an attachment to different leaders 
ambitiously contending for pre-eminence and power; or to persons of 
other descriptions whose fortunes have been interesting to the human 
passions, have in turn divided mankind into parties* inflamed them with 
mutual animosity, and rendered them much more disposed to vex and 
oppress each other, than to co-operate for their common good, (1993: 
404)
While Madison believed that faction and dissent were part of the human 
condition, he also believed that the causes for that dissent could not, and should 
not be removed. Madison understood that human beings will embrace different 
doctrines that order their understandings of the world, and that disposition is 
something that cannot be expeditiously eliminated. Instead, Madison argued, our 
efforts should be directed towards negotiating and controlling the effects of 
dissensus. However, Madison was convinced “that neither moral or religious 
motives can be relied on as adequate control" {1993; 408). Neither moral virtues 
nor religious sentiments were sufficient enough to secure the stability of the 
polity from the intrigues and machinations of conflicting doctrines, and to 
provide a common reference to transcend those particular interests. For Madison 
and other framers of the Constitution, the objective was to construct a political 
framework that took into account the diversity of competing positions and 
worked to channel the ambitions and passions “in the direction of a common, 
public good" (Krouse, 1983: 63). The burden rested on justifying a set of 
political principles capable of appealing to competing interests to take up
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Hamilton’s call to responsibly form good government based on reasonable 
reflection and choice,
The political point that emerges from this discussion is that any 
undertaking to legitimate a form of political society must also entail a 
justification of the principles upon which the polity will be constructed. While 
some regimes may resort to terror, force, or coercion to impose the “legitimacy” 
of the State upon the population, democratic polities are based on the assumption 
that legitimacy is obtained only through the uncoerced and participatory consent 
of citizens who have a vested interest in the political affairs affecting their lives. 
Madison’s project is thus in many respects no different from Rawls’s theoretical 
experiment to justify political liberalism as the legitimating framework for a 
constitutional democratic regime, whose legitimacy cannot be imposed by force.
Like Madison, Rawls recognizes that political life is replete with 
"prejudice and bias, self- and group-interest, blindness and willfulness” which 
can turn political practices into, as Ambrose Bierce defines it, “the conduct of 
public affairs for privaLe advantage,’02 And just as Madison noted that “neither 
moral or religious notions can be relied on" for negotiating the contested terrain 
of political society, Rawls, too, is concerned with providing a viable framework 
for a constitutional polity that does not rely on comprehensive moral, religious, 
or metaphysical doctrines. In terms reminiscent of Madison, Raxvls argues that 
“no general moral conception can provide a publicly recognized basis for justice 
in a modern democratic society” (1985: 225). For Rawls, the single most 
important conception for working out the basic structure of a modern 
constitutional democracy into “one unified system of social cooperation” is a
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free-standing political conception ofjustice as fairness that would be, “so far as 
possible, independent of controversial philosophical and religious doctrines” 
(1985: 223), The political conception ofjustice as fairness would navigate the 
sometimes treacherous fields of metaphysical claims of universal truths, human 
nature, and especially transcendent goods that would, more than likely, impede 
the practical political undertaking of justifying principles of a democratic 
political society in non-metaphysical terms.
Since liberalism embraces a range of fundamental freedoms and rights that 
give great latitude to how human beings will pursue the creation of fulfilling 
individual lives, “deep disagreements . . .  as to how the values of liberty and 
equality are best realized in the basic structure of society” invariably take place 
(Rawls, 1985: 227). Many of these deep disagreements stem from 
incommensurate conceptions of the good that inform individual private lives 
spilling over into the public political domain where they become instruments for 
narrowly-vested political purposes. This is evidenced, for example, in the 
domestic political affairs of the United States, where a politicized religious 
extremism has mobilized extensive resources for the purposes of imposing a 
religious comprehensive doctrine on private and public morality, sexual relations 
and public education that would threaten many of the basic rights and liberties 
centra! to that constitutional representative democracy. This particular example 
illustrates the kind of intervention into political society with which Madison was 
so concerned, where individuals mobilize to “use the coercive apparatus of the 
state to win for themselves a greater liberty or larger distributive share on the 
grounds that their activities are of more intrinsic value” (Rawls, 1985: 229).
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The conflicts generated by the clashes between religious extremism and 
advocates of liberal political principles of fundamental rights and freedoms has 
not been altogether reasonable or tolerant. Madison would certainly consider 
such a situation as threatening to the stability of popular government because of 
the manner and methods by which certain factions were unreasonably questioning 
the legitimacy of its democratic framework. Rawls would also view this situation 
as threatening, bee use “certain fundamental questions give rise to sharp and 
divisive political controversy, and it seems difficult, if not impossible, to find 
any shared basis of political agreement” (1985: 226). But dissensus between 
citizens and political factions also arise over issues of systemic injustice that 
reveal varying degrees of disregard for substantive liberal principles, such as the 
long-term struggle to overcome racial-ethnic discrimination or fully implement 
1 4th Amendment equal protection guarantees of constitutional civil and political 
rights in the face of unfair state practices.
However, individuals or groups which call into question the “fundamental 
intuitive ideas” as they are worked Into a liberal political society or attempt to 
manipulate the constitutional or legislative framework to the disadvantage of the 
rights and liberties of other persons, force social tensions into what can be 
considered a legitimation crisis.13 I believe that Rawls’s theoretical experiment 
presupposes the contingencies of periodic legitimation crises that beset liberal 
democratic societies and challenge the coherency and justification of liberal 
principles. To a large degree these emerge as challenges to the two fundamental 
components of Rawls’s conception ofjustice as fairness: rights and liberties and 
a fair distribution of resources. Invariably the relations between the individual, 
government, and society serve as the lens through which attacks against rights,
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liberties, and fair distribution of resources are focused. In this light justice as 
fairness, the priority of right, and overlapping consensus can be considered as 
three theoretical tools with practical application for confronting conditions which 
threaten the principles legitimating the stability and unity of a constitutional 
polity. Crisis situations provide a crucial opportunity for reassessing the tools 
and principles employed for creating a just and reasonable framework “sufficient 
to underwrite a just constitutional regim, ” (Rawls, 19S5; 247).
One of the many complaints leveled against liberal political philosophy 
is that the commitment to individualism, grounded on mistaken metaphysical 
premises, necessarily results in insufficient attention being given to the fact that 
individuals are embedded in and never detached from the communal, social, and 
cultural relations that contribute to forming the individual’s identity and moral 
linkages.^ These criticisms, at least in regards to Rawls’s work, were no doubt 
principally inspired by his ideas of the veil of ignorance with an “unencumbered 
self'  placed in the original position, allegedly “ independent of  its contingent 
wants and aims” (Sandel, 1982: 20). One of the most vocal critics has been 
Michael Sandel, who writes:
What is denied to the unencumbered self is the possibility of membership 
in any community bound by moral ties antecedent to choice; he cannot 
belong to any community where the self itself could be at stake. Such a 
community—call it constitutive as against merely cooperative--wouId 
engage the identity as well as the interests of the participants, and so 
implicate its members in a citizenship more thorough-going than the 
unencumbered self ean know, (1982: 19)
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But Sandel’s objection misses the practical aim that Rawls is working 
towards, namely, “to provide a more secure and acceptable basis for 
constitutional principles and basic rights and liberties” (Rawls, 1985: 226). This 
is not an easy task, as Rawls well understands. He recognizes the fact that 
individuals are situated in communities, and that the diversity of those settings 
also implies “a diversity of doctrines and [a] plurality of conflk ting, and indeed, 
incommensurable, conceptions of the good affirmed by the members of existing” 
communities (1985: 225). The fact that there are different settings “constitutive” 
of moral ties, identities and interests motivates Rawls, as it did Madison, to 
undertakethe serious practical task of elaborating a non-metaphysicalconception 
of justice that steers clear oT controversial religious, moral, or metaphysical 
doctrines. Individuals embodying different frameworks of values do not always 
agree or cooperate in a reasonable manner over what should be the political 
principles of a democratic polity nor how those principles will be implemented 
and realized in political, social, and economic life. Thus Rawls is not fabricating 
an abstract individual that can assume a transcendent kind ofjustice, because the 
aim of the political conception of justice as fairness is practical in that it “can 
serve as the basis of informed and willing political agreement between citizens 
viewed as free and equal persons" (1985: 230).
As 1 argued in the previous section, citizens viewed as free and equal in 
no way suggests that they are somehow magically unencumbered from their 
constitutive identities or comprehensive doctrines. Rawls’s endeavor to recast 
the social contract in terms of an overlapping consensus requires negotiating the 
empirical contingencies of individual difference, social dissensus, and histories
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that are the ‘‘all-encompassing framework” in which we are embedded. Yet as 
Rawls states, “the reason why the original posi tion must abstract from and not be 
affected by the contingencies of the social world is that the conditions for a fair 
agreement on the principles of political justice between free and equal persons 
must eliminate the bargaining advantages which inevitably arise within 
background institutions of any society as the result of cumulative, social, 
historical, and natural tendencies” (1985: 235-36), Like Madison, Rawls is not 
concerned with eliminating the causes of dissensus but in practically navigating 
the effects in such a way as to “shape into one coherent view the deeper bases of 
agreement embedded in the public political culture of a constitutional regime and 
acceptable to its most Firmly held considered convictions” (1985: 229).
As we have seen, Rawls presupposes the general fact that a democratic 
political culture contains certain fundamental intuitive ideas concerning rights 
and liberties that can be worked up into a political conception ofjustice suitable 
for a democratic constitutional regime. We can also grant that for any public 
political agreements to be achieved, many of the fundamental intuitive ideas must 
also have found their way, albeit perhaps somewhat altered, into the background 
doctrines of civil society. The original position only serves to model what Rawls 
considers fair conditions whereby free and equal citizens can elaborate the terms 
of social cooperation in the case of the basic structure of society. In this manner, 
a framework could be secured enabling individuals to pursue both private and 
cooperative goods over a complete life. Sandel’s argument that Rawls’s 
individual could not experience either a constitutive community or a deeply 
meaningful citizenship begins to lose its plausibility.
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However, Sandel does not stop there. He is also very disturbed by the 
priority Rawls places on universal rights for setting limits on permissible ways 
of life, as well as for their implication in creating the abstract free and equal 
citizen. Sandel is concerned that the “universalizing logic of rights” has 
displaced direct political life from smaller fora of participation to the universal, 
comprehensive dimension of the State, This he considers to be the supposedly 
dangerous contemporary predicament of the “unencumbered self.” Sandel offers 
the following description of the current political situation as he perceives it:
[I]t is a striking feature of the welfare state that it offers a powerful 
promise of individual rights, and also demands of its citizens a high 
measure of mutual engagement. But the self-image that attends the rights 
cannot sustain the engagement.
As bearers of rights, where rights are trumps, we think of ourselves 
as freely choosing, individual selves, unbound by obligations antecedent 
to rights, or to agreements we make. . . .
In our public life, we are more entangled, but less attached, than 
ever before. It is as though the unencumbered self presupposed by the 
liberal ethic had begun to come true -- less liberated than disempowered, 
entangled in a network of obligations and involvements unassociated with 
any act of the will, and yet unmediated by those common identifications 
orexpansive self-definitions that would make them tolerable. As the scale 
of social and political organization has become more comprehensive, the 
terms of our collective identity have become more fragmented, and the
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forms of political life have outrun the common purpose needed to sustain 
them. (1992:28)
Sandel paints a grim tableau oflife in a liberal democratic polity, but his 
reflections are part nostalgic fiction and part misconstrual of the landscape we 
live in. The nostalgic fiction is implicit in the above characterization ofliberal 
democracies as an ensnaring matrix of abstracted rights, obligations, and 
entanglements that disempower individuals from being able to exercise will- 
governed acts of genuine meaning entwined with collective identities and 
common purposes. According to Sandel, true individuality cannot be experienced 
in the anomic, fragmentary spaces of the all-encompassing welfare state where 
we are compelled by rationalized obligations to engage with other individuals. 
Instead, the saving grace that lies within Sandel’s denunciation of liberalism is 
some unnamed living solidarity of persons in a community defined by antecedent 
moral bonds and common purposes that create a “true” local political life. In that 
association, rights are not necessary as trumps against others because they would 
be irrelevant in such a community of self-sustaining mutual aid and respect. But 
just where does SandePs counter-example exist? Sandel’s criticism clearly 
misses the sources of fragmentation and disempowerment to which he should be 
directing his attention, such as unequal and unjust economic development and 
consumption, decaying urban spaces, degraded environments, extensive 
movements of populations, social and familial violence, and so forth, which 
cannot be so conveniently blamed on liberalism. In many respects, the invention 
of universal rights or, better yet, human rights has proven to be one of the most 
effective tools for addressing assaults on human well-being and dignity.
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Rawls’s priority ofright is an essential element in his political conception 
ofjustice as fairness in that “the principles of (political) justice set limits to 
permissible ways of life; hence the claims citizens make to pursue ends that 
transgress those limits have no weight” (1988: 251). John Stuart Mill succinctly 
explained the purpose of such a political morality in the well-known third chapter 
of his On Liberty:
That mankind are not infallible; that their truths, for the most part, are 
only half-truths; that unity of opinion, unless resulting from the fullest and 
freest comparison of opposite opinions, is not desirable, and diversity not 
an evil, but a good, until mankind are much more capable than at the 
present of recognizing all the sides of the truth, are principles applicable 
to men’s modes of action, not less than to their opinions. (1991: (53)
In minimal terms, rights can be considered as deliberately considered rules 
in an informal or formal rule-governed system which protect certain claims of 
right-holders by imposing reciprocal duties. However, I believe that this does not 
fully convey thesenseof mutuality, solidarity, and reciprocity implicit to human 
rights, nor dies it capture the importance Rawls gives to the complementarity 
between right and good. Human rights should be understood both as positive 
principles invoked by moral persons to aid and cooperate with other individuals 
in securing, protecting, and promoting the full realization of fundamental rights 
and liberties, and as negative principles not to impede or coerce other individuals 
from participating in securing, protecting, and promoting the conditions in which 
individuals will be enabled to fully develop their moral powers. As Rawls puts 
it:
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[T]he equal liberties and freedom of speech and thought enable us to 
develop and exercise these powers by participating in society’s political 
life and by assessing the justice and effectiveness of its laws and social 
policies; and liberty of conscience and freedom of association enable us 
to develop and exercise our moral powers in forming, revising, and 
rationally pursuing our conceptions of the good that belong to our 
comprehensive doctrines, and affirming them as such. (19S9; 262)
In his work, Rawls is concerned with distinguishing that his political 
conception of justice elaborated through political liberalism is not a 
comprehensive doctrine embracing the whole of life and defining the moral 
boundaries for each kind of relation we are engaged in. For political liberalism 
to attain that kind of totalizing insinuation into a democratic pluralistic civil 
society, “only the oppressive use of state power" could be used to “maintain a 
continuing affirmation of one comprehensive . . . doctrine” (1989: 246). Rawls 
believes that a constitutional democratic state should be grounded in the 
fundamental intuitive idea of society as a fair system of cooperation between free 
and equal persons who are fully cooperating members of society over a complete 
life, Rawls’s version of the social contract is replete with the importance of 
participation, cooperation, civility, tolerance, mutual and self-respect: terms that 
no doubt Sandel would consider as exemplary of social relations in his 
meaningful, non-contractarian community. But the difference is that Rawls 
stresses the importance of individuals having the appropriate conditions of 
fundamental rights and liberties to make the important deliberations and 
decisions which affect their lives. To develop and exercises one’s full moral
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powers, a setting is needed where individual action and social cooperation are 
“guided by publicly recognized rules and procedures which those who are 
cooperating accept and regard as properly regulating their conduct” (Rawls, 1985: 
232),
Rawls of course sees these rules and procedures as based on the principles 
ofjustice as fairness. In order for political liberalism to justify its principles as 
a legitimating framework for the basic structure of a democratic polity a 
reciprocal tolerance is needed between those principles and other religious, 
philosophical, or moral comprehensive doctrines. This reciprocal tolerance is a 
necessary feature of Rawls's well-ordered society where there is “a public 
understanding not only about the kinds of claims it is appropriate for citizens to 
make when questions of political justice arise, but also about how such claims are 
to be supported" (1988: 255). The key is revealed in Rawls’s understanding that 
right and good arc complementary, and provide that nexus for finding “a shared 
idea of citizen’s good that is appropriate for political purposes . , . that is 
independent of any particular comprehensive doctrine and hence may be the focus 
of an overlapping consensus” (1988: 256).
The right and the good are complementary in the sense that publicly 
affirmed rules and regulations covering permissible and impermissible actions do 
not force a single metaphysical good on all individuals, but contribute to public 
conditions being secured and promoted that enable each person to pursue his or 
her conception of the good, either singularly or in community, as long as it does 
not transgress the limit of permissibility. As Rawls explains, “permissible 
comprehensive conceptions of the good, however distinct their content and their 
related religious and philosophical doctrines, require for their advancement
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roughly the same primary goods, that is, the same basic rights, liberties, and 
opportunities, as well as the same all-purpose means such as income and wealth, 
all of which are secured by the same social bases of self-respect” (1988: 257),
Sanders criticism that the “universalizing logic of rights" is somehow the 
cause of alienation and fragmentation overlooks the good that has been achieved 
through the post-Second World War human rights system, especially wrhen 
combined with democratic practices. It also overlooks that human beings all over 
the planet who, on a daily basis, face illiberal regimes and practices aspire to be 
the moral subjects of human rights and appeal to them for protecting their well­
being and dignity. It is evident that comprehensive doctrines that only 
minimally, or not at all, embrace the kinds of principles espoused in Rawls’s 
political liberalism have taken unfair advantage of political, social, and economic 
relations in such a fashion as to undermine the stability of human rights as the 
primary core ofjustice as fairness.
The two principles ofjustice seek to enable all persons, regardless of their 
identities or histories, to equally benefit from the scheme of human rights and 
liberties, and provide a limiting restraint to inequalities through an ethic of 
sharing the burdens of inequalities more equally. Since we are indeed situated 
in particular social contexts that are constitutive of our diverse characters, values, 
and goods, Rawls’s rights and principles ofjustice serve as a threshold of dignity 
which should guide our relations with other persons and give us the permissible 
latitude to choose how we will lead our lives, However, Sandel argues that these 
terms of the social contract by "their very arbitrariness” of imposing 
“entanglements” of rights and claims and the imposition of a “false" ethic of 
sharing are remote from the particular moral ties that constitute the real bonds
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where sharing is something more than the redistribution of resources for the 
public good of a “concatenated collectivity” (1992: 20-24). But why should we 
consider that human rights or an ethic of sharing the burdens of inequalities are 
somehow disingenuous compared to what might exist in some romanticized 
“traditional” community? Do rights, liberties, or an ethic of sharing resources to 
secure citizen’s fundamental needs fail some test of substantiality whereby they 
cannot serve as basic values constitutive of who we are as human beings engaged 
in both common and private purposes?
Sandel in fact fails to provide any plausible evidence to show that some 
traditional constitutive community which regards “commonality” as fundamental 
could provide the conditions by which a human being can fully develop his or her 
moral powers as an individual and citizen in a polyethnic culture. Indeed, the 
20th century struggle for human rights and freedoms has been principally against 
the prejudices of traditions that discriminate against “otherness.” Human rights 
as part of a society’s constitutional framework also place obligations on 
legislative majorities to respect and protect those rights regardless of the 
particularities that differentiate us as human beings. This is where Sandel and 
other communitarians misunderstand what the liberal individual is and the role 
that human rights play in today’s pluralist political and civil societies. Human 
rights serve not as the identification of a single, unchanging nature for all human 
beings. They are, instead, political and ethical principles that human beings have 
worked out for treating each other’s well-being and dignity while respecting the 
differences that otherwise distinguish them.35 Thus, as Thomas Nagel recognizes, 
the “radical communitarian view that nothing in personal life is beyond the
106
legitimate control of the community if its dominant values are at stake js the main 
contemporary threat to human rights” (1995: 106),
The centrality of civil and political rights to attaining and sustaining this 
project of obtaining human well-being is of great ethical importance. Freedom 
of expression, belief, conscience, religion, association, equality before the law, 
and security of person, all contribute a dynamic component to a liberal political 
society by the very fact that the individuals constituting it are empowered via 
political principles with moral import, When combined with the cultivation of 
just and fair conditions supportive of social cooperation and individual choice, 
reciprocally complementary experiences of self- and mutual respect are bound to 
make both public and private lives substantially meaningful and connected. As 
Rawls notes (1989; 249), differences and diversity are then accepted as a healthy 
state of public democratic culture. It is through these practices and principles 
actuated within our lives that a liberal political society can generate commitments 
to cooperatively justify its principles by addressing the affairs that are important 
to our lives as members of that society and by legitimating its constitutional 
stability through protecting individual rights and liberties. Rawls’s justice as 
fairness and the priority of right serve not only as non-metaphysical principles 
for securing the conditions necessary for human dignity, but also for establishing 
fair rules and conditions of cooperation and participation so that different 
individuals can work out the everyday essentials of living together.36
It is true, however, that another difficulty, which I have purposely avoided 
up to this point, is presented with Rawls’s theory of basic rights and liberties. 
Rawls’s political conception ofjustice draws upon the public political culture of 
Western democratic societies. Consequently, Rawls stipulates that one of the
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basic assumptions on which the application of his conception to the basic 
structure of society rests is the following;
I assume that the basic structure is that of a closed society; that is, we are 
to regard it as self-contained and as having no relations with other 
societies. . . . That a society is closed is a considerable abstraction, 
justified only because it enables us to focus on certain main questions free 
from distracting details, At some point a political conception ofjustice 
must address the just relations between peoples, or the law of peoples, as 
I shall say, (1996; 12)
Clearly, the theory ofjustice that we have analyzed up to this point is 
meant by Rawls to address the issue ofjustice within a single society. As Rawls 
admits, this leaves issues of international justice out of the picture. Yet it is 
certain that the questions of international justice andhuman rights are at the heart 
of the problems with which Rawls’s political philosophy are ultimately 
concerned. This is particularly apparent in Rawls’s focus on the basic rights and 
liberties of persons in today’s culturally diverse societies. But does Rawls’s 
assumption that his theory is constructed in terms of a “closed” liberal- 
democratic society negate the possibility that principles of political right are 
applicable across the boundaries of diverse political cultures? To address this 
question, what must be examined next is how well Rawls’s theory succeeds in 
developing a conception of international justice consonant with the domestic 
conception ofjustice and, ultimately, with the notion of universal human rights.
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Chapter Three
Rawls and the Question of International Justice
Although the discussion in the previous chapter sought to establish that Rawls’s 
theory ofjustice contains a central role for basic human rights, it has not yet been 
established that Rawls provides the kind of extension ofjustice as fairness to an 
international level that must be regarded as a corollary to the modern conception 
of human rights. Over the course of the next two chapters I intend to establish 
that Rawls’s work does indeed allow for that extension, although I will argue that 
Rawls unnecessarily limits the range of that extension.
The purpose of the present chapter is to explore how the domestic theory 
of justice as fairness presented in A Theory of Justice might be expanded into the 
international domain and thus provide the framework of a theory of international 
justice that is both consistent with Rawls’s overall treatment ofjustice and yet 
also develops some of those areas that remain unexplicated by Rawls. Doing so 
will brine out some of the conceptual difficulties and practical consequences of 
extending justice as fairness on an international scale. The next chapter will then 
carry the discussion forward into the context of Rawls’s more recent thoughts on 
international justice and human rights.
To begin with, then, in section one I shall review what Rawls has to say 
about international justice in A Theory of Justice and then over the course of the 
chapter flesh out those rather sparse remarks into what I hope is a more revealing
109
discussion of international justice as fairness. In the second section, I draw 
attention to two fundamental problems in Rawls account of international justice: 
first, the priority of the domestic original position over the international original 
position; and second, the analogy he draws between individuals and states. In the 
third section, I examine Thomas Pogge’s arguments concerningaRawIsiangloba! 
justice as they relate to the issue of diversity or social pluralism. This leads, in 
the fourth section, to a discussion of the principle of self-determination and how 
certain difficulties with this principle problematize the law of nations scheme 
endorsed by Rawls, In section five, I consider the possibility of extending 
Rawls’s two principles ofjustice to a global scale and some criticisms that might 
be raised against this move,
3.1 Rawls's Account of International Justice
In A Theory of Justice. Rawls divides the problem of social justice into three 
stages: that concerning the justice of domestic institutions; that concerning 
individuals; and that concerning international justice and the conduct of states 
(1971: 377), In the first two stages, the primary subject ofjustice is essentially 
the basic structure of domestic society, that is, the way in which the major social 
institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine the division 
of advantages from social cooperation. In the previous chapter I discussed the 
principles of justice in light of which the basic structure of society can be 
evaluated are specified by means of Rawls’s hypothetical social contract and 
rational choice procedure.
110
According to Rawls, once the principles of justice as they apply to the 
basic structure of domestic society and to individuals have been derived, one may 
extend the interpretation of the original position and “think of the parties as 
representatives of different nations" choosing together the fundamental principles 
to adjudicate conflicting claims among states (1971: 378), Those parties to the 
international original position are, as were those to the domestic original 
position, represented as rational (choosing among principles by reference to the 
interests of their nations as defined by the principles of justice already 
acknowledged), symmetrically and equally, and as deciding for appropriate 
reasons; the parties know nothing about the particular circumstances of their own 
society, its power and strength in comparison with other societies, nor do they 
know their place in their own society. However, Rawls suggests that the parties 
do know that nation-states arc the historical reality of the day and that nation­
states, like individuals in society, will have conflicts of interest (3 971: lOSff, 
378). “This original position,” writes Rawls (1971: 378), “is fair between 
nations; it nullifies the contingencies and biases of historical fate." I will argue 
in the sections which follow that the international original position offered by 
Rawls does not in fact nullify certain significant historical contingencies and 
biases, and that his theory is thus flawed.
As Rawls’s aim here is an account of international justice, the nations so 
represented need to choose principles to order their interactions and to adjudicate 
any conflicting claims between parties. Before the principles ofjustice that 
would be chosen under this model can be indicated, however, it is first necessary 
to briefly describe the formal constraints of right that would apply to the choice 
procedure of the parties. The first constraint on the parties is that any set of
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possible principles of international justice must be narrowed such that their 
derivation is consistent with the institutional and individual principles ofjustice 
already chosen in the domestic context of justice as fairness. Just as the 
individual and social institutional principles of the domestic context together had 
to form a coherent conception of justice as fairness, so too are international 
principles to conform to the previously established conception ofjustice.
The second constraint is b, sed upon one of the conditions of the 
rationality of the parties. According to the condition of strict compliance, the 
principles Finally acknowledged will constitute the basis for an ideal theory of 
international justice. In Rawls’s words, “the parties can rely on each other to 
understand and act in accordance with whatever principles are Finally agreed to. 
Once principles are acknowledged the parties can depend on one another to 
conform to them” (1971: 145). This constraint allows for the parties to 
concentrate on selecting those principles of reciprocal advantage for well-ordered 
nations that will become the foundation for the basic institutions of a well- 
ordered society of nations.
Given these two constraints, the parties can now consider the principles 
to be chosen with respect to the matter of international relations. In Rawls’s 
opinion, the “familiar principles** of international law, or what he refers to as the 
law of nations, would be chosen under this scenario (1971: 378). The first 
principle of international justice to be chosen is apparent given the conception of 
the parties as free and equal. This is the basic principle of equality: 
“Independent peoples organized as states have certain fundamental equal rights” 
(1971; 378). This principle analogizes the status of individuals as free and equal 
to that of states, and is the consequence of the transfer of moral status of
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individuals to nation-states based upon the characterization of the parties to the 
international original position as representatives of states. Rawls remarks that 
the principle of equality between nations, that is, the idea that the fundamental 
rights and obligations of all nations are the same, is a long-standing principle of 
international law, indeed is the “basic principle of the law of nations” (1971: 
378).37 The principle of equality seems required, of course, by the very structure 
of the original position ind the constraints outlined above, since it is fundamental 
to establishing reciprocal relationships for mutual advantage and cooperation. 
Rawls’s point here is that international law would not retain its legitimacy and 
force if nations were not treated equally under it.
The second principle to be chosen is that of self-determination, that is, 
"the right of a people to settle its own affairs without the intervention of foreign 
powers" (1971: 378). This principle means that each nation’s conception of the 
good, being protected by the principle of equality, is deemed legitimate and of 
equal worth. Because the particularities of specific conceptions of the good are 
unknown behind the veil of ignorance, the parties could not reasonably agree to 
a principle which would allow ranking of differing conceptions, thereby putting 
their own nation’s conception of the good in jeopardy. Any other principle 
permitting one nation’s predominance over or interference in the internal affairs 
of another state, due solely to differing conceptions of the good, could not be 
allowed and would violate the principle of equality. Rawls claims that the 
principle of self-determination thus carries with it aright to non-intervention and 
a right to self-defense, with the latter right implying principles of just war (jus 
ad helium and ius in bello). Rawls’s brevity on the connection between self­
determination and non-intervention leaves much to be desired, since he seems not
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to recognize that the right to be free from foreign interference can operate so as 
to preclude humanitarian intervention or even investigation into the so-called 
internal affairs of a sovereign state in the event of unjust violence or abuses of 
human rights on the part of that state.38 Rawls would reply, of  course, that his 
comments on self-determination are given with the assumption that more-or-less 
just states are in view under an ideal theory of justice as fairness and strict 
compliance. I return to this matter below.
The third principle acknowledged by the parties in the original position is 
the basic principle of obligation, traditionally known as the principle of pacta 
sunt servanda (“treaties are to be observed”), which means that states must carry 
out their treaty obligations in good faith and without exception (1971: 378). This 
principle is needed if the international order is to be given a reciprocal structure. 
It can be viewed as encompassing the individual analog of fairness, combined 
with the duty of mutual respect, already acknowledged at the domestic level. 
Consequently, nations must acknowledge and take responsibility for their 
international claims and actions. The principle of obligation thereby establishes 
the contours of reciprocity in international relations.
According to Rawls, then, these three principles (and their corollaries) 
taken together form a foundation for erecting a basic structure of international 
justice. These principles are intended to represent the final stage of a coherent 
theory ofjustice as fairness when aligned with the previously derived principles 
of individuals and domestic social institutions. Although the discussion of 
international justice provided by Rawls in A Theory of Justice is clearly 
minimalist (two pages out of a book of nearly 600 pages) in comparison to his 
treatment ofj ustice as fairness at the domestic level, Rawls nevertheless indicates
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an expectation that his domestic theory can be extended such as to cover 
international affairs, Rawls himself admits, however, that A Theory of Justice 
"does not pursue these larger matters” (1989: 252). In the sections that follow 
I discuss a number of problematic assumptions contained in Rawls’s theory of 
international j ustice and propose several changes to his theory that would, I think, 
result in a fuller conception of international justice which nevertheless retains its 
Rawlsian character. 39 In the next section, I address some of t h ' difficulties 
presented by Rawls's account of the international original position.
3.2 The International Original Position
Rawls characterizes the international original position as follows:
Let us assume that we have already derived the principles ofjustice 
as these apply to societies as units and to the basic structure. 
Imagine also that the various principles of natural duty and of 
obligation that apply to individuals have been adopted. , . . Now 
at this point one may extend the interpretation of the original 
position and think of the parties as representatives of different 
nations who must choose together the fundamental principles to 
adjudicate conflicting claims among states. . . . Once again the 
contracting parties, in this case representatives of states, are 
allowed only enough knowledge to make a rational choice to 
protect their interests but not so much that the more fortunate 
among them can take advantage of their special situation. , . .
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Justice between states is determined by the principles that would 
be chosen in the original position so interpreted. (1971: 377-78)
As was mentioned above, this original position is considered fair by Rawls 
such that it “nullifies the contingencies and biases of historical fate” (1971; 378). 
The point in ideal theory of nullifying the effects of specific historical 
contingencies is to ensure that the parties to the original position will not exploit 
such contingencies to their own advantage when it comes to the choice of 
principles of international justice. The question that I will examine here, 
however, is whether the original position and the veil of ignorance limitations 
portrayed by Rawls do meet that desired purpose,
Thomas Pogge takes the position that Rawls does not, at least in A Theory 
of Justice, distinguish between uvo possible readings of his interpretation on how 
the contractarian device is to apply at the international level (1989: 242ff.). On 
one possible reading, R t, the parties to the international original position 
represent persons from the different societies; on another possible reading, R2, 
the parties to the original position represent states. In both cases, of  course, the 
international original position is utilized only after the principles ofjustice have 
been chosen at the domestic level.
It seems clear, however, that Rawls intends the parties to the international 
original position to no longer be mutually disinterested persons, Rather, given 
Rawls’s insistence that the international original position only comes into play 
subsequent to the establishment of domestic “societies as units” at an earlier 
stage, it is certain that the participants are literally, in Rawls’s words, 
“representatives of different nations” and “representatives of states” (1971: 378),
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Consequently, the parties are to be understood in Rawls’s account as 
representatives of nation-states, and not of persons, in an initial situation where 
they are to choose principles for structuring the relations between states.
Pogge’s claim that two possible readings of Rawls’s description of the 
international original position can be found in A Theory ofjustice thus appears 
unfounded. It does nevertheless point to what I think are the two fundamental 
flaws of that very description: first, the priority of the domestic choice situation 
over the international choice situation and, second, the analogy between 
individuals and states. More specifically, I am concerned that each of these 
features in Rawls’s theory undermines the attempt to establish a genuinely fair 
choice situation from which principles of international justice can be derived in 
ideal theory.
The problem with Rawls’s prioritization of the domestic over the 
international choice situation is that it negates the ethical advantages gained 
through the utilization of the veil of ignorance. Rawls concedes that the parties 
to the international original position "know nothing about the particular 
circumstances of their own society, its power and strength in comparison with 
other nations" (1971; 378), However, the parties do know a most important fact, 
namely, that the societies of the participants are nation-states and the parties are 
to serve as representatives of those states. This is problematic because the idea 
and existence of the nation-state is a uniquely modern, historically contingent 
factor that ideally ought not to have an influence on the selection of principles 
ofinternational justice. In other words, Rawls assumes without justification that 
international justice is concerned only with relationships between states and not 
relationships between persons who reside in various societies.
117
This problem is exacerbated by Rawls’s presupposition that the domestic 
principles, of justice apply to societies that are “self-contained national 
communities]” or "more or less self-sufficient association^] of persons" (1971: 
457, 8), While Rawls insists that the priority of the domestic over the 
international choice situations is intended to guarantee that the parties to the 
international original position are states that have already adopted domestic 
principles ofjustice there is no similar guarantee that the parties will be willing 
to extend the same principles to others when it comes to dealing with one another 
solely as sovereign states. In setting up the international original position as he 
does, Rawls unnecessarily burdens it with the type of contingent historical 
elements missing from the domestic original position. If domestic societies are 
conceived as more or less self-contained or self-sufficient states, what motivation 
might they have Tor agreeing to principles of justice that would govern 
international relations? Even an inter-state system in which each state is 
committed to ensuring justice within its own borders might fall short of an 
international society based on equal rights and liberties for all persons, wherever 
those persons might happen to reside at any given time. In Rawls’s description 
of the international original position, in which the parties are states, the right to 
political equality, fair equality of opportunity, and the difference principle extend 
up to but not necessarily beyond the national level.
The problem of prioritizing the domestic over the international is further 
reflected in the analogy Rawls draws between individuals and states. In 
particular, Rawls analogizes the interests, equality, and autonomy of persons with 
the interests, equality, and sovereignty of states (1971: 378). In this way he 
apparently derives a convenient device for shifting the identities of the parties to
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the original position. In the domestic original position, the participants are 
individual persons; while in the international original position, the participants 
are representatives of states. In both cases the parties are conceived of as “ free 
and equal” and having similar interests. There are, however, significant 
differences between the two types of participants which I believe would have a 
negative impact on the principles ofjustice that would ultimately be chosen, 
Moreover, it is not clear to me just how he participants can move from their 
status as individuals to that of state representatives unless Rawls incorporates 
several unnecessary assumptions into his theory.
In ihe domestic choice situation, of course, the aim is to select those 
principles that will guarantee individuals an equal or equitable share of those 
social primary goods necessary in a just and well-ordered society. The principles 
ofjustice adapted are therefore those that are in the best interest of individuals, 
within a situation in w'hich the constraints of having a morality are enforced. As 
a result, the domestic original position is said to represent fair conditions among 
free and equal moral persons, that is, persons who possess the capacity to 
exercise their moral powers with respect to how a just society ought to be 
organized.
In the international choice situation described by Rawls the aim and 
method of ideal theory appears to take a backseat to the dictates of a realist view 
of international politics. No longer are the participants moral persons, rather they 
are fully formed nation-states, or the “representatives” of those states. The 
problem here, I want to argue, is that this move changes the entire complexion of 
a Rawlsian idea! theory of justice. This is because Rawls overdetermines the 
characteristics of the original position: the question is not left open as to what
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type of system of international justice will be adopted by the participants to the 
original position, since Rawls has already defined those participants as nation­
states and has already indicated that international justice is relevant only insofar 
as it can “adjudicate conflicting claims among states” (1971: 378). 
Consequently, the interest that is to be taken into consideration by each 
contracting party when selecting the principles of international justice is the 
“national interest” of the state apparatus, which does not neces sarily coincide 
with the interests of moral persons (1971; 379). To repeat the point bluntly, the 
representatives of states who function as parties to the international original 
position are there to "protect their [nation’s] interests” (1971; 378). It is little 
wonder then that Rawls observes that “there would be no surprises” among the 
principles of international justice adopted in such a choice situation, since the 
principles would be the "familiar ones" of the traditional law of nations (1971: 
37S). Yet it is not at all clear to me that, if the participants were moral persons 
such as those conceived in Rawls’s domestic theory ofjustice, they would in fact 
adopt such all-too-famiiiar principles.
I would argue that the concept of international justice differs from that of 
domestic justice insofar as it refers to a set of (moral and political) principles that 
transcend the narrow interests defined by a nation-state’s historically-contingent 
borders. It is from this perspective that Rawls’s account of international justice 
succumbs to the present day dictates of realism in international politics. And yet 
an ideal theory of international justice should be concerned not so much with 
what is but with what ought to be, not so much with adopting “familiar” rules of 
political realism but with articulating principles with which to evaluate those 
existing rules and suggest goals for transforming them. An ideal theory of
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international justice must be, in the end, about how the world ought to be 
organized. If that is the standard, then Rawls’s theory aims too low.
3,3 Some Problems with Rawls’s Theory of International Justice:
Diversity and Self-Determination
In the argument that has been offered so far I have suggested that Rawls’s 
description of the international original position is flawed because, first, Rawls 
prioritizes domestic justice above international justice and, second, he replaces 
the interests of persons with those of states in the choice situation and thereby 
assumes that the interests are analogous. More needs to be said, however, about 
how these features of the international original position result in principles of 
international justice that do not, in important respects, live up to the same 
rigorous standards of domestic justice proposed by Rawls, In this section I 
consider some of the principles of international justice that Rawls claims would 
be adopted by the parties to the international original position as modeled in A 
Theory of Justice, and show how these principles are deficient for purposes of 
constructing a robust theory of international justice.
Thomas Pogge's contention that Rawls does not clearly distinguish 
between two possible readings of his account of the international original 
position, while not necessarily accurate, ean nevertheless prove useful as a 
starting point for our analysis. Pogge’s criticisms of Rawls’s views on 
international justice are grounded on Rawls’s endorsement of the “familiar 
principles" of international law and the two possible readings on how the 
contractarian device is to be applied at the international level. On reading R,} it
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will be recalled, the global parties represent persons from the different societies; 
on reading R2 they represent states. Pogge’s argues that the endorsement of a 
conventional version of the law of nations and the two readings go against 
important Rawlsian commitments, specifically the need to focus on the basic 
structure of society as well as the moral conception of persons.
Pogge contends that the absence of a single world government is not the 
fundamental problem facing international justice. Instead, according to Pogge, 
the weakness of international law is due to the fact that states presently operate 
within a realist political system in which international relations are a modus 
vivendi. that is, states are concerned only to further their own interests and inter­
state relations are carried out only on prudential grounds. In such a system, 
relatively weak international institutions are the result of governmental practices 
based on prudential, rather than moral, reasons informed by the current 
distribution of power. As a result, finding a moral reason to support some part 
of this international order—for instance, international human rights agreements— 
is very difficult, since such agreements can be seen as just another step in 
prudential behavior.
Given an intergovernmental modus vivendi. assurance and stability 
problems in international relations are acute. In a modus vivendi. even though 
prudential equilibrium is necessary—all parties must have a reason to participate 
on the going terms—the terms of such equilibrium are not. The competition over 
the balance of power and over the terms of the modus vivendi is unrestrained and 
unlimited. Despite the fact that a modus vivendi is a very malleable arrangement, 
perhaps preventing an all-out war in the long run (the malleability of the terms 
accommodates changes in the power and situation of the parties), it is precisely
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this malleability which fosters short-term instability and detachment from higher- 
order moral values* For instance, the prudentially-determined survival of a 
nation’s own values, as well as ensuring that a decline in power and a 
deterioration in the terms do not occur, takes precedence over the short-term 
instantiation of higher-order moral values, Seen through the lens of political 
realism, ethical constraints upon the pursuit of power in the present might well 
be viewed as signaling defeat in the future and the long-term eradication of one’s 
own values. Thus, no party’s values are adequately reflected in their external 
conduct, their decisions about compliance, or the terms of the modus vivendi.
In a modus vivendi. effective mechanisms of adjudication and enforcement 
become impossible. Each party fears that it will be dominated by those who 
dislike its way oflife and domestic institutions. Thus, those mechanisms will he 
dependent upon the strongest governments’ temporary bargain and not the rule 
oflaw. Furthermore, international treaties will not be honored when the benefit 
of noncompliance is considerable; international treaties are perceived as 
rcilccting self-interested bargaining, with no higher ethical standing. And parties 
assume others to be ready to reinterpret treaties or abrogate them as well when 
it is in their benefit to do so. Finally, an intergovernmental modus vivendi is 
unsatisfactory on at least three related counts: First, such a framework is
insensitive to the fate of others in the poorest or weakest societies, A party’s 
bargaining power is a function of the distribution of military and economic 
strength; a concern for deprived “foreigners” and for universal human needs is 
perceived as putting a nation’s own bargaining position in jeopardy. Second, an 
intergovernmental modus vivendi embodies little concern for the treatment of 
persons within their own societies. Within this system, a party’s interest in
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controlling its own population outweighs its interest in those abroad, Third* a 
party in the modus vivendi framework is relatively unconcerned about the 
treatment of persons at the hands of allied governments or governments that are 
operating within its “sphere of influence.” A basic feature of the modus vivendi 
framework is that each superpower has “special claims” to those regions which 
are more essential economically or strategically to its security than to that of the 
next superpower. It is not uncommon for changes of government, political 
systems, and economies in that sphere of influence to occur without significant 
interference (Pogge 19S9: 224-27).
Using the terms of Pogge’s analysis, it can be argued that Rawls’s 
description of the international original position is deficient insofar as it leads 
him to endorse the “ familiar principles” of the law of nations, principles that are 
hurdened with the realist presumptions of a modus vivendi system. An 
international system based on such principles is better characterized not in terms 
oT global justice, but in terms of global instability and power struggles, the 
pursuit of narrow self-interests, and indifference towards the interests of persons 
who happen to reside outside of one’s own borders. As Pogge emphasizes, these 
are principles grounded on prudential rather than moral reasons, a situation that 
is hardly fitting for an ideal theory ofjustice.
Pogge argues that the principles of international law assumed by Rawls are 
inadequate for dealing with contemporary issues of distributive justice; even an 
intergovernmental system in which each state is committed to ensuring justice 
within its borders (as Rawls wants) will degenerate into a modus vivendi if based 
only upon such principles. In RI? in which the parties to the original position are 
representatives of states, the right to political equality, fair equality of
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opportunity, and the difference principle extend up to but not beyond the national 
level. Since in R2 the global background justice is assessed by how it tends to 
affect the domestic justice of states, especially the least just, the reading still 
allows for indefinite international inequalities. Those international inequalities, 
plus the fact that the Rawlsian principles ofjustice need not be fulfilled at the 
global level, translate into enormous inequalities among the members of different 
communities, in regard to political rights, opportunities, and socioeconomic 
means. In Rls in which the parties are representing persons, the principles chosen 
make the position of the least advantaged individual globally the touchstone of 
international justice (the parties do not know the place of their soeiety among 
others, nor do they know their place in their own society). However, in Rawls’s 
model, the domestic choice situation takes precedence over the selection of 
principles in the international choice situation and Pogge contends that, given 
this precedence, even the criterion that would be chosen in Rs cannot be fulfilled.
According to Pogge, the priority of the domestic choice situation assumes 
that the favored model of a just national basic structure can be developed without 
paying attention to its international environment, in other words, that principles 
of domestic justice can simply be “complemented" with inter-national rules 
preventing global injustice. And yet, the fact of a plurality of nations and the 
ramifications of their actions collectively cannot be accommodated by merely 
adding rules. Moreover, if an international scheme is to endure, urges Pogge, it 
must engender in national populations moral allegiance to and compliance with 
the ground rules of that scheme. This will partly depend on the domestic 
institutional organization of societies, which means that from the start reflection 
on (and models for) national institutions is to be conducted with an eye on
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considerations of the stability and functioning of the global basic structure, that 
is, together with the preferred ideal of a global basic structure, Pogge writes:
Since national and global basic structures strongly affect each other’s 
stability and are closely interrelated in their effects upon individual lives, 
we should think about our basic social institutions in general and from a 
global point of view, thereby aiming for an integrated solution, a just and 
stable institutional scheme preserving a distribution of basic rights, 
opportunities, and index goods that is fair both globally and within each 
nation. Such an institutional scheme, if constructed along Rawlsian lines 
at all, would be developed through asingle unified original position global 
sn scope. (1989: 256)
Such a global original position affords those reflecting upon the two 
principles of domestic justice the constrained standpoint of persons who are both 
insiders and outsiders ofdiffcrent national societies. The global original position 
thus subjects the institution of the modern nation state in its present form to 
moral examination.'10 In contrast to the approach adopted by Rawls, Pogge holds 
that while the institutions of an “isolated” state might be justified by reference 
to its least advantaged members (even by the communal life they protect for all 
its members), a system of sovereign states requires a global examination and 
justification. In a world of vast interdependence one cannot decide whether 
competitive markets, private property of the means of production, and so on are 
to be governed by the domestic criterion of the initial choice situation or the 
global criterion of the international choice situation, because it is impossible to
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maintain the sharp distinction between national and international institutions that 
both Rj and Rj maintain.
The point made by Pogge makes explicit one of the concerns I have 
suggested about Rawls’s remarks on international justice, namely, that they are 
not attuned to the increasingly globalized character of world society. 
International relations are coming more and more to resemble domestic society 
in respects relevant to the justification of principles of social justice; thus, such 
principles ought to apply globally. Yet, as I mentioned previously, Rawls 
assumes that states are more-or-less "self-sufficient” or “self-contained.” The 
self-sufficiency thesis assumes that the nations of the world interact only in 
marginal ways. The familiar principles of international law presuppose that, at 
least in ideal theory, each society’s external behavior is controlled by its 
domestic principles ofjustice; agreement on principles for the law of nations is 
made only to provide states with security about other states’ behavior. But what 
i f the world as a whole fits the description of a scheme o f cooperation under the 
circumstances of justice?
It is indisputable I think that the contemporary world fits the description 
of a global scheme of cooperation: there is interdependent economic (as well as 
political, social, and cultural) activity that produces substantial aggregate 
benefits, and a pattern in which international and transnational institutions 
(multinational corporations, international and transnational trade and investment, 
property rights over national territories and their resources) distribute those 
benefits and also burdens. However, as Charles Beitz recognizes, “it is easier to 
demonstrate that a pattern of global interdependence exists and that it yields 
substantial aggregate benefits, than to say with certainty how those benefits are
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distributed under existing institutions and practices or what burdens those 
institutions and practices impose on participants” (1979b: 145). Nevertheless, 
some genera! observations are possible.
Global interdependence, as it now functions in a modus vivendi 
framework, widens the gap between rich and poor countries, generates political 
inequality and inequality of opportunities among the members of different 
countries and, domestically, widens the gap between the upper and the lower 
income classes. These considerations lead Beitz to conclude that, in a world 
where slate boundaries do not constitute the limits of social cooperation, Rawls’s 
confinement of principles of distributive justice to the domestic sphere has the 
effect of taxing poor countries and poor classes therein. In characterizing the 
principles of international justice as the familiar rules of the law of nations, 
Rawls sacrifices strong consideration of the distributive aspect (of substantive 
goods) of international justice to She notion of simple conformity to the common 
or established rules of international affairs. This is a serious omission given the 
necessity of having both principles ofjustice as fairness in place in Rawls’s 
domestic conception. The two principles, when given domestic preference, might 
then justify wealthy nations in denying aid to the poor if that aid can be used 
domestically to promote a more just regime. And yet, if the wealth of a “more 
just” regime has come about with the “cooperation” of a poorer regime, principles 
of domestic justice will be genuinely just only if they are consistent with 
principles of global justice, which must be considered from the start and not 
regarded as a mere afterthought. Beitz therefore claims that, because of our 
international interdependence, the difference principle ought to hold globally and
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that a resource redistribution principle would have to apply to the uneven and 
morally arbitrary distribution of the earth’s natural resources (1979b: 137-43)/'
It might be argued, however, that the types of global interdependence 
evidenced primarily by the transactions of the present world system are not a 
sufficient foundation upon which to build a Rawlsian model of international 
justice. In particular, the steadily growing recognition of cultural diversity and 
the distinctiven. ss of many people’s identities has often led to sentiments that 
run counter to a sense of global or even national solidarity. Considerations of 
social cooperation at the domestic level are problematic enough as it is given the 
now well-entrenched fact of social pluralism.
One way to approach these matters is through a discussion of the notion 
of self-determination, which Rawls suggests is one of the familiar principles 
chosen by the parties to the international original position. Yet Rawls has little 
to say about self-determination, other than he understands it to mean “the right 
of a people to settle its own affairs without the intervention of foreign powers” 
(1971: 378). What does it really mean though, when Rawls invokes the right of 
“a people” to “settle its own affairs”? Such a claim could imply a democratic 
determination of public policy by the equally free members (i.e., persons as 
citizens) of a political community, or it could refer to the policies pursued by a 
state (“a people”) without recourse to democratic and public decision-making 
procedures. While the latter situation might conflict with the requirements of 
Rawls’s version of domestic justice, it is less certain that it would conflict with 
Rawls’s version of international justice.
A further problem arises when Rawls analogizes the “equal rights of 
citizens” with the “equal rights” of states (1971: 378). Surely it would be wrong
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to “intervene” in the affairs of a person who, possessing basic rights and liberties, 
exercises those same rights and liberties in pursuit of his or her vision of the 
g°°d, as long as that pursuit does not negate the equal rights and liberties of 
others,42 Can the same be said of a state? Rawls seems to be claiming that the 
members of a political community should be able to freely choose the framework 
and policies constituting their community, without outside interference, But if 
a state, in pursuing its “national interest," violates the “equal rights” of some of 
its own citizens, should it be free from “the intervention of foreign powers” as 
Rawls suggests? Can the state be regarded as so insular when it comes to issues 
ofjustice? I do not think a satisfactory answer can be given on the basis of 
Rawls’s model which—while attempting to analogize the interests and rights of 
states and persons—elevates the interests of States over that of persons in the case 
of international justice. The fact of the matter is that in the realist law of nations 
model endorsed by Rawls, states and persons are not analogous, since the state 
reigns supreme. Consequently, it will be worthwhile to say something further 
about the subject of self-determination in order to illuminate some of the tensions 
contained in Rawls’s treatment of international justice.
3.4 Self-Determination in a Post-Colonial World; More Trouble for 
Rawls?
The principle of national self-determination has a significant genealogy in the 
political thought and practice of the Enlightenment, One can argue that 
intimations of this idea emerged in the political writings of Marsilius of Padua, 
where he made the distinction between the universitas civium (the people) and
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the pars principans (the ruler) in his theory of the autonomous state, with the 
legitimacy of the ruler resting on the sovereignty of the people.43 This idea was 
later taken up by Machiavelli in his considerations on the most appropriate and 
stable form of government, which Machiavelli believed to be a type of civic 
republicanism legitimated by popular support and sovereignty. The famous 
revolutions of the eighteenth-century, however, charged into new political terrain 
in overturning the divine rights of monarchical sovereignty and replacing it with 
the sovereign will of the people. Both the American and French Revolutions 
ushered in radical political rearrangements based on the participation of the 
people who determined through their "will” the form of government and political 
institutions by which they would be governed.
The stirring opening of The Declaration of Independence set a new' 
precedent by which self-determination attained its "inalienable” status as a 
principle or right:
When in the Course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people 
to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another, 
and to assume among the powrers of the earth, the separate and equal 
station to which the Law's of Nature and of Nature’s God entitle them, a 
decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare 
the causes which impel them to the separation. — We hold these truths to 
be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by 
their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these rights are 
Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness. -- That to secure these rights, 
Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from
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the consent of the governed, — That whenever any Form of Government 
becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or 
to abolish it; and institute new Government, . . .
The implications of this document, conjoined with Enlightenment political 
thought concerning civil society, government and rights, are still struggled over, 
appealed to and claimed as legitimate bases for altering political associations that 
do not fulfill the political, economic, social and cultural aspirations of a people. 
As the Preamble of the Constitution declared, “We the People” have the right and 
responsibility 10 determine the appropriate form of popular rule. The affirmation 
of popular sovereignty and freedom from external domination established the 
consequential value of political decisions that are subject to and decided by the 
inhabitants of a specific territory: “The value of national self-government is the 
value of entrusting the general political power over a group and its members to 
the group” (Margalit and Raz, 1990: 444).
Just as self-determination is a key element to the US Constitution, it is 
also central to the United Nations Charter, which can be considered the founding 
instrument of the modern doctrine of self-determination. It is possible to read in 
the Charter’s opening phrase “We the Peoples of the United Nations” the same 
justification ofpopular sovereignty as the legitimate basis ofstate or government 
authority. This phrase underscores the importance placed on the UN's role in 
fostering self-determination, human rights, and peace between peoples as 
developed in Articles 1 and 55. Article 1.2 states that the members of the UN are 
“to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle 
of equal rights and self-determination of peoples,” while Article 55 declares that
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“with a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being, which are 
necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for 
the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the United 
Nations shall promote . , ,  universal respect for, and observance of, human rights 
and fundamental freedoms. . . The language of the Charter presents a 
significant evolution of the political ideals developed during the Enlightenment, 
by directly linking self-determination with universal human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, but also, and more importantly, recognizing that there is 
an intrinsic connection between those rights and freedoms and creating and 
sustaining the necessary conditions for both domestic well-being, stability and 
peace of peoples, and for global stability and peaceful relations between peoples.
While self-determination has therefore been linked to the realization of 
human rights, particularly by decolonization movements after the Second World 
War, it has also been regarded as conceptually and normatively problematic, 
since it is a right that has been codified in international law by established 
states.'1'1 Rupert Emerson, in bis book Self-Determination Revisited in the Era of 
Decolonization, reveals the aporia contained in the principle of self­
determination: "My right to self-determination against those who oppress me is 
obviously unimpeachable, but your claim to exercise such a right against me is 
wholly inadmissible” (1964: 61). Emerson’s acerbic insight into this paradox of 
self-determination exemplifies the still dangerous tensions that exist between 
claims for self-determination and the legal sanctity of an existing territorial 
arrangement as embodied in a sovereign state. Political and legal thinkers who 
have addressed the notion of self-determination generally assume, then, that
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existing state arrangements serve as the ultimate precedents by which claims to 
self-determination are to be evaluated.
The process of decolonization after the Second World War was 
instrumental in establishing the contemporary political and legal right that a 
people have to freedom from external or foreign control over their political 
institutions, affairs, and everyday lives. This right to national self-determination 
was articulateJ in the 1960 UN Declaration on the Granting of Independence to 
Colonial Countries and Peoples, which states that:
1. The subjugation of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and' 
exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary 
to the Charter of the United Nations and is an impediment to the 
promotion of world peace and co-operation.
2. All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right 
they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their 
economic, social and cultural development. (UN, 1994: 56)
Several paragraphs later (Para. 6), however, the Declaration asserts that 
“Any attempt at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the 
territorial integrity of the country is incompatible with the purposes and 
principles of the Charter of the United Nations,” This reflects the conviction that 
“a people’s” right to self-determination is conceived within the framework of the 
modern sovereign state, whose integrity and unity are fundamental.45 This 
approach has led to many injustices in polyethnic states where governmental 
power is controlled and exercised by one group of people while other groups are
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subjugated or marginalized. In such situations human rights are filtered through 
the apparatus of a state power defined by a dominant group. Human rights then 
become dependent on the vicissitudes ofa domestic legal-political system, giving 
rise to normative confusion when pleas for outside intervention are raised in the 
event of domestic abuses. This situation underscores some of the vulnerability 
of Rawls’s notion of international justice, which is subordinated to the statist 
principles of the conventional law c f nations.
We have seen that the principle of self-determination leads to the principle 
of non-intervention, both of which ultimately derive from and protect the 
principle of state sovereignty. A classic definition of sovereignty states that 
"there is a final and absolute political authority in the political community,” 
which takes precedence over any other possible type of authority elsewhere 
(Hinstcy, 1963: 26). The principles of self-determination and non-intervention 
arc, at bottom, intended to protect all of those matters viewed as coming under 
the purview of the domestic jurisdiction of states. We have also seen, however, 
that a paradox resides in the current inter-state system: on the one hand, the 
principles of sovereignty, self-determination, and non-intervention are regarded 
as necessary to constrain the "external'’ power and actions of states, and thereby 
produce international peace and stability; on the other hand, the principles also 
restrict the progression of international peace and stability by placing the 
"internal" power and actions of states off-limits to outside "meddling.”'’5 
However, the domestic and foreign affairs of states are not so nicely separated 
and when internal crises result that threaten regional or global peace and stability 
(or simply one particular power’s “national interests”), political contortions are 
often needed to justify responses such as “humanitarian” intervention. Indeed,
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the gradual influence of the idea of human rights in international relations in 
recent years has increased the legitimacy of intervention into the internal affairs 
of other states and, consequently, has challenged the conventional notion of 
sovereign statehood and the supremacy of state interests.47
The tension between national self-determination and the identities of those 
persons living within a state’s territory has generated conceptual confusion 
between what is “a people” and “the state,” and thus mrde the adjudication of 
rights and duties around self-determination ambiguous and difficult. As Hurst 
Hannum remarks, “Perhaps no other contemporary norm of international law has 
been vigorously promoted or widely accepted as the right of all peoples to self­
determination. Yet the meaning and content of that right remain as vague and 
imprecise as when they were first enunciated by President Woodrow Wilson and 
others at Versailles” (1990: 27). While self-determination has been held up as 
a fundamental right, the troubling question of “What does self-determination 
mean?” still persists/* Answering this question is particularly challenging when 
the history of implementing the right to self-determination shows that it 
consistently clashes with the bias towards state sovereignty that has settled into 
international political-legal practice, The conceptual confusion between the state 
as “a legal and political organization with the power to require obedience and 
loyally from its citizens,” and the people “as a community . . . whose members 
are bound together by a sense of solidarity, a common culture, a national 
consciousness” has only contributed to contradictory and divergent 
interpretations of the meaning of the right to self-determination and to the moral 
and legal evaluation of claims (Seton-Watson, 1977: 1).
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The controversies surrounding the ambiguity of the principle of self­
determination are therefore of special concern in what can be called the era of 
late twentieth-century ethnic nationalism. Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, 
new life has been given to a diverse spectrum of ethnic aspirations for nation and 
state building around the world. Polyethnic tensions across Africa, Asia, and the 
Middle East have generated numerous conflicts fueled by aspirations for self­
determination and freedom from what are considered oppressive regimes. Thes ' 
regimes are often controlled by an ethnic group which has unfairly employed the 
institutions and apparatuses of the state for capturing power, control, and 
resources to the detriment of other ethnic groups. Civil war, genocide, ethnic 
cleansing, violent suppression of minority-rights movements, characterize 
conditions in the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, East Timor, Kosovo, Burma, 
Chechnya, Armenia and Azerbaijan, and Somalia, to name only a few. The 
forceful resurgence of ethnonational aspirations is the contemporary stage where 
the drama of self-determination is once again being played out, especially where 
the right to self-determination clashes with the rights of state sovereignty and the 
internationally recognized moratorium against secession.
Within the contemporary inter-state system and the structure of 
international law, discussions concerning international justice generally make 
reference to the state as the political and legal agent and representative of the 
citizens of the state. As James Crawford argues, ‘‘[references to the State, the 
basic unit of international law, involve a reference to the social fact of a 
territorial community of persons with a certain political organization, in other 
words, a reference to a collectivity. In this sense, international law rules that 
confer rights on States confer collective rights” (1988: 55). But interpretations
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of international law have also established a rule that since states are the political 
and legal agents of a community of people and collective rights are first conferred 
on the state, then the government’s interests and rights stand first even if the 
government’s actions diverge from the popular interests or demands of the 
citizens. Thus, the tensions unique to the concept of self-determination are 
especially apparent between what has come to be delineated as the external and 
iniernal dimensions of self-determination. While the external dimension defines 
the right of “a people” to be free from “outside” interference, thereby 
demarcating certain aspects of relations between peoples or relations between 
slates, the internal dimension implies the right o f ‘a people” to assert its will over 
and. if need be, against the government that supposedly represents its interests. 
The conventional law of nations, as well as Rawls’s account of international 
justice, is prepared to recognize only external self-determination within the 
modem context of sovereign stales. Yet contemporary world events have 
increasingly focused on issues of internal self-determination, particularly in the 
case of minority groups or Indigenous peoples within existing but contested 
territorial arrangements. In each case, however, the right of self-determination 
is invoked on behalf of “a people.”
One of the most pressing contemporary problems, then, is that the right of 
a people to self-determination lacks a precise definition of what constitutes “a 
people,” especially in our contemporary polyethnic (or multicultural) societies. 
For many political and legal theorists the operative assumption has been that “the 
people" shared a common political identity. This assumption is found in the 
interpretation of Articles 1 and 55 of the UN Charter by the German jurist Hans 
Kelsen. Kelsen (1951: 51-53) leaned towards interpreting the term “peoples” as
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simply referring to the state. Kelsen and others contributed to equating a 
political-legal symmetry between the state and the people, where the two terms 
were understood as being synonymous and interchangeable. In many regards, 
this interpretation can be understood as an interpolation of the Enlightenment 
political principle of the popular sovereignty of citizens as the ground of state 
legitimacy and authority. From this perspective, it is plausible to argue that the 
people are coterminous with the state. This argument supports the conventional 
law of nations approach to international affairs adopted by Rawls in A Theory of 
Justice.
YeL is the identification of a nation-state with “a people” either an accurate 
reflection oTtoday 's polyethnic societies or a viable political, philosophical, and 
legal ideal? Consider, for example, that the political reality in many, especially 
postcolonial, societies is that “a people" is grounded on an exclusivist sense of 
community that has led to ethnicaily-based definitions oT sovereignty. Ethnic 
sovereignty is then linked to a contiguous political ideology that is understood 
in terms of some type of ethnic nationalism, which usually identifies the 
“members of an ethnically defined national grouping" as sharing common 
"physical characteristics, culture, religion, language, and . , , ancestry” 
(Kupchan, 1 995: 4). Yet if the right to internal self-determination is reduced to 
exclusivist ethnic definitions of sovereignty, it might not be possible for external 
self-determination to plausibly succeed within the established international 
system since that system is threatened by a state’s domestic instability.4’ The fact 
of pluralism thus challenges the simplistic picture of international society 
endorsed by Rawls. In the post-colonial and pluralist world, self-determination 
does not simply buttress the territorial borders of established autonomous states
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against outside interference; instead, it can be the very means to challenge 
statehood.''0
Thomas Pogge again provides a useful position for approaching these 
issue. Pogge attempts to sketch “another way for a shared institutional scheme 
to emerge and be sustained even while its participants have divergent interests 
and values." In this alternative scheme, the “central idea is to seek institutions 
that are based not upon free bargaining informed by the changeable distribution 
of power but upon some values that are genuinely shared" (1989; 227). Pogge 
refers to such shared values as “ultimate" in the sense that they are to be 
embodied in the institutions regulating the public, political interactions among 
participants. Since those interactions are for Pogge interactions among persons, 
he contends that one need not fear that the exchanges between nations (or 
cultures) might be well-ordered while their domestic exchanges might not.
Pogge asserts that the predicament in international relations is not that 
there is no, or too little, value overlap among populations. The problem is that 
shared values generally play no role in the standing global institutions, given the 
modus vivendi framework and its assurance problem. Unfortunately, Pogge says 
little about those presumed overlappingly shared values. Like Rawls, however, 
Pogge points out that ultimately what is being sought is an overlapping (not 
strict) consensus upon “public” (not all-pervasive or comprehensive) values, that 
is, upon those values that have to do with others and with others as a matter of 
justice. For Pogge, the prerequisite of the embodiment of shared values into 
“institutional fixed points” that stand above prudential bargaining (where 
everything is negotiable) is the moral acceptance on the part of all societies ofthe 
“continued existence of one another and of the values central to their domestic
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social contracts” (1989: 228), This prerequisite is what Pogge calls the moral 
acceptance of international pluralism,
Pogge, following Rawls’s own example, compares international pluralism 
within the modus vivendi frameworkto the relations between the plural Christian 
faiths after the Reformation. Each side long sought to reunify the Church on its 
own terms, sought to prevail over the other, until a fragile bargain was struck 
(cuius regio eius relieio, “each lord may force his religion upon his subjects 
without outside interference”). This bargain was gradually transformed into a 
shared value commitment of religious toleration with deference to the 
individual’s freedom of conscience. “The decisive condition for an analogous 
transformation in our current world,” writes Pogge, is widespread acceptance of 
international pluralism, “the idea that knowledgeable and intelligent persons of 
good will may reasonably favor different forms of (national) social organization” 
(1989: 230).
Several questions come to mind about Pogge’s claim. What does "an 
analogous transformation” really mean here—a shared value commitment, at the 
global level, to toleration of national/cultural diversity with the hope that it 
engenders more toleration, as toleration of individual and group pluralism, within 
each society? Might it be possible that widespread acceptance of international 
pluralism can be at odds with an interest in the protection of equal individual 
freedom and human rights? Does national or cultural pluralism always stand for 
the idea that persons of good will are collectively determining their fates, while 
leaving room for minority dissent and individual self-determination? Is national 
or cultural autonomy reducible to conformity o f  a society’s main institutions with 
appropriate principles ofjustice?
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According to Pogge, wanting one’s own political ideal to prevail only 
contributes to our modus vivendi predicament, that is, lack of assurance on the 
part of others that one is not seeking to destroy their domestic institutions and, 
thus, an analogous desire to prevail on the part of others as well. International 
acceptance of international pluralism is a step towards solving this assurance 
problem: it allows value clusters “with their coordinated national forms of 
regime” to be morally accepted and protected against extinction; it mak is 
possible for every party, once they know that their existence and that of their 
constitutions is no longer at issue, to focus on the shared global scheme and order 
their preferences concerning that scheme according to how well it reflects their 
own values, not simply their survival. As Pogge recognizes, this is a realist 
argument: it is for the sake of one’s own values that one should accept a scheme 
reflecting a core of overlapping values and thus that one should accept a 
modification of one’s values in the direction of greater mutual tolerance.
Pogge remarks that the international acceptance of international pluralism 
is not tantamount to agnosticism with respect to the justice of national 
instituUons; it is equivalent to the acceptance of disagreements as reasonable 
disagreements. In a reasonable disagreement, the other cannot beforehand be 
assumed “different" or “deluded” and one cannot assume that one stands to learn 
nothing from the variety of national regimes and ways of life. Still, the examples 
oT reasonable disagreements at the global level that Pogge offers—whether the 
means of production should be owned by national governments, private owners, 
workers; whether democracy is best achieved through a single party or a 
multiparty system; whether civil and political or social and economic rights are 
more important in the reform of institutions—are not all the disagreements there
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are. What should be done about regimes that do not accept any democratic form, 
where the bulk of the population is economically deprived, where human rights 
are violated? Does a society whose constitution codifies that only certain 
classes—religiously or racially defined for example-are to have full rights still 
count as a society to be respected because of the centrality to them of the values 
of their social contracts? Can we be sure that such social contracts have much to 
do with widely, deeply, reasonably held values?
The general point to take from all of this is that the current inter-state 
system does not live up to rigorous standards of global justice. The criticisms 
being made here, however, are not to be understood as a recommendation that 
states be abolished (yet neither do I foreclose that possibility). Rather, I am 
arguing that the core of the problem is that state interests and domestic justice are 
too quickly given priority over global interests and global justice, defined in 
terms of everyone in the world. This can be seen not only in current inter-state 
practice but also in Rawls’s account of international justice, which considers 
international justice as a kind of afterthought to domestic justice and thereby 
replicates the realist view of international relations. While Rawls considers 
international justice to be justice among states, I think that international justice 
ought to be at least equally about justice among persons, irrespective of what 
historically-contingent state a person happens to be a member of at present.
A further point I am trying to make, then, is that a theory of international 
justice cannot simply represent or model what kind of international society 
currently exists; it ought to say something significant about what kind of 
international society might exist, by contesting existing principles and presenting 
alternatives. Although I think Rawls fails, in A Theory of Justice, to take this
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further step, the question remains open as to whether his fundamental account of 
justice can be globally extended in some other way. Is it possible to strike a 
different balance than he does between domestic justice and global justice? In 
particular, is it possible to offer an account of international justice without it 
having to follow upon a prior account of domestic justice? In the following 
section I will argue that it is, but only if w-e take the primary subject of 
internatior al justice to be persons, not states.
3.5 Reconfiguring Rawlsian Internationa] Justice
The discussion carried out thus far of Rawls and international justice has been 
critical of the view articulated in A Theory of Justice, The criticisms advanced 
have, however, sought to evaluate Rawls’s description of international justice 
from the point of view of Rawls’s own theory of domestic justice, especially the 
centrality accorded there to the moral status of persons and their basic rights and 
liberties. What I want to do now is consider in more detail the need and process 
of working toward a theory of international justice structured by Rawls’s two 
principles of justice as fairness.
There is some question, though, of whether and how successfully Rawls’s 
two principles ofjustice can be globally extended. Charles Beitz, following 
Brian Barry (1973) and Thomas Scanlon (1973), argues that the principles can be 
extended as long as the model of the hypothetical social contract is altered 
somewhat. First, national boundaries, not being coextensive with the scope of 
global cooperation, have no fundamental moral significance and therefore do not 
mark the limits of the obligations ofjustice. Second, then, it cannot be assumed
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that the parties to the original position know that they belong to a national 
community and are choosing principles for a nation-state; the veil of ignorance 
applies to matters of nationality and the principles ofjustice must be chosen to 
apply globally. If Rawls’s arguments for the two principles are correct, “there 
is no reason to think that the content of the principles would change as a result 
of enlarging the scope of the original position,” writes Beitz, “In particular, if 
the difference principle . . . wo: id be chosen in the domestic original position, 
it would be chosen in the global original position as well” (1979b: 151), In 
Beitz’s model there is no reason to assume that membership in the least- 
advantaged group will be coextensive with that of any particular state. Thus, the 
parties in the international original position are treated as persons and not states 
or representative of states.
If BeitzOs argument is correct, that is, if the notion of a scheme of global 
cooperation and a conception ofjustice given that scheme of cooperation are 
sufficient to justify Rawlsian justice, then his conclusion could be considered 
radical, Rawlsian principles of international justice would guarantee to every 
person in the world the same set of rights, irrespective of nationality and culture, 
irrespective of whether they are citizens or outsiders, as well as the means to 
make those rights worthy. The universality of human rights would thus be 
grounded on considerations of Rawlsian international justice.
Like Beitz, Thomas Pogge’s concern is to specify a model of international 
justice that is the well-suited for the purpose of guaranteeing human rights to all 
persons. As l mentioned previously, Pogge presents a theory of “global justice” 
that is informed by, yet different from Rawls’s idea of international justice as 
presented in A Theory ofjustice. Pogge claims that, according to his theory;
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the globalized first principle might be viewed as requiring a thin set of 
basic rights and liberties (analogous to the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights . . .), which each national society could, in light of its 
national conception of domestic justice, “inflate” and specify into its own 
bill of rights. . . . Similarly, while the global second principle would 
constrain how societies may arrange their ecc tomies, these constraints 
would be less stringent than Rawls’s requirement [in A Theory of Justice! 
that each society must satisfy the difference principle internally. (1989: 
272)
As the above quotation makes clear, Pogge’s emphasis on the moral 
salience of and the international responsibility for the global basic structure 
amounts to a defense and development of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights in us most cosmopolitan reading, specifically, as stated in Article 28: 
"Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and 
freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized.”
However, a number of pressing questions are as yet unanswered in our 
discussion of Rawlsian global justice: Can the description of the original
position remain the same at both the domestic and global level? Is the 
assumption that persons are free and equal globally reasonable or can it be made 
reasonable? Are the ideals of a community of humankind and cosmopolitanism 
reasonable among and within a framework of nation-states? These questions are 
significant because it is my intention to defend the applicability and workability 
of Rawls’s criterion as regards the global basic structure and its participants.
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Pogge partly addresses the questions raised above while responding to several 
objections put forward against the ideal of a Rawlsian world order. Those 
objections assert that there are special factors on the global plane that make it 
inappropriate to apply Rawls’s criterion to the global structure,
One common objection asserts that the global system is so marginally 
well-ordered in Rawls’s sense that one cannot apply to it a criterion appropriate 
only to the “rich, North Atlantic democracies.” Pogge contends that Raw s ’s 
notion of a well-ordered society is not descriptive but normative. This means that 
when the parties are said to be choosing a criterion for a well-ordered society, the 
criterion is supposed to harmonize with, to be satisflable in, and to guide toward 
an ideal of society that, in Rawls’s words, “it seems one would, on due reflection, 
wish to live in and want to shape our interests and characters” (1974b: 634). It 
does not mean that the criterion is only applicable to actual well-ordered 
societies, for there are (probably) no such societies. In this sense, it is misguided 
to maintain that a Rawlsian criterion of global justice must change in response 
to different non-well-ordered global conditions. The task is to create on both the 
global and the domestic levels the economic, political, and legal institutions that 
one would, on due reflection, think should exist in a just world.
A second, more powerful objection is one that is based on the fact of 
cultural diversity, The ideal of a Rawlsian global scheme, the objection goes, 
may cohere with “our” traditions and considered judgments but it is inappropriate 
due to the existing intercultural diversity of traditions and moral judgments. 
Rawlsian institutional reform at the global level might well require the 
supplantation or at the least the reorganization of cultures in the name of our own 
values.
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I think that in order to respond to this objection it is first necessary to 
present the Rawlsian conception of global justice under the appropriate 
rationales. Pogge holds that Rawls’s reluctance to globalize his conception of 
justice affects only one aspect of such globalization, namely, it reflects the belief 
that the domestic institutional organization and the assessment of the justice of 
such organization should perhaps be left to the members of communities whose 
cultures are different. Yet such an alternative is not available with respect to the 
global structure. How the global structure should be reformed and assessed 
cannot be evaded because of the unavoidability of global interaction, nor can it 
be adequately dealt with except through a conception of background justice. 
Rawls’s criterion when globalized is not a neutral criterion equally congenial to 
every value and every culture, and thus to every particular form of domestic 
institutional organization. But then again, there are no neutral criteria ofjustice. 
As Rawls himself recognizes, the idea of institutional arrangements under which 
all values and judgments would flourish is an impossibility. Any global scheme 
can be opposed on the grounds that it is inhospitable to some other way of life. 
The question then, though Pogge does not clearly state it, is whether there is a 
better alternative than a conception of global justice that takes into account the 
fact of global interdependence, the importance of global background justice, and 
the ideal of moral persons as free and equal.
Another way of responding to the second objection is to contend that a 
“degrees" approach to the legitimation of Rawlsian justice within different 
communities might be appropriate. Thus, as Pogge points out, many of the 
protestations against pursuing “our" ideals ofjustice in the international arena 
come from advantaged members of our own culture and communities and, one
148
may add, the advantaged members of most communities. Similar protestations 
generally do not come from those actually living in hunger or oppression. This 
is not to deny that intercultural diversity in moral judgments may be great; it is 
simply to point out that one does not know how great it is. Any government, 
taken as the representative of “a people,” likely will be violating rather than 
expressing the different moral judgments of its own various communities, when 
it engag s in the detention and torture of political prisoners or the denial of civil 
and political liberties.
Moreover, Pogge points out, communities endorsing different political 
judgments and different criteria of justice about a more just world might still 
agree on the Rawlsian conception as the “first stretch" on the road to global 
institutional reorganization. According to Pogge, this possibility is confirmed by 
the fact that some Third World proposals for global institutional reforms could 
arguably be favored by Rawlsian principles. Ironically, such proposals have been 
resisted by the West on the grounds of diversity. But resisting reforms demanded 
by justice as we ourselves understand it, on the ground that others do not really 
or fully share our convictions, is to take a position which acquiesces to the 
preservation of existing advantages. Minimally then, the globalization of 
Rawts‘s conception must be the benchmark in the assessment of government 
policies (foreign and domestic yet having a global impact).
A further response to the objection based on diversity is to argue that the 
proposal of Rawlsian global justice under appropriate rationales wil 1 be followed 
by consensus. Despite the great intercultural diversity of considered judgments 
on justice (because of the diversity of histories and traditions), Pogge argues that 
what counts at the global level, as at the domestic level, is convergence upon the
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Rawlsian criterion itself. Such a convergence need not require a particular 
derivation of or rationale for the criterion. What the objector has to show is more 
than diversity of considered judgments; she has to show that agreement on and 
convergence around the criterion of global justice is impossible. In addition, the 
proposal of global justice can appeal to reflective equilibrium. Rawls’s 
conception ofjustice when globalized is, I think, among the best proposals in the 
light of which an Internationa: cross-cultural moral dialogue on justice can be 
initiated. The idea of dialogue implies that one deals with objections and 
counterproposals from others as they arise; it also implies self-criticism, as the 
dialogue itself broadens the vision of its participants and requires them to 
accommodate others and the relevant facts, making their political convictions less 
parochial. The dialogue on a substantive moral issue of common concern will 
require others, perhaps nonliberal disputants, to work out their conceptions of 
justice and clearly expound the grounds of their disagreement. It is possible of 
course that disagreement will persist, that a global overlapping consensus on 
Rawlsian global justice will not be reached. However, as Pogge notes, the “ fact 
of disagreement is no reason not to act in the light of whatever (factual and) 
moral beliefs we now think are best supported. Our considered judgments 
support a conception ofjustice whose scope is universal, even though its present 
appeal is not” (1989: 270). The point to take from this is that traditions, public 
institutions, and considered judgments have no ultimate moral sanctity just 
because they exist; rather, their understanding is open to criticism and to change.
In Pogge’s view a final, and probably the most important, response to be 
made is that his globalized version of Rawls's conception ofjustice offers a good
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deal of flexibility for incorporating cultural diversity. Unlike the two readings 
(Rj andR2) suggested in A Theory of Justice, the global parties in Pogge’s theory 
are not constrained by any prior (Rawlsian) criterion of domestic justice. The 
global parties can in a single global session decide how much room to leave for 
differences in national conceptions of justice and in domestic institutional 
arrangements. For instance, the globalized first principle of justice may be 
viewed as requiring the “thin” set of rights and liberties embodied in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which each national society can then 
“inflate” in its own bill of rights in light of its domestic conception of justice. 
And the globalized second principle of justice, though constraining how' societies 
may arrange their economies so as to not affect the globally worst share of 
primary goods, may still allow choices among more-or-less egalitarian forms of 
domestic organization. As Pogge concludes:
The resulting global institutional ideal would then allow each society a 
good deal of choice as regards its internal practices (and moral principles), 
so long as such choices are supported by most of its citizens and are 
consistent with the basic rights of all human bemgs, citizens as well as 
outsiders. . . . What matters is that by balancing the liberty interest in 
collective [domestic] autonomy against other liberty interests, [the 
globalized conception] goes beyond R, and R2 in the liberal quest to allow 
for “opposing religious, philosophical, and moral convictions.” (1989: 
272-73)
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Clearly, then, Pogge amends not just the scope but also the content of 
Rawls’s conception ofjustice as fairness; in the remainder of this chapter 1 will 
briefly discuss several ways that Pogge does so* One of Pogge’s strategy for 
amending Rawls’s principles ofjustice consists in “specifying the first principle 
so that it forbids radical social and economic inequalities (avoidably involving 
extreme poverty)" (198 9: 13 8), In other words, he incorporates into the principle 
rights to a “minimum" of social and economic benefits. Let me briefly expound 
Pogge’s justification of this amendment.
We have seen (in Chapter Two) that in Rawls’s special conception of 
justice lexical priority is defended; the maximin criterion consists of two 
maxim in criteria governing, respectively, those aspects of the basic structure that 
define and secure the equal liberties of citizenship, and those that establish or 
engender social and economic inequalities. Each scheme is to receive two scores 
based, again respectively, on the worst position it generates in terms o f  rights and 
liberties and on the worst socioeconomic position. Weights are assigned to these 
scores to make possible the ranking of alternative schemes; in the special 
conception first score differentials always override second score differentials. 
Rawls’s rationale for prioritizing the satisfaction of the first principle over the 
second is “that the interests of liberty , .  , become stronger as the conditions for 
the exercise of the equal freedoms are more fully realized, Beyond some point 
it becomes and then remains irrational . . .  to acknowledge a lesser liberty for the 
sake of greater material means and amenities of office” (1971: 542),
Underlying Rawls’s lexical priority is his distinction between liberty and 
its worth. The goods under the two principles make different contributions, 
according to Rawls, to the same supreme value of liberty. The goods under the
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first principle spell out effective legal freedom or simply “liberty,” while the 
goods under the second principle (plus effective legal freedom) spell out the 
worth of this liberty. The question of compensating for a lesser than equal liberty 
does not arise; that of compensating for a lesser worth of liberty does since, 
according to Rawls, the capacity of the least fortunate would be even less were 
they not to accept inequalities whenever the difference principle is satisfied. The 
usefulness ofliberty is specified in terms of an index of primary goods regulated 
by the second principle. Accordingto the tw'o principles, then, the basic structure 
is to be arranged so as to maximize the worth to the least advantaged of the equal 
basic liberties.
Pogge’s criticismsofRawlsrely on a clarification of the maximin idea and 
on the fact that favorable conditions need not obtain, or even if they do obtain, 
need not entail the satisfaction of socioeconomic needs. The criterion ofjustice, 
Pogge explains, requires basic structures to maximize the worth to the least 
advantaged of the complete scheme of equal liberty shared by all. This 
presupposes that the parties have a preeminent interest in the worth of freedom, 
in being in the best possible socioeconomic position to enjoy, exercise, and take 
advantage of liberty. This means that in non-ideal conditions, wfhen the 
difference principle is not satisfied, the parties need assurance that a narrow 
interpretation of the first principle will not end up by deferring the fulfillment of 
basic needs for the sake of establishing legally effective rights and liberties.
Indeed, the same might be the case even under favorable conditions, for 
“favorable conditions” are somewhat vaguely portrayed by Rawls as those social 
conditions that allow an effective establishment of rights and liberties— 
supposedly, conditions advanced enough so as to render feasible economic
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institutions fulfilling urgent needs. Yet feasibility hardly entails existence, as it 
is patent in many Western countries today. Pogge concludes that Rawls’s refusal 
to include rights to a socioeconomic minimum in the first principle since “in view 
of the difference principle a fraction of index goods can already be regarded as 
such minimum,” does not distinguish between design (the ideal) and 
implementation, Thus, Pogge suggests the need to include among the rights and 
liberties protecting the freedom and integrity of the person “rights to a 
socioeconomic position that is sufficient to meet the basic social and economic 
needs of any normal human participant in the relevant social system" (1989: 147), 
Pogge’s amendment of the second principle ofjustice is also interesting, 
especially his comments on self-respect and the implications ofself-respect vis-a­
vis the difference principle. If according to Rawls self-respect is too important 
to be left to an index goods calculus and equality of opportunity is essential to 
this self-respect, then Rawls’s distinction concerning the facts about individuals 
to which institutional inequalities may be related needs revision. For example, 
a democratic-equality interpretation of the second principle allows inequalities 
of opportunity arising from natural contingencies (talent) to be governed by the 
difference principle, whereas it disallows those arising from social contingencies 
(class) through the opportunity principle. Pogge demonstrates that the 
natural/social distinction is problematic, since so-called natural contingencies 
have a considerable social component, Talent-induced inequalities, for instance, 
cannot simply be explained by reference to the natural distribution of  talents and 
the prevailing institutional scheme (merely allowing talent to play a role in 
determining shares). That distribution itself is influenced by “how valuable the 
various natural talents are considered to be in the relevant social system . . .  [a
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consideration that] will itself be determined by the prevailing institutional 
scheme” (1989: 164). Race-and-gender-induced inequalities, for instance, though 
related to “natural” contingencies in Rawls’s sense, have more in common with 
class-induced inequalities than Rawls seems to recognize,
Pogge’s amendment of Rawls’s second principle thus turns out to look 
something like this: Inequalities in index goods are governed by the difference 
principle, subject to the condition that there must be formal equality of 
opportunity and rough equality of actual opportunity (e.g,, access to a roughly 
equivalent education with equivalence understood in terms of cost). Everyone 
should have such access. The constraint upon inequalities of opportunity arising 
from social contingencies is extended to those related to any other (natural) 
contingency,
Pogge’s criticisms of Rawls’s position on international justice are helpful 
in allowing us to recognize the deficiencies of that position, and also offer us 
some means of improving upon those deficiencies. It might be argued, however, 
that a revised cosmopolitan conception of Rawlsian international justice such as 
that which I have advocated here (along with Pogge and Beitz)—understood as a 
global scheme in which basic universal human rights can be fully realized— 
requires domestic liberal democracy of a Rawlsian kind. By this 1 mean that 
there exists an equal and quite demanding set of rights, liberties, and 
opportunities for all citizens; those rights and liberties take priority over claims 
of the general good and of perfectionist values; and also that there are measures 
ensuring both citizens as well as outsiders the all-purpose means so that those 
rights and liberties are effectively realized. If it is the case that the effective 
realization of universal human rights requires a liberal democratic organization
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of society, is it possible to articulate a scheme of international justice that allows 
for even minimal differences in national conceptions of domestic justice? A 
question that remains to be examined further, then, is whether the conception of 
international justice presented here is compatible with the existence of different 
social and political cultures that are not liberal democracies. It is to this question 
that I turn,
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Chapter Four
Rawls, the Law of Peoples, and Human Rights
Human rights are a notably contested topic in late twentieth-century political 
philosophy. Whether or not one regards universal human rights as desirable or 
possible, Rawls’s recent attempt to combine an account of human rights with his 
theory of justice as fairness is a challenging intervention into the debate. 
Considering the arguments of the previous chapter, however, one might be led to 
wonder if Rawls has anything to offer of real worth for human rights theory and 
practice. Any doubts on this matter will have to be settled by closer examination 
of what Rawls has to say specifically about human rights within the context of 
social justice at both the domestic and international levels. Thus, this chapter 
will analyze Rawls’s essay “The Law of Peoples."
In the first section 1 discuss Rawls’s proposed argument for a “ law of 
peoples" and argue that his conception of human rights is flawed. In the second 
section I critically examine Rawls's argument in light of the foregoing discussion 
of international justice, focusing on the problems that arise from his distinction 
between liberal and hierarchical societies and their respective interests and public 
cultures. In section three, I contend that the manner in which Rawls constructs 
the choice procedure For the law of peoples leads him to draw mistaken 
conclusions about the types of human rights required by liberal and hierarchical 
peoples. In concluding, I discuss how a revised Rawlsian theory of international
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justice, in which the global is no longer subordinated to the domestic, can provide 
a suitable basis for addressing human rights. Against Rawls, I argue that, from 
the point of view of a more cosmopolitan ideal of social justice, universal human 
rights require the liberal democratic organization of domestic society.
4,1 Rawls’s Argument in “The Law of Peoples”
In his recent article “The Law of Peoples,” Rawls has attempted to respond to 
criticisms of his previous remarks (or lack thereof) on international justice. More 
specifically, he has reacted against the possibility that his two principles of 
justice might serve to evaluate the systems of cooperation of cosmopolitan 
individuals, that is, individuals that in choosing a criterion of domestic justice 
must both, and at the same time, be insiders and outsiders to their community 
because, in an interdependent world, ii is impossible to sharply distinguish 
between national and international basic institutions.
Rawls states that his proposed law of peoples is “a political conception of 
right and justice that applies to the principles and norms of international law and 
practice” (1993: 42). International law is the existing, positive, legal order 
understood by Rawls according to the law of nations perspective. The law of 
peoples is the family of political concepts and principles specifying the content 
of a liberal conception ofjustice worked up to apply to and evaluate international 
law (1993: 50-51). Rawls’s idea is to pair liberal ideas ofjustice, similar to but 
more general than those of justice as fairness, with the law and the political 
practices of the international society of peoples, and see whether the latter can be 
legitimated. In so doing, Rawls’s aim is twofold: First, he wants to give an
158
account of the role of human rights and of the form that toleration of nonliberal 
societies must take from the point of view of liberalism extended to the law of 
peoples. Second, he wants to prove that his liberal law of peoples is acceptable 
across the board, to both “well-ordered” liberal and “well-ordered” nonliberal 
peoples; he wants to prove, in other words, that a society need not be liberal in 
order to respect human rights,
Rawls identifies a political conception ofjustice as having the following 
three features (1993: 220 n,2):
(1) it is framed to apply to basic political, economic, and social 
institutions; in the case of domestic society, to its basic structure, in the 
present case to the law and practices of the society of political peoples; (2) 
it is presented independently of any particular comprehensive religious, 
philosophical, or moral doctrine, and though it may be derived from or 
related to several such doctrines, it is not worked out in that way;
(3) its content is expressed in terms of certain fundamental ideas seen as 
implicit in the public political culture of a liberal society.
For Rawls, extending liberal ideas of political justice to yield a law of 
peoples has nothing to do with the positing of universal first principles, but rather 
with the notion of the social contract and its constructivism. As in the case of the 
principles of justice for the basic structure of liberal domestic society, the 
principles of the law of peoples—the principles ofjustice for the society of 
societies—must be constructed byway ofareasonable procedure in whichrational 
parties would adopt and assent to those principles, Rawls states that the choice
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procedure is modified to tackle “the issue at hand,4* which here is “the distinct 
structure of the social framework . , , the distinctive nature and purpose of the 
elements of society, and of the [international] society of peoples” (1993: 47), 
Thus, the principles chosen must be endorsed on due reflection by the agents to 
wrhom they are supposed to apply, in this case “peoples.” Rawls explains that he 
uses the term “peoples” to refer to “persons and their dependents seen as a 
corporate body and as organized by their political institutions, w'hich establish 
the powers of government” (1993: 221, n. 5). Peoples are thus understood to 
refer to nation-states rather than individuals, which is in keeping with Rawls’s 
use of nation-states as the representing parties in the international original 
position presented in A Theory of Justice.
Given that perfect isolation is a thing of the past, Rawls notes, every 
society must have conceptions of how it is related to other societies and how it 
must conduct itsel f with respect to them; every society must have principles and 
ideals that guide its policies toward other peoples. The question for a liberal 
society is how a conception similarto justice as fairness can be extended to cover 
that liberal society’s relations with both liberal and nonliberal societies and to 
yield a law of peoples that is “reasonable." For in the absence of that extension 
the liberal conception ofjustice would be historicist, applying only to similar, 
liberal societies. Rawls suggests that the way to proceed, then, is to defend a 
constructivist liberal doctrine that is universal in reach, in the sense of giving 
principles for the most comprehensive of subjects, i.e., the political society of 
peoples. Its authority rests on the principles of practical reason adjusted to apply 
to the subject at hand, and on the fact that it can be endorsed on due reflection by 
those to whom the principles apply.
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Rawls argues that liberal ideas ofjustice contain three important elements; 
(1) a list of basic rights, liberties, and opportunities; (2) a priority for those 
freedoms, especially with respect to claims of the general good and of 
perfectionist values in general; and (3) measures ensuring all citizens all-purpose 
means so that those freedoms are effective. However, Rawls excludes from the 
more general liberal ideas ofjustice upon which the law of peoples is going to be 
constructed the strong egalitarian features ofjustice as fairness—the principles 
of the fair value of the political liberties and of fair equality of opportunity, and 
the difference principle. Those features, he tells us without further explanation, 
are simply not needed for a law of peoples (1993: 51-52).
The way that Rawls proposes to extend these liberal ideas of justice, with 
the requisite degree of generality, to yield the law of peoples is sui generis and 
has two stages, each possessing two steps. The first stage Is that of ideal or strict 
compliance theory, and the second stage is that of nonideal or noncompliance 
theory.
The first step in the first stage of ideal theory is to prove that the original 
position is a device of representation for the case of different and well-ordered 
liberal peoples, that is, when it is reused to extend the liberal conception of 
justice to the law of democratic societies, This amounts to showing that, similar 
to the account of international justice given in A Theory of Justice. 
representatives of liberal societies in the original position adopt a law of peoples 
whose content turns out to be almost identical to the standing principles of 
international law.
The second step in the first stage of ideal theory is to specify the 
requirements of44well-orderedness” fornonliberal or hierarchical societies. This
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consists of demonstrating that the original position is also a device of 
representation when reused to adopt alaw ofpeoples among hierarchical peoples, 
and showing that representatives of hierarchical peoples in the original position 
would adopt the same law of peoples as that adopted by liberal peoples.
In the case of a single liberal society, the original position with its veil of 
ignorance is a device of representation because it models what free and equal 
citizens of a well-ordered liberal society regard as fair conditions and a ceptable 
restrictions under xvhich parties, as representatives of citizens, must choose the 
terms of domestic cooperation for the basic structure, Given the veil, 
representatives are represented symmetrically and equally, as rational, and as 
deciding for appropriate reasons among alternative principles.
In the case of different liberal societies, when the original position is 
reused to extend the liberal conception of justice to the law of democratic 
peoples, it is also a device of representation because it models what citizens of 
different democratic societies would regard as fair conditions under which parties 
are to choose the terms of cooperation among peoples. Rawls reiterates here that 
the parties to the original position are “representatives of societies” or peoples; 
thus, the terms of cooperation regulate not a single domestic structure but the law 
and practices of nation-states.
Rawls adds that three conditions are essential to setting up the original 
position: (1) the representatives of liberal societies are symmetrically and 
equally situated; (2) the representatives are to choose among principles for the 
law of peoples by reference to the interests of their democratic societies; and (3) 
the representatives do not know certain details (such as the size and population 
of their territories, the relative strength of the people they represent, the amount
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of their natural resources and their level of development). Given these 
conditions, citizens of different liberal democratic societies would agree that the 
original position models fair conditions under which representatives of societies 
are to specify a law of liberal peoples (1993: 53).
Rawds claims, then, that the following “familiar principles” of a law of 
peoples will result from the extension of a liberal conception of justice to 
democratic societies (1993: 55):
L Peoples (as organized by their governments) are free and independent
and their freedom and independence is to be respected by other peoples.
2. Peoples are equal and parties to their own agreement,
3. Peoples have the right of self-defense but no right of war.
4. Peoples are to observe the duty of nonintervention.
5. Peoples arc to observe treaties and undertakings,
6. Peoples are to observe certain specified restrictions on the conduct of
way (assumed to be in self-defense).
7. Peoples are to honor human rights,
Except for the addition of the new principle to honor human rights these 
are, of course, the same familiar principles proposed by Rawls in A Theory of 
Justice. Since this law of peoples for liberal peoples “will also allow for various 
forms of cooperative associations among peoples” and “cooperative 
arrangements” such as trade, Rawls thinks that the parties ought to come up with 
“standards of fairness” and provisions “of assistance” ensuring “that in all 
reasonably developed libera! societies people’s basic needs are met” (1993; 56).
163
By “basic needs” Rawls understands the economic and institutional means 
necessary for individuals “to take advantage” of the rights, liberties, and 
opportunities of their society (1993: 223, n. 15).
Extending the law of peoples to well-ordered hierarchical societies 
involves proving that a second session of the original position—in which 
representatives of hierarchicalpeoples are equally situated, rational, and deciding 
for appropriate reasons- -actually models what hierarchical peoples consider to be 
fair conditions under which peoples are to choose a law of peoples. (It is 
interesting to note that there are no first sessions of the original position in the 
case of hierarchical societies. If first sessions were to be held, what principles 
ofjustice would the parties choose? Would we have any further need to then 
speak of hierarchical societies?) This extension also involves proving that in 
such a second original position the same law of peoples—the same standing 
principles of international law—as that adopted by liberal peoples would be 
adopted by hierarchical peoples. An important corollary to the law of peoples, 
then, is that nonliberal societies are also to honor human rights.
The question that will be the concern for the remainder of this chapter is 
whether nonliberal, hierarchical societies can in fact honor human rights. I will 
argue that they can only if one adopts a relativistic conception of human rights 
which grants “different” rights to "different” cultures. I think that Rawls ends 
up adopting this conception in order to make his law' of peoples xvork, and as a 
result his theory of social justice as a whole suffers. If human rights are 
"different” depending on the social context, are they even recognizable as human, 
i.e,, universal rights?
1 6 4
Before establishing this, however, it is necessary for Rawls to specify a 
“hierarchical society,” and determine when it is well-ordered. According to 
Rawls, a hierarchical society is one not characterized by the separation o f  church 
and state; its political institutions specify a consultation hierarchy; and its basic 
social institutions satisfy a conception ofjustice that expresses a conception of 
the common good (1993: 52), If it turns out that societies which are religious in 
nature, whose political i; stitutions specify a hierarchy of estates or castes, and 
whose social (including the legal) systems satisfy a common good conception of 
justice are also peaceful and non-expansionist, then their hierarchy is just, their 
legal and political systems legitimate; in short, those societies are well-ordered. 
This wel l-orderedness, Rawls suggests, ensures the human rights of their citizens. 
He contends that those societies will therefore have no problem in agreeing to a 
liberal law of peoples, one of whose main principles is respect for human rights.
A hierarchical society is peaceful and non-expansionist if its religious 
doctrine, though comprehensive and influential in governmental policy, does not 
seek to undermine the civic order of and liberties within other societies. Its 
system oflaw is legitimate if it imposes moral duties on all persons within its 
territory, guided by a “common good” conception of justice; if it takes 
impartially into account the fundamental interests of all members of society; and 
if judges and administrators sincerely believe and publicly defend that the law is 
indeed guided by such a common good conception. Another way of further 
spelling out this last requirement is to say that the political institutions of a well- 
ordered hierarchical society constitute a reasonable and just consultation 
hierarchy;
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They include a family of representatives bodies, or other assemblies, 
whose task is to look after the important interests of all elements of 
society. Although in hierarchical societies persons are not regarded as 
free and equal citizens, as they are in liberal societies, they are seen as 
responsible members of society who can recognize their moral duties and 
obligations and play their part in social life. With a consultation hierarchy 
there is an opportunity for different voic )s to be heard, not, to be sure, in 
a way allowed by democratic institutions, but appropriately in view of the 
religious and philosophical values of the society in question. Thus, 
individuals do not have the right of free speech as in a liberal society; but 
as members of associations and corporate bodies they have the right at 
some point in the process of consultation to express political dissent, 
(1993: 62; my emphasis)
Rawls asserts that if alt of this is the case, a hierarchical society’s common 
good conception of justice secures for all persons certain "minimum” rights. 
These are rights to means of subsistence and security; to liberty as freedom from 
slavery, serfdom, and forced occupation; to formal equality as in "similar cases 
must be treated similarly”; and to some personal property (1993: 62). If  those 
rights are violated, it cannot be claimed that the legal system imposes moral 
duties on all persons, or takes impartially into account fundamental, essential 
interests. If those rights are violated it cannot be claimed that the consultation 
hierarchy is reasonable. A well-ordered hierarchical society, Rawls concludes, 
respects what he calls “basic human rights” (1993: 63),
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Confronted with the problem that in hierarchical societies a state religion 
or comprehensive doctrine might not admit full and equal liberty of conscience 
and thought for all, Rawls strikes a compromise in his response. He notes that 
it is essential to the well-orderedness of hierarchical societies that other religions 
are not actually persecuted or denied practice, and that the society allows for the 
right to emigration. Doctrines that deny full and equal freedom of conscience are 
not reasonable, but, Rawls adds cunningly, they are not unreasonable either. 
Allowing “a measure” of liberty of conscience, though not fully and not equally, 
lies “between the fully reasonable and the unreasonable, which denies it entirely” 
(1993: 63; 225, n. 28). Thus, Rawls circumvents the problem of whether a state 
religion to which certain privileges attach, and which allows a “measure” of 
liberty of thought, might end up affecting the fullness and equality of other 
rights. Of course, given the “minimum” rights Rawls recognizes as being 
suitable for persons living in hierarchical societies, it’s doubtful that he would 
acknowledge there is a possible problem here.
At any rate, the conditions of well-orderedness specified by Rawls (i.e., 
non-expansionism, the legitimacy of the legal system and reasonableness of the 
hierarchy, and the honoring of human rights) are presented, on the one hand, as 
the necessary conditions for membership in good standing in a reasonable society 
of peoples and, on the other hand, as the proof that nonliberal societies can be 
members in good standing in terms of their own conceptions of justice.
In order to confirm that an agreement on the part of hierarchical societies 
on a law of peoples protective of human rights is possible, Rawls argues further 
that the original position is a device of representation for hierarchical peoples 
among themselves. Although domestically the conceptions ofjustice in these
167
societies are not “political,” nor can they be said to be constructed or justified in 
a manner consistent with Rawls’s political constructivism, it is not unreasonable 
for these societies (members of different hierarchical societies) to insist that their 
representatives be rational and equal in making claims against other societies at 
the second step of the extension. Members of ihose societies would thus agree 
that the original position models fair conditions when their representatives: (1) 
care for the good of their own societies, understood in accordance with their own 
conceptions; (2) have equality in making claims vis-a-vis other representatives; 
and (3) care for the benefits ofpeace, trade, and assistance (1993: 64). Also in 
this case the standards of fairness for trade and other “cooperative arrangements” 
focus on how well a society can meet its basic needs, understood in terms of that 
particular society’s cluster of minimum rights and liberties.
IT this is the case, Rawls continues, representatives of hierarchical 
societies will agree to the same law of peoples as liberal societies inter se. and 
hierarchical peoples will honor the law of peoples for the same reasons liberal 
peoples do. Rawls explains that this is because the law of peoples as derived 
allows each people to pursue their interests and their conceptions of justice, 
within certain limits. Thus the limits of the law of peoples apparently coincide 
with those that hierarchical societies impose upon themselves in terms of their 
own common good conceptions ofjustice.
Several conditions are essential to the agreement proposed by Rawls. The 
first is that the original position at the second level of the law of peoples does not 
incorporate a “liberal,” political conception of the person as free and equal. The 
second is that the law of peoples is not worked out through an all-inclusive global 
original position representing all persons “regardless of their society and culture”
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(1993: 65-66). Without these conditions, Rawls worries that articulating a law 
of peoples would be “much more troublesome” (1993: 66). My concern here, 
however, is that universal human rights are premised on the ideal that individuals 
are free and equal, regardless of what society they happen to be born into, and 
that the point of human rights is to protect this freedom and equality from the 
type of discriminatory treatment characteristic of Rawls’s hierarchical societies, 
"o  whom is this ideal troublesome? To Western philosophers theorizing in the 
comfort and safety of their offices? To power elites reaping the privileges of 
their positions of authority and control at the top of hierarchical societies based 
on inequality? To those marginalized and rendered voiceless or invisible by 
those very hierarchies? Perhaps if it were individual persons represented in a 
global original position, rather than the representatives of a hierarchical state, the 
parties would find agreement on such “liberal" principles to be not so 
troublesome after all.
In light of his account of the law of peoples, that is, his account of the 
"political conception of justice applying to and evaluating international law and 
practices," Rawls sums up his rather peculiar conception of human rights.
Rawls contends that human rights are different from rights in political 
liberalism. Human rights "do not depend on any particular comprehensive moral 
doctrine or philosophical conception of human nature, such as, for example, that 
human beings are moral persons and have equal worth, or that they have certain 
particular moral and intellectual powers that entitle them to rights” (1993: 68; my 
emphasis). Neither do human rights require the “liberal idea that persons are first 
citizens, and as such free and equal members of society who hold those basic 
rights as the rights of citizens” (1993: 69; my emphasis). Apparently, human
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rights require only the contingent fact that one is a “member” of some society or 
other; thus, one's moral obligations and interests will be different depending on 
the society one happens to be a member of. Because these obligations and 
interests are variable in Rawls’s view, human rights need not be the same for all 
persons everywhere. A member of a hierarchical society need not be considered 
a person possessing identifiable moral powers, and can be denied equal worth on 
the basis of what class of membership they happen to be born into. Oddly, the 
arbitrary circumstances of historical and geographical fate are to allowed to 
determine in Rawls’s law of peoples whether a person is treated equally or 
unequally. While Raw ls’s position may be an accurate description of certain 
empirical situations in which people are in fact treated unequally and rendered 
powerless within their societies, his concession to “political realism” (1993: 59) 
seems a far cry from the theory of justice as a moral as well as political 
conception.
Rawls argues that the above requirements are to be observed because 
human rights must work as the “minimum standards” ofwell-ordered institutions 
for all peoples w'ho belong in good standing to a just political society of peoples, 
A just political society of peoples must consider hierarchical societies to be 
"members in good standing.” And the minimum rights recognized in those 
hierarchical societies must, Rawls argues, be referred to as human rights in the 
same way that the more robust set of rights in liberal societies are referred to as 
human rights (1993: 69),
Rawls explains thaL the nonliberal conception of the person in other 
traditions might regard persons as “responsible” members of society, acting in 
accordance with their “moral duties”; as first and foremost members of estates,
170
associations, and corporations, whose rights arise from this prior membership. 
These are referred to as enabling rights, that is, rights enabling persons to 
perform duties in the groups to which they belong. That rights are understood to 
hold for persons only as members of estates and corporations, and not as 
individual citizens, “does not matter” according to Rawls (1993: 70), What is 
important is that these so-called “basic human rights” can be protected (through 
the imposition ofmoral rights and duties on p; rsons as members of differentiated 
groups) in a hierarchical society, without appealing to a comprehensive or 
political liberalism.
Rawls concludes that human rights are a “special class” of rights with a 
“special role” in a reasonable taw of peoples; in his view, they are distinct from 
constitutional rights and the rights of democratic citizenship (1993: 70ff). To 
support this conclusion, Rawls offers a limited interpretation of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. According to his interpretation, human rights 
“proper” are only those contained in Articles 3 and 5 of the UDHR, i.e., the rights 
to life, liberty and security, and rights against torture and degrading treatment or 
punishment (1993: 227-28, n. 46), As we have seen, however, Rawls understands 
the right to liberty and security to apply differently in liberal and hierarchical 
societies; in hierarchical societies, liberty and security are minimally conceived 
as “ freedom from slavery, serfdom, and forced occupations” (1993: 62). The 
other human rights recognized by Rawls are those described by the 1948 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and the 
1973 Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, 
The remaining 28 articles of the UDHR, and apparently the economic, social, and
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cultural rights set out in the International Conventions of 1966, fall outside the 
realm of human rights “proper.”
Article l o f the UDHR, which states that “All human beings are born free 
and equal in dignity and rights” is dismissed by Rawls as merely expressing 
“liberal aspirations” (1993: 228, n. 46). This move is telling, however, because 
Rawls’s interpretation ignores that Article 1 is the very basis for all of the 
interdependent rights contained in the UDHR and the Conventions. The principle 
of equality or non-discrimination, which holds all persons to be free and equal, 
is recognized as the foundational concept in legislation, judicial interpretation, 
and other instruments concerning fundamental human rights.51 According to 
these sources, the purpose of human rights is to universally respect, protect, and 
promote the freedom and equality of all persons. Rawls’s account of human 
rights is unable to meet these recognized standards since it allows for the 
possibility of unfair inequality as the result of historically contingent injustices 
and disadvantages, rather than from choices made by individual persons as 
members of society whose partiality has been suitably constrained.52
4.2 The Law of Peoples: Some (Further) Problems of International
Justice
The description of international justice offered by Rawls in “The Law of Peoples” 
is one in w'hich “peoples” cooperate and interact only in peripheral ways. As in 
A Theory of Justice, the (more or less) self-sufficiency and self-containment of
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the national community and the domestic scheme are asserted without much 
argument. Unlike A Theory of Justice, however, “The Law' of Peoples” has 
dropped the idea that every domestic scheme of cooperation can be regulated by 
a Rawlsian criterion of domestic justice, and has added to the "familiar principles 
of international law” the principle of respect forhuman rights. Rawls’s world of 
human rights implementation and protection is one in which the domestic 
community bears the utmost responsibility. The international political society 
of peoples is there merely to set some minimum standards for domestic 
institutions so that “certain” yet differing human rights are protected.
From the outset, Rawls affirms that the political conception of justice 
among peoples, i.e., the law of peoples, applies to inter-national (literally) law 
and practices; and he describes inter-national practices as cooperative 
associations and cooperative arrangements, such as trade between peoples. 
Extending political-liberal ideas of justice to yield a liberal law of peoples 
acceptable to liberal and nonliberal peoples, Rawls explains, depends on having 
a second original position modeling peoples, that is, nations, as free and equal. 
For Rawls, this is needed because the structure of the international social 
framework is different from the domestic basic structure, and because such 
representation embodies fair conditions according to peoples as corporate bodies 
organized by their institutions and governments, endorsing the principles there 
arising,
Rawls’s assertions admit of two different readings, oneless charitable than 
the other. The less charitable reading holds that Rawls simply ignores the types
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of arguments I raised in the previous chapter. If the boundaries of cooperation 
and cooperative schemes do not coincide with nation-state boundaries; if 
institutions such as corporations, trade, investment, or credit do not distinguish 
between “national” and “international” cooperation; and if the global flow of 
information, resources, capital, and persons now interlock citizens and foreigners, 
then a second original position as Rawls envisages it, and the principles of 
international justice derived from that original position, are unjustified.
The more charitable reading, which I will examine here, suggests that 
Rawls is not so much denying the fact of interdependence as claiming that global 
distributional and political-power matters take second place vis-a-vis a more 
urgent project aimed at strengthening the legitimacy of international law as it 
now stands, and where domestic obstacles to compliance with that law and to 
human rights protection take center stage.
On this second reading, it can be argued that Rawls’s project in “The Law 
of Peoples” is one of legitimation, that is, presenting a political conception of 
justice for the case of the political of societies that can help provide a shared 
public basis for the justification of international law and practice on the part of 
each “people” (nation-state). Because that political conception is said to 
articulate liberal democratic ideals and values and is said to be capable of gaining 
the support of nonliberal peoples, it can also allegedly provide international law 
and practice with a common value-based, rather than a modus vivendi-based, 
foundation.53 Rawls describes his project as one intended to deny that standing 
international law and the principle of respect for human rights are ethnocentric,
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reflecting and imposing Western values (1993: 69-70). If it can be shown that 
standing in a relation of freedom and equality with all other societies, and 
accepting a criterion of legitimacy in the eyes of their own people are reasonable 
conditions for any given society, he argues, then the law of peoples can be 
claimed to be “universal." Central to this argument is the notion that, although 
the criterion of legitimacy is international, because it belongs to the law' of 
peoples, it can be accepted by nonliberal societies in terms of their own 
conceptions of justice (1993: 79ff.).
However, Rawls’s attempt at strengthening the acceptance of and 
compliance with international law' and respect for human rights contains several 
problematic assumptions. First, his theory would seem to imply that what lies at 
the root of disrespect for human rights is a lack of conviction on the part of 
populations that the principle of human rights and their domestic conceptions of 
the good do in fact cohere. Second, it would seem to imply that the major 
distinction to be drawn among nations in the world today is that between, on the 
one hand, liberal and nonliberal political cultures that are capable in principle and 
through moral argument of supporting human rights and, on the other hand, 
nonliberal cultures that completely disregard the principles of international law. 
Indeed, Rawds’s prototypes of non*compliant states in “The Law of Peoples” are 
those whose comprehensive doctrines are expansionist and recognize no state 
boundaries (like the Hapsburgs in the 16th and 17th centuries), and those whose 
“religious and philosophical traditions” support oppressive governments, corrupt
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elites, the subjection of women, and unsustainable environmental practices (1993: 
72ff., 77).
It seems to me, however, that Rawls’s diagnosis would be belied by Rawls 
himself, were he to take his own arguments to their final consequences. 
Moreover, his account does not easily agree with other descriptions of the world 
as manifesting more consensus than he admits, both in the literature on 
international law and popular movements supporting human rights. Let me 
briefly take up these issues.
As Rawls implies, it certainly matters whether or not populations have a 
moral allegiance to the principle of respect for human rights. Moral allegiance 
ensures compliance with this principle in its self-regarding and other-regarding 
dimensions, that is, domestically and in the interactions with other populations. 
Vet, is it true that the principle of human rights ultimately lacks legitimacy 
because of a lack of moral allegiance on the part of populations, that is, because 
populations still have to be persuaded that the fundamental interests ensured by 
their conceptions of justice coincide with those ensured by the principle of 
respect for human rights?
Rawls himself contradicts this estimation when giving us the principles 
that ought to guide the behavior, under the law of peoples, of liberal and 
nonliberal well-ordered societies towards "outlaw regimes” and societies under 
"unfavorable conditions.” Regarding those societies that are either expansionist 
or do not recognize any conception of domestic right and justice at all, Rawls 
asserts that well-ordered societies must, either separately or within the United
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Nations, denounce their institutions, deny them military, economic, and any other 
assistance, and exclude them from mutually beneficial cooperation. Yet 
regarding societies under unfavorable conditions (which Rawls reduces to the 
unreasonability of their political cultures), well-ordered societies must assist 
them in attaining those conditions that make possible a well-ordered society, and 
ultimately in attaining conditions ensuring the fulfillment of their basic needs and 
respect for human rights.
Now, it is clear that many expansionist and tyrannical regimes are neither 
denounced nor denied military and economic assistance. And it is also clear that 
many societies under unfavorable conditions are not in fact granted the resources, 
technology, and human know-how that make a well-ordered society possible, 
although they may be granted some moral outrage against the unreasonability of 
their manners, How can we explain these discrepancies?
One possible explanation is that a well-ordered society does not actually 
exist in the world today; this is to say that no society is presently and effectively 
regulated by its own conception ofjustice, both in the sense that the population 
generally accepts and complies with such a conception, and in the sense that the 
basic domestic institutions satisfy its requirements.S4 Rawls seems to point in 
this direction, but only in passing, He notes that actual democracies like the 
United States, unlike well-ordered democracies, can intervene in and undermine 
less secure and well-established democracies like those of Allende in Chile, 
Arbenz in Guatemala, or Mossadegh in Iran (1993: 59). But what would “well- 
ordered" really mean here? That the institutions of foreign policy, and Foreign
177
conduct in general, must satisfy the domestic conception ofjustice? If  that is the 
case, why do they not?
Rawls appeals to the example of domestic oligarchic governments carry ing 
out “covert operations” in other countries without the knowledge and the consent 
of the public, Thus, by Rawls’s own passing avowal, it cannotbe simply claimed 
that the institution of foreign policy does not satisfy the domestic conception 
because the population are unpersuaded that it must be brought into line with the 
domestic conception’s values. Rather, it might be the case that the institution of 
foreign policy excludes the domestic conception’s (and population’s) values 
because it is in the hands of oligarchic interests and oligarchic governments. In 
other words, individual persons do not have a say in the matter of whether and 
how domestic and international conceptions ofjustice are to coincide, because 
their “ interests" at the international level are controlled by the representatives of 
states who are “in bad faith . . . claiming to speak on behalf of the community” 
(Nagel, 1995: 106), And those representatives may have brutal reasons for 
claiming that the principle of respect for universal human rights does not cohere 
with their “peoples” traditional values.
Another possible explanation of why tyrannical regimes are not ostracized 
and regimes underunfavorable conditions are not substantially assisted is that the 
political society ofpeoples is not well-ordered; “peoples” do not generally accept 
the law of peoples, and international law and practices do not satisfy the 
requirements of the law of peoples. However, this second explanation reduces 
to the first, because Rawls’s well-ordered society of peoples is no more than the
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society of well-ordered peoples: each society complies with the law of peoples 
because it is well-ordered. But if there are no well-ordered societies in the world 
today, Rawls’s discussion on noncompliance regarding those societies that refuse 
to acknowledge a reasonable law of peoples cannot be restricted to the ideal, 
strict compliance behavior of well-ordered liberal and nonliberal societies 
towards non-well-ordered regimes. And if there is any suspicion that there are 
no well-ordered societies in the world today because the institutions of foreign 
policy and practices are generally in the hands of domestic elites, then arguments 
aimed at the moral persuasion of populations must be combined with arguments 
on institutional reform so that each society can go from the “real” to the “ideal” 
(denying military and economic assistance to tyrannical regimes, and so forth).
It is likely, though, that the non-well-orderedness of the political society 
of peoples amounts to more than the non-well-orderedness of each society. It 
might be that international law and practices do not satisfy the requirements of 
Rawls’s law of peoples because alliances of oligarchic interests and oligarchic 
governments discourage or make futile attempts at the well-orderedness ofother- 
regarding institutions on the part of some societies. These alliances are usually 
made not just for security, survival, or other such worthy ends, but also for power 
and profit; and they would not be so profitable were they not so easy to make 
because of the fact of economic and power-political interdependence that Rawls 
seems to consider secondary.
In addition to the concerns raised above, I think that Rawls’s partition of 
the world among reasonable liberal and nonliberal political cultures—thus able
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to support human rights—and unreasonable ones—thus unable to support them—is 
unsound and not bom out by the human rights literature and practice.
In his arguments regarding populations under unfavorable conditions, and 
after pointing out that they must be granted resources, technology, and human 
know-how so that their needs and rights are met, Rawls adds:
I shall not attempt to discuss here how this might be done, as the problem 
of giving economic and technological aid so that it makes a sustained 
contribution is highly complicated and varies from country to country. 
Moreover theproblem [in societies under unfavorable conditions] is often 
not the lack of natural resources. Many societies with unfavorable 
conditions don’t lack for resources. Well-ordered societies can get on 
with very little; their wealth lies elsewhere: in their political and cultural 
traditions, in their human capital and knowledge, and in their capacity for 
political and economic organization. Rather, the problem is commonly the 
nature of the public political culture and the religious and philosophical 
traditions that underlie its institutions. (1993: 76-77)
This way of speaking about public political cultures and principles as 
though they were self-originating is a step backwards even from the arguments 
of A Theory of Justice. Most of the literature dealing with the attitudes of 
peoples toward international law, and human rights in particular, recognizes that 
the public cultures o f societies are shaped by a confluence of economic, political,
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and ideological forces that originate from many sources beyond a state’s 
territorial borders,55 Clearly, there are differences of degree in the extent of 
observance of rights, and differences in the types of rights being observed among 
countries. Scholars disagree about what factors would explain these differences; 
some emphasize the level of economic development and the type of economy; 
others, the economic-political ideology; others still emphasize the effects of 
competing political traditions and the alliances forged with domestic and foreign 
powers. Despite these differences, two points can be made. First, analyses of 
political tradition and culture, insofar as they are considered to have a bearing on 
the protection of human dignity, do not separate them from economic and 
political factors. Second, economic and political factors are not regarded in the 
literature as exclusively endogenous, that is, originating and influenced merely 
by internal domestic culture.
Thus, Rawls’ notion of domestic public cultures characterized as 
“unreasonable” traditions might be criticized as another version of those narrow 
ideological discourses which blame the recurrence of violence, human rights 
abuses, and social instability on supposedly intractable (therefore hopeless) 
defects of “national character.” Are violence, human rights abuses, and social 
instability merely the necessary burdens of a “self-contained," “closed” society 
whose domestic political culture inherently fails the test of reasonableness?
This is not to deny that there are political cultures more reasonable than 
others; it is simply to add that the reasonability and unreasonability of political 
cultures are related to historical material conditions, some or perhaps even many
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of which are extra-domestic. Moreover, if Rawls’s abstract conception of 
political culture seems to be refuted by much human rights literature and practice, 
so too does his portrayal of “peoples” interests, I return to this last point in the 
next section,
4.3 Rawls’s Law of Peoples and the Fate of Human Rights
Rawls’s treatment of human rights included in his law of peoples has several 
unfortunate consequences. First, it rationalizes different rights standards among 
libera] and nonliberal peoples and among members of nonliberal peoples 
themselves. Second, it seriously compromises the range and interdependency of 
the rights codified in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Third, it also 
misconstrues the purpose of contemporary human rights law. In this section 1 
want to expand briefly on these criticisms.
Rawls’s principle of respect for human rights as part of a just law of 
peoples can be interpreted in two different ways, both of them problematic:
(1) The human rights that nonliberal peoples recognize—e.g., the rights 
to subsistence and personal security, to liberty as freedom from slavery, 
serfdom, and forced occupation, to some formal equality as in “similar 
cases must be treated similarly,” and to “certain” liberties of conscience, 
thought, and association—are the human rights that liberal peoples
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recognize; that set of  rights is the same for both nonliberal and liberal 
societies and it is a narrow set.
(2) The human rights mentioned above are nonliberal peoples* human 
rights; that a law of peoples accommodating both liberal and nonliberal 
peoples settles upon them is a reflection of liberal societies’ toleration of 
nonliberal societies.
As for the fust interpretation, it is patently false that liberal parties in the 
second session adopt the same law of peoples for the same reasons (Rawls 1993: 
60, 67) as nonliberal parties in their second session. Recall that according to 
Rawls’s scenario the first stage of the original position involves two steps or 
sessions, the first for liberal peoples and the second for nonliberal or hierarchical 
peoples. In the second session, representatives of each “peoples” (nation-states), 
bound by the “interests” of their respective societies, choose principles for the 
law of peoples by reference to how these principles accord with the principles of 
domestic justice already chosen; as Rawls makes clear, the law of peoples only 
draws some “outer boundaries” to domestic justice. Because Rawls divides (he 
original position into two stages, giving priority to the domestic choice situation, 
he is necessarily committed to the distribution of different contents and scopes 
of freedom and equality.
In liberal democratic societies, claims of the general good and other 
perfectionist values do not take priority over the freedoms and interests of 
individual citizens. In democratic societies, at least in principle, the “interest”
183
of the society is the interests of its individual citizens in accord with the 
principles of domestic justice. The law of liberal peoples, and the principle of 
human rights in particular, must ensure, not undermine, a very demanding set of 
individual rights, liberties, opportunities, and socioeconomic means. But there 
is some doubt that Rawls’s liberal law of peoples can ensure that set. Rawls 
understands by “basic needs” those that must be met if citizens are to be in a 
position to take advantage of the rights, liberties, and opportunities of their 
society. One can assume that the set of rights, liberties, and opportunities is 
sufficiently similar and wide in all liberal democratic societies, but it need not 
be. If standards of fairness for cooperative arrangements that focus on how well 
“peoples” or societies satisfy their basic needs do allow for indefinite inter­
peoples inequalities, however, those standards, unlike the difference principle 
that Rawls summarily excludes from the law of peoples, might end up widening 
the gap among different societies’ shares of means and sets of rights.
The “interests” of hierarchical societies, as typified by Rawls, are not the 
demanding interests of citizens, much less those of equal citizens. How does 
Rawls’s theory determine the interests of hierarchical societies given that 
inequality? To which perspectives or claims does it pay attention, and which 
does it ignore? For ail that Rawls says, common good conceptions ofjustice in 
hierarchical societies guarantee only a very minimum set of rights to all 
members, but also a wider set of rights to some members. The law' of hierarchical 
peoples is therefore a different law than that of liberal peoples; the law of
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hierarchical peoples ensures only a narrow set of rights, and fewer means to make 
those rights worthy, than does the law of liberal peoples,
Contrary to Rawls, I think it unlikely that liberal societies made up of 
individuals matching Rawls’s political conception ofpersons—and thus concerned 
about preserving the worth of a demanding set of rights, liberties, and 
opportunities—would agree to standards of fairness that aIlowr for indefinite 
inequalities among peoples by focusing only on domestic well-being and 
disregarding the extra-domestic components of that well-being. The difference 
principle, were it not to be excluded by Rawls from the “more general ideas of 
liberal justice” suited for the law of peoples, wrould, by focusing on inter­
personal inequalities across national boundaries, provide a more rigorous check 
on those inter-peoples inequalities. The same can be said about the principles of 
fair equality of opportunity and the fair value of political liberties; but those too 
are excluded by Rawls,
In addition, doubts can be raised about the case of hierarchical societies. 
Why would they allow' for indefinite inter-peoples inequalities that threaten even 
the narrow set of rights (and means) they recognize? Why would they not want 
to guard themselves against contingencies—such as a huge population, 
environmental hardship, or lack of relative strength—through measures more 
definite than those barely meeting their own basic needs? Why would they allow 
contingent national borders (often arbitrarily determined by the colonial powers) 
to “justify” enormous inter-personal inequalities at the global economic level, 
even if they apparently do not care domestically about basic equality? Liberal
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and nonliberal peoples alike might care about inter-peoples inequalities, even if 
they do not care in the same way about domestic equality.
Thus, in contrast to the first interpretation of Rawls’s account of the 
principle of respect for human rights, I would argue that liberal peoples, 
concerned about preserving the widest and most worthy possible set of individual 
rights, liberties, opportunities, and means, would not accept as the content of 
international measures ofprotectionthe narrower set ofrights and means ascribed 
to nonliberal peoples. Though it is plausible, as Rawls says, that both liberal and 
nonliberal peoples care about imposing limits on internal sovereignty, I think it 
likely that liberal peoples would demand stronger rather than weaker limits.
Turning to the second interpretation, Rawls might be saying that liberal 
peoples agree to the same law of peoples, to the same principle and content of 
international human rights as nonliberal peoples, simply because the reasoning 
of liberal parties in the second session tries to accommodate the existence of 
nonliberal societies. When liberal parties accept a second session of the original 
position without representing “peoples” as free and equal across all societies, and 
accept the limits on internal sovereignty based on hierarchical peoples’ own 
conceptions of the good, they are demonstrating that accommodation through a 
commitment to toleration.
However, the second session thus understood commits liberal peoples to 
a lowest common denominator understanding of human rights, in contravention 
of the spirit of the UDHR that human rights are standards of achievement for all 
peoples and nations, and not of legitimation of any given scheme of domestic
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justice. The second session description of rights destroys the range and 
interdependency of international human rights across the board. It might be that 
such a lowest common denominator understanding is only intended to regulate 
liberal peoples* behavior towards nonliberal peoples and not necessarily the 
behavior of liberal peoples among themselves, but 1 do not think this would be 
the case in light of our discussion above of the first interpretation.
Liberal democratic societies, Rawls states, must tolerate nonliberal 
societies, organized by comprehensive doctrines but meeting certain conditions 
of well-orderedncss, in the same w ay that liberal citizens must respect citizens 
with other comprehensive views, provided they are pursued in accordance with 
domestic justice. The consLructivist account which holds that the original 
position procedure is to represent “peoples” symmetrically and equally situated, 
so that the liberal conception does not impose on other societies, is thought by 
Raw Is to be the best manner of show ing such “liberal” toleration since it asks of 
other societies only w'haL they can reasonably grant (1 993; 67, 79). But leaving 
aside for the moment the simplistic parallel between toleration of individual 
pluralism and of pluralism of conceptions of the good at the level of the slate, 
liberal societies, or rather the citizens of liberal societies, must also be responsive 
to the fundamental needs and interests of all other persons qua persons, and this 
equally. This is simply a feature of liberal persons that cannot be waived. It is 
not clear to me why, when a liberal political conception ofjustice is extended to 
the law of peoples, the essential question becomes for Rawls “What form does the
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toleration of nonliberal societies take in this case?” (1993; 42-43), as opposed to 
“What form do liberty, equality, and solidarity take in this case?”
However, Rawls wants to prove that distinguishing two stages injustice 
as fairness—the first focusing on liberal domestic institutions and individuals, and 
the second focusing on the political relations between “peoples”—not only agrees 
with the reflective public opinion of all peoples as “corporate bodies,” but also 
that such a distinction does not totally commit liberal democratic “peoples” to 
overlook or disregard the liberty and equality that I am concerned with here. In 
other words, such a distinction is in Rawls4s opinion the best manner to balance 
liberal toleration towards independence and self-determination of peoples and 
liberal universalism regarding the liberty interests of individuals.
The powers of sovereignty, Rawls explains, are a part of the law of 
peoples and not of domestic justice or domestic jurisdiction. Among those 
pow ers are how a state is to treat its own citizens, and among the principles of the 
law of peoples are the minimum standards of such treatment, that is, the principle 
of respect for human rights. Human rights are ensured through the criteria of 
"well-orderedness” of the law of peoples that the well-ordered hierarchical 
societies can respect. On this view, we must tolerate only those societies. And 
the smaller measure of freedom and equality oftheir members that those societies 
respect is all liberals can “reasonably” ask for.
Consider again the criteria of hierarchical well-orderedness that the 
society of liberal societies accepts and hierarchical regimes can respect. Rawls 
claims that the social and legal systems are legitimate and the hierarchy is just
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because the rights those systems and the hierarchy recognize enable all human 
beings therein to be dutiful members of their societies and dutiful members of 
their assigned station. To be sure, hierarchical societies keep their members alive 
and protected against slavery, serfdom, torture, and other similar degrading 
treatments which would destroy the moral dutifulness of any person. Yet it 
seems unlikely that “moral dutifulness” defined in terms of a hierarchical well- 
orderedness is always or even ever in accord with the type of respect of human 
dignity recognized by tbe UDHR. Think, for example, of the predicament of 
traditionally “dutiful” women and other disempowered persons (religious and 
racial or ethnic minorities) in those contexts, and the consequences of Rawls’s 
views with regard to their struggles for emancipation and full and equal human 
rights begins to look rather too tolerant.
Moreover, in agreeing to the representation of hierarchical peoples as 
pursuing the common Interests of their societies, although subject to some 
limitations of the law of peoples, liberal peoples not only agree, as Rawls points 
out, to the denial of full and equal liberty of conscience and thought to the 
members of such societies. In societies where a state religion or a state 
comprehensive doctrine reigns, the members of the established religion or 
comprehensive doctrine enjoy certain privileges that translate into elitism and 
paternalism, and consequently the denial of the fullness and equality of almost 
ail other liberties to the rest of the members, including tbe minimum liberties that 
Rawls grants them. Any advocacy of toleration towards pluralism of conceptions 
ofjustice at the level of the state must take note of these facts, especially if the
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struggles of non-privileged members against the dominant domestic, common 
good conception are also pursued in accordance with standards of justice 
recognizable to liberal societies.
It is arguable that Rawls’s notion of a society of liberal societies 
accommodating what the society of hierarchical societies “can reasonably grant” 
might say more about the interests and concerns of the power elite at the top of 
the hierarchy than about the ideals and values of their populations, at least of the 
oppressed therein. Because the criteria of well-orderedness of the law of peoples 
have been designed with a view to what hierarchical societies can reasonably 
accept in terms of their own common good interests (those criteria are to become 
"human rights” for theml and because, less ideally, the scope and content of state 
internal sovereignty are dependent on the practices and omissions of the 
international community, it is difficult to say whether hierarchical peoples enter 
the proposed agreement with a very different understanding of human rights, 
which must be tolerated, or whether they are destined to maintain that 
understanding. And even though Rawls claims that his law of peoples does not 
embody the "morality oT states” view'(i.e., the traditional law' of nations) because 
it places the powers oT internal and external sovereignty in the realm of the law 
of peoples itself, that is, in the hands of the community of communities (1993: 
4Sff.s 221 n. 8), Rawls’s notion of toleration among peoples and the design which 
guarantees that toleration come very close to the morality of states view. On this 
point, Rawls remains faithful to the position taken in A Theory of Justice.
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I very much doubt, then, that the reflective liberal democratic individual 
and the disempowered members and groups of hierarchical societies would 
support Rawls’s tw'a sessions as described, that is, the very minimum criteria of 
well-orderedness of the second session. But even if those criteria were to be 
supported, that would only show, I think, that public opinion is siill to be brought 
into equilibrium with better possible conceptions ofjustice among peoples.
One could still argue that despite the limitations I have pointed out, 
Rawls’s project of an overlapping consensus of peoples on a law' of peoples, 
which allows them to pursue their collective interests within limits, still leads to 
the moral affirmation of important rights; and thus, that this approach is belter 
than a modus vivendi state of affairs. However, there still remain reasons for 
doubting the wisdom of a list of differing minimum rights as standards of 
international protection.
For instance, when it is claimed that for the purposes of foreign policy and 
action, the sixty or more rights recognized in the International Bill of  Human 
Rights should be trimmed down to something more manageable, that “something 
more manageable” tends to reduce either to the set of rights with regard to which 
a particular government is “doing better” in comparison with a real or imagined 
opponent (e.g., economic rights in socialist countries, political rights in liberal 
democratic countries), or to a set of rights that reflects de facto rather than 
normative consensus.56
Furthermore, Rawls’s list of basic rights is surprisingly "Western” in what 
it leaves out, despite his anti-ethnocentric aspirations: economic and social
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rights, except the right to subsistence, have disappeared, as well as any reference 
to international solidarity and international institutional reform as necessary for 
the full realization of all rights (Article 28). Rawls fails to address the fact that 
in international debates since at least the 1970s “non-Western” (or “developing”) 
societies have struggled for precisely those rights. Even Rawls’s recent feminist 
gestures, such as his condemnation of the oppression of women due to the 
unreasonability of certain conceptions of the common good, agree little with First 
and Third World feminist literature emphasizing the indivisibility of rights and 
the inclusion of socio-economic rights as vital to the full spectrum of human 
rights.5’
Assenting to de facto consensus as the starting point of international 
action—and Rawls’s project seems to read, “let us start with only those rights that 
more easily could be respected by all and see where we can go from there”— 
implies paradoxically that international efforts should emphasize only those 
rights that are not widely and systematically violated. Any sound list of differing 
“minimum” rights would require such extensive empirical research regarding the 
mechanisms by which each repressive government is able to turn human life into 
that of a solitary, poor, nasty, and brutish shell, that we are much better off by 
defending all the rights of the UDHR (Donnelly, 1989: 41 ff.). There is no reason 
to think that not recognizing the right to subsistence is the only means of keeping 
human beings from their food and shelter; and there is no reason to think that a 
de facto minimalism does not lead to a spiraling downwards in human well-being.
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as opposed to a hopeful start. That Rawls appears to think this is a severe step 
backwards from the vision of social justice articulated in his earlier theory.
A final point. Rawls insists time and again that human rights are a 
“special class of rights," different from constitutional and citizens rights. This 
way of describing human rights coheres with Rawls’s project concerning a law 
of peoples, but seems to confuse two different facts, namely, the international 
character of human rights law—the fact that human rights standards are 
internalional—and its true role and object of concern—the fact that human rights 
are rights of the individual, there to protect the inviolability of the individual 
from domestic and extra-domestic threats. International law theorists insist that 
human rights arc individual rights and that their only “specialness" is that they 
arc claimed when legal and political remedies are not working or have failed.5B 
Far from heing different from constitutional and citizens rights, human rights 
become redundant or "se lf  liquidating" precisely when constitutional and citizens 
rights arc in place.
If the purpose of contemporary international human rights law is that of 
raising domestic standards of protection so that individual well-being is 
increased, 1 do not see how Rawls’s project of a lowest common denominator 
“equilibrium” among differing domestic standards respects that purpose and its 
beneficiaries. And if human rights taw can be expansively read as safeguarding 
the individual also against extra-domestic threats and in accordance with a very 
demanding set of rights that are appropriate for all persons everywhere, then I fail
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to see how Rawls’s law of peoples can improve upon that recognition and 
protection.
4.4 Rawls and Cosmopolitan Social Justice: Concluding Remarks
Charles Beitz argues that a social justice model of human rights accommodates 
the economic and social rights of the Universal Declaration, brings In issues of 
contribution regarding the fulfillment of rights claims (i.e., w ho should satisfy 
rights claims), and addresses matters of priority among rights “in the context of 
a theory draw ing together the diverse moral considerations that (must) enter in 
the justification of general principles of social justice” (1979a: 60). Beitz’s 
argument is aimed against some specific trails of natural rights theories, yet he 
docs not emphasize other advantages of the social justice model, such as its 
ability to preserve the universality of human rights.
Beitz contends that because “the social justice model recognizes that some 
rights rind their philosophical foundation in certain characteristics of human 
social cooperation, it can explain the basis o f . , . those human rights which do 
not belong to persons as persons, but rather belong to persons because of the 
social relations in which they stand” (1979a: 58-59), Before I enter into the 
matter of human rights universality at the conclusion of this thesis, however, I 
want to comment on the justification of human rights within the social justice 
model. This is because I think that Beitz is wrong in asserting that economic and 
social rights find their foundation exclusively in human social cooperation,
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whereas “personal” rights (and perhaps even civil and political rights) appeal to 
other bases. This brief commentary will set the tone for the discussion that 
follows.
One of the problems with Beitz's argument is that it tends to obscure the 
ideal dimension that the notion of social cooperation has in a theory of social 
justice such as that of the early Rawls, in terms of its importance to the 
justification ofRawlsian justice. For instance, in his account ofRawlsian global 
justice in Political Theory and International Relations. Beitz merely appeals to 
the empirical existence of global cooperation given the circumstances ofjustice 
yet neglects the ideal of cooperation among free and equal persons. In other 
words, B citz appeals to the role ofjustice but neglects the interpretation of this 
role intimately connected to an ideal of social cooperation. I think that in 
Rawls’s theory (and I refer here to his conception of social justice in A Theory 
of Justicel. all rights—eivil and political as well as economic and social (what 
Rawls refers to as means contributing to the worth of freedom)--are justified by 
appeal not only to their necessity and efficacy given societal cooperation under 
the circumstances of justice, but also by appeal to the notion of cooperation 
among free and equal persons, which is a normative ideal. (The question I raised 
in the previous chapter is whether Rawls’s principles of international justice are 
able to vindicate this ideal). In overlooking this normative ideal Beitz 
unnecessarily fragments the justificatory bases of (human) rights. And Rawls 
ends up with the same result by dropping this ideal from his theory ofjustice.
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I think it is necessary to underline that point because one of the usual 
contentions in human rights theory is this: If human rights are rights that all 
individuals have simply because they are human, why then are human rights also 
entitlements, that is, how come they refer to social structures, political ties, and 
so on? The answer to this query is not to argue that there are, in the UDHR, two 
different philosophical anthropologies (human beings as “natural” vs. human 
beings as “social”) and two opposing views of human freedom and rights 
(negative and positive). Those remarks often imply that social and economic 
rights are different, less firm, and somehow second category rights. What ought 
to be argued is that there is one single normative ideal of the human being—as 
equally free—and that economic and social rights, as much as any other right, rely 
on it; and that ideal is to be realized, logically, in society. How else are we to 
understand the Preamble to the 1CESCR, which states that the “ideal of free 
human beings enjoying freedom from fear and from want can only be achieved 
if conditions are created whereby everyone enjoys his economic, social, and 
cultural rights”? The idea conveyed by these documents is that all rights are 
instrumental in society in helping to secure equally free humanity.
Jack Donnelly has argued that the “humanity” wrhich grounds human rights 
is both historically embedded and utopian, i.e,, a moral ideal. To say that human 
rights derive from the inherent dignity of the human person is to say that human 
rights are needed for a life of dignity, a life w'orthy of a human person, a life of 
freedom and equality. Humanity’s moral status, as free and equal, as possessing 
dignity, not only appeals to the “nature” of persons and their societies given
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contemporary psychological, sociological, and moral facts. It is also a moral 
vision of humanity resting on an account of some of the requirements needed to 
realize that vision. Human rights include, then, the demand that basic legal, 
political, and economic institutions and practices help realize that moral vision 
precisely through the implementation of those rights,59
On this point Pogge’s Rawlsian version of global justice is in agreement. 
In his theory, it will be recalled, Pogge wants to provide an answer to the 
question, What sort of international order makes possible the full realization of 
the human rights of the Universal Declaration given the fact of societal 
interdependence? His answer is more closely related to Kant’s notion of 
cosmopolitan right than it is to Rawls’s notion of a law of peoples. Whereas 
Rawls would accept a division of the world’s peoples into those who are mere 
subjects with unequal rights and those w'ho are equal citizens, Kant argued for the 
establishment of equal world citizenship for all persons. He wrote:
Since the narrower or wider community of the peoples of the earth has 
developed so far that a violation of rights in one place is felt throughout 
the world, the idea of a law of world citizenship is no high-flown 
exaggerated notion. It is a supplement to the unwritten code of the civil 
and international law, indispensable for the maintenance of human rights 
and hence to perpetual peace, (1957: 23)
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The Kantian response to the ideal of equal freedom, and to the Fact that 
whenever people cooperate together so that their actions affect each other a threat 
of infringement of equal freedom usually arises, is to create an order of global 
justice that recognizes and protects the same and equal human rights for all, and 
the measures that guarantee the maximum worth or value of those rights. In other 
words, the response is the creation of or the working towards a global scheme 
that satisfies and harmonizes with Rawls's globalized principles of justice, 
chosen by individuals as free and equal and chosen for basic institutions in 
general.
For Pogge, Rawlsian principles ofglobal justice are the principles that free 
and equal moral persons would agree upon when confronting a world in the 
circumstances of heavy interdependence and pluralism. As he well points out, 
the ideal of the human person as free and equal—or its equivalent, the ideal of 
well-ordered cooperation among citizens regarded as such persons—is no more 
nor less than that: an ideal, a normative conception that must be realized. It is 
as absurd to maintain that a criterion of justice is only applicable to better- 
ordered societies where better-off citizens abide (the West) as it is to maintain 
that human rights are only applicable there where they are (arguably) less needed. 
The task is then to create, not to presuppose, the institutions, and to implement 
the principles that will bring about such an ideal person and such ideal 
cooperation.
This discussion on the importance of normativity allows us to understand 
further advantages of the cosmopolitan social justice model. Those advantages
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have to do with the plausible elaboration it provides of those theoretical and 
practical key points in the international human rights law that some theorists 
argue are underelaborated; for example, the elaboration of some of those global 
circumstances that have made human rights imperative; the elaboration of the 
conceptions ofjustice, freedom, and stability that are reflected in the full range 
of human rights; the elaboration of the links between the national and the 
international obligations required to create conditions that secure human rights. 
I will not enter into these further matter here. I am going to focus, instead, on the 
fact that the broadly Rawlsian social justice model attempts to preserve the 
universality of human rights standards, and some of the problems that follow 
from that attempt.
According to the prevailing human rights Jaw, human rights are universal: 
all and the same human rights should be applicable to every human being and 
equally applicable. This point is essentia! beeause, as we have seen, Rawls’s 
overlapping consensus of peoples on a "law of peoples” protective of differing 
minimum rights does not preserve universality. In Pogge’s framework, it is 
Rawls’s liberal democratic rights that he attempts to universalize. Assuming for 
the moment that a liberal democratic understanding of human rights is the best 
articulation of those rights, the question arises of how to go about universalizing 
them.
According to Pogge, there are at least three strategies to employ in 
universalizing human rights:
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1) Proposing those rights to others under the Rawlsian rationales of the 
fact of pluralism, the fact of the global basic structure, the ideal of cooperation 
among free and equal persons, and the necessity of preserving background justice 
in the light of that ideal. An essential part of this proposal is taking positive 
steps towards refashioning global institutions in a liberal democratic way; the 
West bears a special responsibility here, due to its position of control and 
advantage within those institutions,
2) Adopting a degrees approach to the legitimation of liberal democratic 
rights in diverse cultures,
3) Insisting on the necessity of an overlapping consensus on the same 
rights along individualist lines, so that such consensus is capable of initiating 
global and domestic change and institutional reconstruction,
This strategy suggested by Pogge might appear trivial but it is not given 
present-day tendencies to seek agreement in light of the prudential convictions 
wc happen to have, rather than in light of  the convictions we could have by 
developing better moral and social theories and taking practical steps to realize 
them. The strategy is still too general, of course, yet it is well-taken.
Now, if the universalizing strategy is well-taken, the Rawlsian content that 
Pogge seeks to universalize might not be as proper, particularly if the criterion 
is to help develop and realize the contemporary human rights law. In other 
words, while Pogge can successfully show that Rawls’s theory should move in 
a global direction, and that such a move can only help the universalization of 
human rights, can he show' that Rawls’s conception ofjustice and rights is the
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best available to fully realize human rights? This is important because human 
rights law aspires to more than universality of rights standards. It aspires also to 
the universal realization of the free and equal human being, an ideal underlying 
economic and social as much as civil and political rights. If the same ideal of 
equal freedom underlies Rawls’s rights, opportunities, and means in A Theory of 
Justice, one needs to push Rawls’s criterion so that it coheres with the ideal of 
human rights on the global level. The question then is, does Rawls provide a 
theory of social justice that is capable of grounding universal human rights?
I believe that in his early theory ofjustice as fairness he does, and in my 
estimation there is much to be gained by thinking of human rights in a Rawlsian 
framework, that is, as requirements of domestic and international social justice 
and as standards specifying the legitimacy of institutional patterns. However, 
thinking of human rights in a Rawlsian framework gives us another reason for 
reconfiguring Rawls’s theory of international justice so that the device of the 
original position is brought to bear immediately on the world at large.
One advantage of thinking of human rights in terms of Rawls’s theory of 
justice as fairness is, I believe, the structural vision of the world of human rights 
protection that such a strategy both presupposes and encourages. That conception 
allows the human rights theorist and activist to develop an analysis of the legal 
system, the political constitution, the economic organization (or disorganization) 
of a society; the ways in which those institutions, taken as a “scheme” or whole, 
distribute human beings over different social positions that dramatically 
influence their life prospects and shape their expectations and activities; and the
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ways those institutions often exclude, unduly burden, or clearly exploit the 
members of specific social and economic positions. A Rawlsian conception of 
the world ofjustice and human rights encourages a complex yet unified view of 
the dimensions of social reality,
A Rawlsian conception can also be inclusive, insofar as it recognizes that 
institutional patterns may interlock the members of different communities across 
the globe. As Pogge contends, the present international order is the modus 
vivendi framework brought about by inter-governmental prudential practice, 
informed by the changing distribution of power, whatever that may be. That 
framework cannot reflect the moral values of any nation-state’s population and 
perhaps makes impossible any value-based global institution, such as effective 
mechanisms for the protection of human rights everywhere in the world. This 
predicament explains, for example, why the international community often 
disregards domestic human rights violations in powerless or strategically-allied 
populations, or initiates violations in “spheres of influence.” Moreover, being 
a-morai, the present international order's ground rules are generally insensitive 
to international inequalities, which in turn reinforces the power-structures 
characteristic of the existing modus vivendi. Because those rules do not 
incorporate any egalitarian distributive component (as does Rawls’s law of 
peoples which excludes the difference principle and fair equality of opportunity), 
members of different communities do not have equal chances to influence the 
trans-national and supra-national decisions that shape their lives, and thus do not 
have equal chances of obtaining health care, education, or work irrespective of
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the society to which they belong. Because the international inequalities 
generated do not work to the benefit of the world’s least advantaged groups and 
classes (on the contrary, they compound their position of disadvantage) the rights 
and liberties of those groups are nearly valueless; and this is leaving aside the 
sheer starvation and misery brought about and worth preventing in itself, not just 
in terms of worthy or effective liberty.40
The discussion throughout the last two chapters brings to our attention that 
one of the most important problems facing human rights today is that of the 
diversity of (domestic) frameworks ofjustice and of political cultures, I have 
argued that the absolute primacy of the domestic, or a focus on the domestic that 
disregards the extra-domestic, ought to be contested, This is not to say that the 
dimensions of diverse public cultures do not matter to human rights protection. 
It is to say that discussing issues of cultural diversity in isolation from basic 
structure (domestic and global) considerations may be too short-sighted. I think 
that a properly Rawlsian conception of justice and human rights would be 
concerned to question the separation between the creation of a domestic climate 
in which equal freedom can flourish and the creation of a global scheme in which 
such a domestic climate becomes possible.
However, the continually growing importance of globalization and trans­
national dimensions of social justice calls for more finely-tuned analyses than 
those that stop at the negative human rights significance of the nation-state’s 
borders. The nation-state is clearly still a very important actor within the global 
arena. Given this fact, are the most important human rights violations those
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brought about by the standing modus vivendi framework? If so, what are the 
implications of a Rawlsian criterion of global justice regarding domestic society? 
How well does a Rawlsian global model fare with respect to the tension, and the 
necessary accommodation, between global justice—ensuring universal, equal 
rights—and cultural diversity?
At the end of Realizing Rawls, Pogge maintains that the single, global 
session of the original position allows the parlies to decide how much room to 
leave for differences in national institutional organizations and in national 
conceptions of domestic justice (1989: 272). The parties know that the world 
divides up into national societies although they must accommodate this 
knowledge from the standpoint of free and equal moral persons seeking to 
optimize their shares of primary goods, rather than from the standpoint of states’ 
representatives pursuing prudential interests (1989: 258). Thus, Pogge adds, 
choices as regards domestic practices must, first, be consistent with the basic 
rights oTall (as embodied in the Universal Declaration or according to the rights 
and liberties enunciated by Rawls in A Theory ofjustice). both citizens as well 
as outsiders; and, second, be supported by most of a society’s citizens. Pogge 
identifies these requirements as a balancing of the liberty interest in collective 
autonomy against other (apparently universal and individual) liberty interests. 
According to Pogge, this balancing allows for differences in national conceptions 
ofjustice. But how does it do so? It seems clear that the criterion of global 
justice might allow for domestic variations in institutional features, but it is less
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obvious that variations will be allowed in substantive conceptions ofjustice (or 
in interpretations of those conceptions).
A brief examination of Pogge’s elaboration on domestic choice in his 
discussions of the political process might help to illuminate the problem. Pogge 
maintains that his globalized version of Rawls’s conception ofjustice is more 
responsive to cultural diversity than are Rawls’s own proposals for international 
justice (portrayed in chapter three as R, and R2). This is supposedly because in 
Pogge’s version the global parties arc not constrained by any prior (Rawlsian) 
criterion of domestic justice, and because Pogge envisages the constitutional 
convention as relating not just to differences in national circumstances but also 
to div ersity in national collective preferences.
In Pogge’s opinion, Rawls has the tendency to think of the political 
process as an instance of imperfect procedural justice. Pogge contends, however, 
that insofar as outcomes of the domestic political process are underdetermined 
by an independent criterion (the global criterion), the political process contains 
an element of pure procedural justice; that element allows more of a social 
system’s institutional features to be shaped in accordance with preferences in the 
political debate. In particular, the role reserved for direct democracy, choices 
between democratic single-party or multi-party systems, and choices between 
single-member or multi-member constituencies, can be left to the domestic 
debate.
While the criterion of global justice governs the ground rules ofthe global 
system as a whole, this is still compatible with different institutional
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specifications of the criterion regarding practices whose authority is confined to 
particular regional or local divisions, for the equal political liberties can be 
compatible with those differences. Moreover, since the opportunity principle 
makes no specific requirements about what opportunities a scheme is to generate, 
but constrains only the distribution of such opportunities, and since, similarly, 
the difference principle requires only that inequalities optimize the relative 
position of the least advantaged, the choice of institutional features that affect 
opportunities and socioeconomic positions roughly equally can be left to the 
domestic political process, Pogge recognizes, though, that the domestic political 
process is also constrained. Thus, social policies must be just (the criterion 
excludes certain outcomes, like violations of the first principle ofjustice); the 
equal political liberties must be domestically respected; and the difference 
principle should be incorporated into domestic constitutions.
As far as international justice is concerned in A Theory ofjustice. Rawls 
assumed a conception of social cooperation which is tied directly to the realist 
perspective of conventional international relations and the law of nations, Given 
this assumption, 1 must agree with Pogge that Rawls’s account of international 
justice ts severely hampered by its dependence on a background modus vivendi 
framework. The inequality and instability resulting from this framework are 
hardly conducive to the principles ofjustice endorsed by Rawls at the domestic 
level. As Pogge proposes, then, I believe that the choice situations of the original 
position ought to reflect an alternative conception of social cooperation in order 
to generate a more adequate theory of international justice. This would be
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achieved, in part, by eliminating Rawls’s stipulation that the original position 
may be extended into the international domain only after principles have been 
chosen for domestic purposes. Instead, the parties to the original position would 
immediately address the principles for the basic structure of global society, which 
includes at the same time domestic social systems and individuals. Under this 
interpretation, the majority of the elements found in Rawlses description of the 
original position still remain in place, such as the formal constraints of the 
concept of right (universality, generality, publicity, finality), the condition of 
mutual disinterestedness, and the conception of the parties as rational. However, 
what is most significantly different is that the parties to the original position are 
to be considered persons from different societies and not representatives of states. 
The parties can still be regarded as the citizens (not merely subjects) of states, but 
they would not possess knowledge of the particular features of the slates in which 
they happen to reside. In other words the parties retain, from Rawls’s original 
conception, their identities as free and equal moral persons in the world at large 
but a veil of ignorance precludes them from assuming the identity of states’ 
(liberal or hierarchical) representatives.61
Adopting this position allows for a “more Rawlsian” characterization of 
the international original position. For instance, the parties do not know' the 
particular circumstances of any society, nor do they know any society’s political 
structure or economic situation. Moreover, the parties do not know the particular 
circumstances of the international community. Because Rawls w'ould allow the 
international original position only after the principles have been chosen for the
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domestic original position, in his model the parties must know that they are 
representatives of states whose interests are necessarily determined by an existing 
national context. This would seem to me to defeat the purpose of the veil of 
ignorance and the original position in choosing appropriately global principles 
ofjustice. As Rawls maintains, justice is the object of the basic structure of 
society; yet I suggest that the basic structure is that of an interdependent global 
society rather than that of a single more-or-less self-contained state. This is 
significant because the basic structure is conceived by Rawls as the system of 
institutions which distributes rights and liberties and determines the division of 
advantages of domestic cooperation. It is my argument that the basic structure 
is now to be understood as the system which distributes universal rights and 
Itbertiesand determines the advantages of international social cooperation, which 
necessarily includes different societies.
It should also be noted that if the parties are persons, rather than 
representatives of states in a modus vivendi framework, then they would be more 
liable to adopt a moral rather than merely prudential understanding of their 
existence in the circumstances ofjustice, i.e., that conditions of moderate scarcity 
exist between them, that natural and other resources are not evenly distributed, 
and that the availability of those resources is affected by conflicting claims at the 
global level. This recognition is a factor absent from Rawls’s model. As a result, 
the interests, equality, and autonomy of persons are given priority over the 
interests of states,
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The model presented here suggests that although the parties recognize that 
a basic structure of some sort exists it remains open as to what its final form will 
be, although I do assume it would match up with a Rawlsian liberal, democratic 
society. It does not assume that the selected principles of international justice 
will be the “familiar” rules of the conventional law of nations, which necessarily 
differ from the principles of domestic justice described by Rawls. Thus, the 
parties understand that extended principles ofjustice are required to order these 
underdetermined social institutions for the mutual advantage of all, precluding 
the immediate imposition ofa modus vivendi framework from a position external 
to that of the parlies in the original position, The principles of domestic justice 
would coincide with the principles of  international justice, meaning that the basic 
rights and liberties of people as national citizens would coincide with the basic 
rights and liberties of people as global subjects, Starting from a global rather 
than domestic choice situation therefore entails the following modifications of 
the Rawlsian principles ofjustice that can be derived and used to appraise the 
basic structure of international society:
(1) The first principle of equal liberty requires the distribution of the most 
extensive total system of universal rights and liberties from the start to all 
human beings in the global community,
(2) The second principle concerning equality of opportunity and social 
and economic inequalities applies from the start to the global, not just the 
domestic, community.
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Rawls observed in his theory of domestic justice that, from the 
participant’s point of view, it would not be reasonable to expect agreement on a 
principle ofjustice granting a greater than equal share in any division of the 
social primary goods; neither would it be reasonable to expect agreement on a 
principle distributing less than an equal share. The same can be said if one takes 
the original position, and thus the background ideal of social cooperation, to be 
immediately global rather than only domestic. The basic result of the 
modifications given above is, then, a view ofcosmopolitan social justice in which 
all social primary goods-~equal rights and liberties, fair equality of opportunities, 
the bases of self-respect and respect for others—are to be distributed equally and 
universally. This Rawlsian framework of principles of international justice 
would appear to embody the ideals that are essential to the achievement of 
universally substantive human rights, since such globalized principles are 
justified by appeal not only to their necessity and efficacy given international 
interdependence, but also by appeal to the normative ideal of inter-social 
cooperation among free and equal persons. As 1 argued in Chapter Two, if we 
understand Rawls’s basic or fundamental rights to mean human rights, such rights 
depend both on the normative ideal of social cooperation among free and equal 
persons and on their realization in the socio-political institutions of the basic 
structure of (global) society. It is only if the ideal of free and equal social 
cooperation is as prescriptive at the global level as Rawls holds it to be at the
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domestic level that a specifically Rawlsian conception of international justice can 
be obtained.
If that is the case, a Rawlsian theory of international justice appeals not 
only to a particular conception of moral persons but it also seeks to create the 
basic social conditions, institutions and practices through which human beings 
can actually realize themselves as free and equal. In other words, Rawlsian 
principles of global justice are those that free and equal moral persons would 
agree upon given the circumstances of an international original position. 
However, w'hile such principles are ideals of well-ordered cooperation among 
persons they are clearly also more than that: they are ideals that must be realized 
in society if justice is to be bad. The further task, then, is to construct the social 
institutions and implement the principles that will bring about the type of global 
social cooperation of moral persons that cosmopolitan justice requires.
Thus, 1 share with Rawls the tenet that a major cause of human rights 
violations is the lack of legitimacy of international standards within political 
cultures. However, 1 distance myself from Rawls’s law of peoples approach in 
one important respect: it is the human rights of the international instruments that 
must be legitimized with respect to the interests of individual persons, and these 
universal human rights must take priority over those differing minimum rights 
ascribed by Rawds to different peoples. The main features of human rights in 
international law—the universality of human rights application to every human 
being; the universality of recognition on the part of states and state-actors; the 
inalienability of human rights, which protect interdependent interests—must
211
provide some fixed points to any inquiry into the cross-cultural substantiation of 
human rights. Since human rights standards and procedures need further 
development and substantive force, as even Rawls recognizes, it is true that 
cultural diversity also matters. Yet a strategy may be found sketched in the 
International Bill of Human Rights for the justification of human rights that is 
promising with respect tc their cultural and cross-cultural legitimation,
According to Article 1 of the UDHR. the proximate normative premise 
justifying universal rights is the principle that each human being as human being 
is entitled to freedom and to equal dignity, Persons are so entitled because 
human beings are due freedom and equal dignity as a matter of reciprocal moral 
recognition. Human rights are, then, “aspects of status-part  of what is involved 
m being a member of the moral community" and include “forms of inviolability 
in the status of every member of the moral community" (Nagel, 1995: 85). 
However, the precise characteristics of human beings by virtue of which they owe 
each other moral recognition are left underelaborated, thus leaving them open to 
various cultural interpretations which may conflict among themselves, but 
without affront to the UDHR. This is important because the leeway of 
interpretation is nevertheless constrained by the human rights provisions 
contained in the UDHR as a whole.
According to the Preamble of the UDHR and the discussions of the Third 
Committee of the General Assembly in 1948, another justificatory premise 
helping to prescribe the system of human rights is a description of the Second 
World War and events such as the Holocaust, whose possible repetition make
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mandatory a globally binding consensus on universally applicable human rights 
and on a program of implementation. Thus, it is not the commitment to freedom 
and equality on the basis of some grand assumption about God, Nature, or Human 
Nature that prescribes human rights, but rather the commitment to freedom and 
equality on the basis of political, sociological, and historical analyses of the 
circumstances confronting all societies of the world. Thus, the justificatory 
theory of the UDHR is neither theological nor metaphysical, but rather an 
exercise in situated moral-political rationality. Although the UDHR denies that 
human rights derive solely from human beings* legal and political status in 
society or from their citizenship in a state, it also rejects natural law doctrines 
holding that human rights derive ultimately from an essential “human nature.” 
This position fits well with the one 1 outlined in Chapter Two concerning Rawls’s 
theory of basic (human) rights. As 1 stated there, not every theory that claims 
that human rights are not derived wholly from persons’ legal and political status 
need be a natural right doctrine in a strong, metaphysically excessive sense. 
While the moral interests and obligations representative of those protected by 
human rights do not suddenly come into existence only within a formal political 
unit (does one’s interest in not being tortured come to an end if one is suddenly 
made homeless or stateless by, say, a natural disaster or an act of war?), they are 
only fully realized when respected and protected by a legitimate legal and 
political system.
My assertion is, then, that universal human rights are compatible with 
cultural pluralism with respect to justification, and that the UDHR precisely
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constitutes a proposal for a global overlapping consensus on the same rights 
along the lines of the diversity of cultures, The normative premise in the UDHR 
could be fleshed out, of course, and supplemented with other normative 
principles that might vary with culture, provided they support the freedom and 
equal dignity of human beings, and the priority of that freedom and equality. The 
global overlapping consensus at work here is similar to that proposed by Rawls, 
but differs in that its subject matter ts universal human rights (not principles for 
a basic structure) and its scale concerns international relations within world 
society (and not only domestic societies).
The core problem with Rawls’s approach is that it leads to a lowest 
common denominator standard that trims the range, scope, and interdependence 
of human rights. This is a problem because one of the purposes of 
internationalized human rights norms is the protection of vulnerable individuals 
and groups from local mistreatment by cultural attitudes and practices entrenched 
in dogmatic comprehensive doctrines. Yet if local standards must prevail in a 
law of peoples, as Rawls suggests they must, what would be the point of social 
jusliccas conceived in Rawls's earlier work? What would be the point of striving 
to raise domestic standards that allow cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment, 
ir not that of at least maximizing the minimums in its most pedestrian sense, i.e., 
improving the lot of the worst off? Unfortunately, Rawds’s human rights are not 
universal standards of achievement for all nations and cultures. They condone 
different rights among the members of different societies, and among the 
members of the same society.
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I do not think that international standards are as vague in meaning and 
possible forms of implementation as Rawls apparently believes, unless of course 
one ignores the concrete history and institutionalization of rights and insists on 
“isolating" one culture from the next. Rawls’s method of isolating 
cultures/countries in the procedure of the original position makes it easier and 
more likely to fragment human rights, to begin a process of separation and then 
dilution. However, appeal to cultural diversity need not lead to the kind of 
parochialism exhibited by Rawls!s law' of peoples, since not all (many? any?) 
cultures are locally confined, or inward-looking, or homogeneous.
Finally, I would suggest that accepting the basis of human rights to be the 
freedom and equal dignity of all persons would require the eventual 
transformation of a hierarchical state into a democratic, secular one. This is 
because, in accepting the equality of all persons, human rights and a human 
righls-based constitution and not a comprehensive religious or moral doctrine 
must become the law' of the land. One cannot arrive at a constitution based on the 
liberties of equal citizenship by starting with a doctrine that clearly denies this 
basis. Such a transformation is desirable from the point of view of social justice 
since a neutral (liberal democratic) state does not violate the religious rights of 
anybody (although it probably “violates” the unreasonable demands of some that 
the state be organized according to their comprehensive doctrine). The most 
effective way to guarantee the human rights of all persons is through a series of 
constitutions w hose bases are liberties of the person, legal liberties, liberty of 
conscience, and political liberties, and these equally without discrimination, A
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state organized on such a basis has ceased to be a hierarchical state (although 
perhaps what survives of religion in public life are rhetorical formulae of the kind 
found in the United States, such as “In God we trust” and so on). Such a state is 
actually more responsive to the fact of social pluralism, since it provides for the 
freedom of all persons to hold diverse religious and moral beliefs, grants each 
person an equal liberty of thought and conscience, and accords “to each 
individual some substantial space of personal independence, immune from 
coercion by the w ill of others" (Nagel, 1995: 94).
I am aware, of course, that such a transformation is not easily achieved in the 
practical realm. A reformed hierarchical society that proclaims the legal and political 
equality of all persons is in fact a hierarchical society proclaiming its self-dissolution, 
and with it the disappearance of the legal, political, and economic advantages for those 
at the top of the hierarchy or consultation elite. Yet in my opinion the preservation of 
a hierarchical society docs not cohere with universal human rights, an opinion I think 
would he shared by at least the early Rawls.
In A Theory of Justice we can find a typical liberal democratic argument for the 
separation of religion and state (and law); the notion of a confessional state is rejected 
and the notion of state neutrality affirmed. Incidentally, one rejects the notion of a 
confessional state not only because the contents of most religious obligations to have the 
state organized according to comprehensive religious doctrine are discriminatory against 
others’ different goods and rights; but also because leaving in the hands of the state any 
sort of possibility of appealing to religion in order to justify public policy is leaving in 
those hands too much leeway and pow'er.
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In A Theory of Justice the principle of equal liberty, the First principle ofjustice 
for institutions, is chosen under conditions of fairness and impartiality. That principle 
and very prominently the liberties of the person, equal liberty of conscience and freedom 
of thought, and equal political rights (what Rawls calls the liberties ofequal citizenship) 
are to be incorporated into and protected by the constitution. Rawls points out that the 
argument for the first principle in general can be given by considering the argument for 
freedom of conscience (1971: 205Ff.).
In the original position, even though the parties do not know what specific 
religious and moral views they hold and they do not know how their views will fare in 
their society, they know that they have moral and religious obligations which they want 
to keep thcmsch cs free to honor, The parties then choose principles that guarantee the 
integrity of those obligations: they choose principles to regulate their liberties as 
citizens with a view, among others, to preserving those obligations, and the principle of 
equal liberty of conscience (and equal liberty in general) is the only one that can 
possibly be acknowledged.
As Rawls explains, the plausibility of the argument hinges on reflecting on "what 
to take one's religious and moral convictions seriously” means. To take one’s 
convictions seriously means one does not gamble with them, for example, by choosing 
an unequal principle and hoping that one’s religion will be in the majority. To take 
religious and moral convictions seriously also means that one cannot reasonably expect 
others to acquiesce in an inferior liberty of conscience or to accept an inferior liberty as 
the interpreter of their religious duties. The veil of ignorance ensures that I take other’s 
convictions seriously when and on the same reasoning that I take seriously my own.
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If the principle of equal liberty of conscience is the only one that can be 
acknowledged, the constitution must ensure a regime guaranteeing equal freedom of 
thought and belief and of religious practice. This means that the state cannot favor a 
particular religion or morality, and cannot impose any disability on the grounds of a 
particular religious affiliation. In particular, apostasy is not recognized as a legal 
offense, nor is atheism. The notion of an omnipresent “laicist” state is also denied. 
Thus, the neutrality or the secularism of the state—the fact that the state is merely to be 
understood as the association of equal citizens, that in justifying its coercive decisions 
it can only appeal to the protection of equal liberty (primary goods), that the protection 
of equal liberty limits the sorts of reasons the state can invoke—does not imply that 
religious and moral commitments are not important to people. It implies that those 
commitments cannot be the state’s business.
I know of no better way to argue for equal freedom of conscience and state 
neutrality than to maintain that the protection of all individuals and their interests 
must be ensured by placing restrictions on the type of reasons that the state can 
invoke in justifying coercion. That the state can only invoke political, secular 
reasons, i.e., the protection of equal liberty (equal human rights) itself, is 
something that a reasonable person and reasonable members of culture can 
accept, where reasonability is understood in the light of a wide reflective 
equilibrium and members are understood to refer to persons, and not “peoples” 
(nation-states). What else, then, but state and legal neutrality can be demanded 
by the principles of equality and nondiscrimination embedded in human rights 
instruments such as Article 2 of the UDHR; “Everyone is entitled to all the rights
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and freedoms of this Declaration without distinctions of any kind”? This 
vocabulary of universal human rights, which recognizes the same rights for all 
persons equally is, in the end, superior to that of Rawls’s law of peoples.
2 1 9
Conclusion
We can conclude with a brief survey of the arguments discussed in this thesis. 
Overall, I have been concerned to show that the theory of international justice 
and human rights elaborated by John Rawls, while based on his domestic account 
ofjustice as fairness, fails to carry forward the normative significance of the 
domestic account into the international arena and thus cannot adequately support 
a genuinely universal human rights project, Although Rawls's theory' ofjustice 
can, I think, be utilized to contribute to a theory of universal human rights, this 
contribution must depend on a greater commitment to extending the priority and 
principles of justice to all persons and not only to those already living in 
established liberal democracies.
Chapter One presented an introduction to the moral and political concerns 
of social contract theory and served to state the focus of this study. First, the 
essential contours of contractarianism were set out. Then the important elements 
of rights and freedom were shown as central to contractarianism, establishing the 
further connection between social justice and the existence of basic rights and 
freedoms. Next, the emergence of the modern discourse of universal human 
rights was discussed along with various aspects of that discourse in relation to the 
social contract tradition.
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With this basic groundwork thus set out, the thesis moved to consider 
Rawls’s role in the social contract tradition and the intersection of his work with 
the issues of international justice and human rights.
Chapter Two was concerned with the fundamental theses and ideas that 
form the core of Rawls’s moral and political theory ofjustice as fairness. This 
included accounts of the original position, the veil of ignorance, the thin theory 
of the good, the formal constraints, the principles ofjustice, and the sense of 
justice. In the course of investigating the place of rights within Rawls’s theory, 
it was shown that Rawls places a priority on the social primary goods of basic 
rights and liberties. It was argued that Rawls’s views on the rights and liberties 
in A Theory of Justice can be understood in terms of basic human rights which 
arc to be recognized for all persons. 1 then explored the influence of social 
pluralism on Rawls’s later political conception of justice as fairness and 
addressed some communitarian criticisms of Rawls’s theory.
In Chapter Three, the arguments Rawls provides for his description of 
international justice were examined. Essentially, Rawls contends that an 
extension ofjustice as fairness from the domestic to the international level results 
in a picture of international justice that is identical to the traditional law of 
nations framework. I argued that Rawls’s description contains two fundamental 
problems that lead to an unnecessarily weak account of international justice, 
namely, the priority he assigns to the domestic original position over the 
international original position, and the analogy he draws between individuals and 
states. I also discussed the principle of self-determination and how certain
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difficulties with this principle problematize the law of nations scheme endorsed 
by Rawls. Finally, I examined the possibility of extending Rawls’s two 
principles ofjustice to a global scale by eliminating the priority Rawls gives to 
the domestic original position.
Chapter Four built on the analysis of the third chapter through a discussion 
of Rawls’s most recent, and most comprehensive, attempt to account for human 
rights through the extension of justice as fairness into an international “law of 
peoples.” In the case ofthe law of peoples, it was shown that Rawls’s distinction 
between liberal and hierarchical societies leads him to propose a concept of 
human rights that provides for different sets of rights with respect to each type 
of society. I then argued that the more limited set of rights ascribed to persons 
in hierarchical societies undermines the universality of human rights and allows 
for the possibility of unfair inequality between persons in the same societies as 
well as between different societies. The chapter concluded with an appeal to a 
more cosmopolitan ideal of social justice informed by Rawlsian ideal theory, 
according to which all persons are regarded as free and equal in worth and 
dignity, and are considered to possess equally certain fundamental human rights. 
Consequently, I believe that this latter approach would better represent a 
conception of global justice committed to universally promoting and protecting 
human equality and dignity than would the approach taken in Rawls’s law of 
peoples.
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1 Shute and Hurley (1993: 3).
2 For a discussion of the contrast between Rawls’s theory and earlier contract 
theories, see Rapaport (1977).
3 The difference between first-order and second-order theories is discussed in 
Mackie (1977: 15-20).
1 For an argument that moi lity is right-based, see Mackie (1984). For further 
right-based theories see Gewirth (1978), and Dworkin (1978),
5 Kupperman (1983) offers an argument that morality is goal-based.
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7 For a discussion of the state of nature theory, see the first two chapters of 
Nozick (1974).
* There are a number of interesting discussions of the idea of natural rights. See, 
for example, MacDonald (1984); Pennock and Chapman (1981); and Freeden
(1991).
" Sec Nozick (1974; 5). Nozick constructs the second type of justification.
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" See the Republic at 359 in Hamilton and Cairns (1961).
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" For a discussion of side constraints, see Nozick (1974: 30-42).
1J Such thinkers as Hume, Bentham, and Marx criticized the idea of natural rights. 
They argued that “rights" can make sense only if they are regarded as the result 
of political legislation, sovereign rule, and positive law. Positivist legal theory, 
for instance, came to view rights as presuppositions of domestic and international 
law' rather than as imprescriptible natural rights. Criticisms of natural-rights 
theory tend to focus on the claim that such rights are “self-evident,” pointing to 
the epistemological difficulty ofdetermining norms that are deduced in someway 
from an objective, independent moral reality. Another criticism commonly 
leveled at natural-rights theory is that it presupposes a more or less static human 
“essence" as the foundation for such rights. However, it is not certain that 
natural rights must be read in such a strong metaphysical sense. Moreover, the 
critic of natural rights faces the difficult problem of explaining the obvious moral 
deficiencies of many existing legal systems and ofthe rights generated by those 
systems, without having recourse to any source of justification other than already 
established political authority and the systematic injustices possibly embodied
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that certain social practices are included within the notion of natural or human 
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contentious issues in human rights debates.
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namely, those of peace, solidarity, and development, as well as rights to a clean 
and healthy environment. See the useful discussion of how the ideas of positive 
and negative freedoms intersect with the contract tradition in Habermas (1994).
15 See Henkin (1981: 24-25), and Henkin (1981: 259).
16 This point is not mentioned by Henkin but by Lindholm (1992). It is an 
important one, actually appearing in the Preamble of the UDHR. There we read 
that “disregard and contempt for human dignity and rights have resulted in 
barbarous acts that have outraged the conscience of humankind,” and that the rule 
oflaw has become necessary against “tyranny and oppression.” This, of course, 
leaves open the character and theorization of prospective ''tyranny and 
oppression.”
•° See Nelson (1989) and (1990). Nelson unabashedly asserts that human 
rights are nothing more than a “wicked” and “genocidal” imposition of foreign 
values (1990: 347-48).
:! I should clarify, however, that this thesis is not intended to be an examination 
of theories of cultural pluralism and universalism per se. and it will therefore 
engage with the issues surrounding these theories only insofar as they arise in my 
treatment of Rawls’s work in relation to his accounts of international justice and 
human rights. In other words, my purpose here is not to offer a theory or 
justification of human rights in response to the universalism/relativism debate 
but, for the most part, to assume the principles contained in the major instruments 
of international human rights law as my starting point and then examine how well 
Rawls’s remarks on international justice and human rights satisfy those 
principles.
” ICymlicka is addressing the special case of minority cultures, on the verge of 
extinction as cultures, within liberal-democratic multinational states.
2) Nozick (1974: 184-86) looks into the nature of the question of how the benefits 
of social cooperation are to be distributed,
M See also Rawls (1977: 159-60).
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JS For a very different approach to the characterization of basic human goods, see 
Finnis (1980).
16 While I will not pursue the thought here, it is worth noting that the ideas and 
institutions “ found” in the public political culture of contemporary democratic 
societies are there to be drawn upon only because of the influence of classical 
comprehensive liberalism in helping to create that very culture over time. Thus 
Rawls might be accused of developing his “freestanding” political conception of 
justice from the very source he is seeking to distance himself from. At any rate, 
it seems to me that Rawls's political conception ofjustice maintains a strong 
continuity with his earlier conception ofjustice as fairness.
" Nagel (1991: 163, n. 49) has more recently dropped the argu nent of 
epistemological restraint, while still holding to its conclusion.
Rawls (1996: 5) also includes a version of the first principle in Political 
Liberalism which reads: “Each person has an equal claim to a fully adequate 
scheme of equal basic rights and liberties, which scheme is compatible with the 
same scheme for all; and in this scheme the equal political liberties, and only 
those liberties, are to be guaranteed their fair value.”
These correspond to the “highest-order interests” discussed earlier.
' Incidentally, Rawls rejects Dworkin’s characterization ofjustice as fairness as 
right-based for being a too narrow definition of his theory. Rawls explains that 
he prefers to regard his theory as "working up into idealized conceptions certain 
fundamental intuitive ideas such as those of the person as free and equal” rather 
than, apparently, building upon the notion of natural rights. Again, however, I’m 
not certain how a “fundamental intuitive idea” such as that of a “person as free 
and equal” differs From the idea ofthe natural right of equal concern and respect, 
which might also be regarded as a “ fundamental intuitive idea” for those in a 
liberal-democratic society. See Rawls (1985: 236, n. 19),
Sumner (1987: 159) raises this question.
Cited in Barber (1984: 4).
1 borrow this phrase from Jurgen Habermas (1975), who discusses the way 
social orders are legitimated and the “crises” that threaten legitimation when 
incompatible “organizational principles” confront one another.
-u See, for instance, Avineri and de-Shalit (1992).
“ Bobbio (1996: 6) observes: “The evident plurality of religious and moral
perceptions is a historical fact---- It is precisely this pluralism w'hich constitutes
the most powerful argument in favour of some of the most significant human 
rights, such as religious freedom and freedom of thought in general,”
M Gerald Gaus (1996: 201) provides a nice description of the role of individual 
rights that meshes well with the account I have offered: “A system of [publicly] 
justified rights thus allows people to live together in peace and coordinate their 
activities wrhile honoring their commitment to publiclyjustify themselves, despite
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the fact that they regularly, if not typically, disagree on the merits or justice of 
particular actions. . . .  A liberal regime, in which individuals live together 
honoring their commitment to public justification in the face of pervasive moral 
disagreement, must be a regime of rights. A regime of justified rights copes with 
the fact of moral disagreement by decentralizing and dispersing moral authority.” 
A publicly justified scheme of basic individual rights thus allows us to negotiate 
through conflicting comprehensive doctrines, without succumbing to the tyranny 
of the moral dogmatism that would result if a single comprehensive doctrine were 
elevated above all others.
n The “law of nations” referred to by Rawls is the traditional name for 
international law, and is defined as the body oflegal rules commonly considered 
binding on states in their relations with one another, while contemporary 
international law is defined more broadly to encompass the relations not only 
between states but also between states and persons and between persons and 
persons. See August (1995: 2). James Brierly (1963) is Rawls’s one and only 
cited authority for international law and relations (Rawls claims that Brierly’s 
book “is all that we need" for the discussion of international justice),
'* See Wicclair ( 1980).
y> Rawls does comment (1971: 8) that the "conditions for the law of nations may 
require different principles arrived at in a somewhat different way” than those put 
forward in his own discussion.
J Pogge (1994} reiterates this point in his critical essay on Rawls’s recent 
discussion of human rights.
Cf. Nardin (1983: 268): "International justice has come to be identified with 
reforms aimed at securing a more equal distribution of wealth rather than with 
conduct according to the common rules of international society.”
j: I use “ intervene” here somewhat loosely and in a strong sense, since people 
clearly cannot live together in society without interfering to some degree wdth 
each other’s lives.
*' See Previte-Orton (1928),
“ See Hannum (1993).
” See also the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning 
Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the 
Charter of the United Nations (1970): “Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs 
[asserting the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples] shall 
be construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember 
or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign 
and independent States. . .
* On the conventional dicholomization of international relations-domestic 
politics, that is, on how the international and the national are viewed as 
oppositions in international relations theory and practice, see Walker and Ashley 
(1990).
2 2 6
47 See Greenwood (1994), Greenwood points out that another interesting 
development is the increasing role of non-state actors, such as NGOs, in devising 
new methods of “intervention" and promoting the view that it is no longer the 
state which can claim sole responsibility for “the common good.”
48 It is not my intention to offer an answer to this question, which would be 
beyond the scope and purpose of this chapter.
See Horowitz (1997). Consider the difficulties presented by the events in 
Eastern Europe and especially the former Yugoslavia since 1989, As the Soviet 
Bloc disintegrated, the principle of self-determination appeared as an effective 
mechanism to justify the autonomy and freedom of the states recognized hy the 
established inter-state system. Yet this same system was thrown into turmoil as 
the principle of self-determination was invoked by ever-smaller groups of 
“peoples” existing across, within, or beyond recognized territorial borders. As 
the drive toward self-determination became more local, the principle became 
always more exclusive. On whose behalf were “outsiders” supposed to 
intervene? A nice discussion of these matters is presented in Frost (1996), 
chapter 7. For an argument that international justice, contra Rawls, requires 
intervention (given certain legitimate criteria) see Harff (1995).
? An extensive discussion of these and related issues is found in Kymlicka
(1995).
1 See Steiner and Alston (1996: 256 ff.), and Brownlie (1992: 567 ff.). On the 
interdependence of human rights see Sen (1994).
Rawls’s interpretation of human rights has, to my mind, a disturbing resonance 
with the US racial segregation policy dictating “separate but equal” treatment for 
black and while Americans, or the attempts to define apartheid as a “separate 
development” policy necessitated by the “fact" that different “races” (peoples?) 
have different interests, obligations, and standards of well-being. Such policies 
were of course nothing more that thinly disguised attempts to justify historically 
entrenched prejudice and discrimination, and to maintain the privileges held by 
those in power.
Js This might be characterized in terms of Rawls's idea of an overlapping 
consensus, applied to the case of a society of peoples, though he himself does not 
put it that way.
For the notion of well-orderedness, see Rawls (1980: 521 ff.),
35 On these distinctions see, among others, Cassese (1 988); Macpherson (1985); 
and Donnelly (1989).
* Sec Donnelly (1989: 28-47).
See the essays in Peters and Wolper (1995).
38 As Henkin (1981) explains, because international law is made by states 
assuming legal obligations, slates party to international human rights agreements 
can be seen in two different roles: as legislators, making law, and as obligors,
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having obligations to ensure the human rights of their inhabitants. International 
law focuses on the state's obligations; but under that law, once it is in effect, the 
rights are rights of the individual. It is true that there are controversies in the 
literature as to whether the individual has human rights in international law— 
whether rights (and obligations) there work only among states, or also between 
an individual and her state. But there are no disagreements that the individual 
has human rights, under international law, against his or her domestic society.
59 This argument is advanced by Donnelly (1989: 16-19). As he puts it, human 
rights say in effect “treat human beings as free and equal and you'll get free and 
equal human beings,” and then add “here is how you (partly) treat human beings 
as free and equal” (enumeration of the list of human rights, and the command to 
implement them in social .ife).
60 See Pogge (1994), passim.
61 Moellendorf (1996) argues for a similar conception ofthe original position with
respect to Rawls’s later account of international justice. See also Scanlon (1973: 
1066-67). .
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